source: non-gtk/emoglen/anarchism.bg.xml

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r1317@kochinka: ash | 2007-06-05 08:26:10 +0300
anarchism: един абзац.

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4<article lang="bg">
5 <title>Триумфиращият анархизъм</title>
6 <articleinfo>
7 <releaseinfo>$Id: anarchism.bg.xml 1153 2007-06-06 17:38:37Z ash $</releaseinfo>
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12 href="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html"
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15 <!--
16 <meta name="Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from
17 being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
18 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
19 <meta name="Keywords" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
20 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Anarchism triumphant">
21 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Free software and the death of copyright">
22 <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Moglen, Eben">
23 <meta name="DC.Subject" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
24 <meta name="DC.Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
25 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
26 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Valauskas, Edward J.">
27 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Dyson, Esther">
28 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Ghosh, Rishab Aiyer">
29 <meta name="DC.Date" content="1999-08-02">
30 <meta name="DC.Type" content="text">
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34 <meta name="DC.Relation" content="IsPartOf First Monday, vol 4, no. 8"></head><body alink="#ffee99" bgcolor="#ffffff" link="#bb7777" text="#000000" vlink="#7777bb">
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36<blockquote><img src="anarchism_files/logo.gif" alt="First Monday" align="bottom" border="0" height="40" width="256"><br>
37
38</blockquote>
39 -->
40
41
42 <para><ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html#author"><!-- <img src="anarchism_files/moglen.gif" alt="Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright" border="0">--> </ulink></para>
43
44 <blockquote><para>Разпространението на ядрото за операционни системи
45 Линукс насочи вниманието към движението за свободен софтуер. Това есе
46 показва защо свободният софтуер, който далеч не е нищожен участник в
47 пазара на комерсиален софтуер, е важната първа стъпка в премахването
48 на системата на интелектуална собственост.</para></blockquote>
49
50 <section>
51 <title>Софтуерът като собственост: Теоретичният парадокс</title>
52
53 <para><emphasis>Софтуер</emphasis>: никоя друга дума не въплъщава
54 толкова пълно рактическите и социалните ефекти на цифровата революция.
55 Първоначално терминът е бил чисто технически и е означавал частите на
56 една компютърна система, която за разлика от "хардуера" -- направен
57 непроменим от производителя си в електрониката на системата, е можел
58 свободно да бъде променян. Първият софтуер е представлявал начина на
59 включване на кабели и прекъсвачи на външните панели на електронни
60 устройства, но още с появата на езикови средства за промяната на
61 поведението на компютъра, "софтуер" започнал да обозначава предимно
62 изразяванията в повече или по-малко понятех за хората език, който
63 както описвал, така и контролирал поведението на машината<footnote>
64 <para>1. Тази отлика е била само приблизителна в първоначалния
65 контекст. В края на 60-те определена част от основните операции
66 на хардуера са контролирани от програми, които са цифрово кодирани
67 в електрониката на компютърното оборудване, които не могат да
68 бъдат променяни веднъж след като продукцията е излязла от
69 фабриката. Такива символни, но непроменими компоненти, са били
70 известни като "микрокод" на жаргона на индустрията, но стана
71 обичайно те да се наричат "фърмуеър". Изменчивостта, както бе
72 показано от термина "фърмуеър" (# БЕЛЕЖКА ЗА ЗНАЧЕНИЕТО НА
73 КОРЕНИТЕ НА ДУМИТЕ СОФТУЕР, ХАРДУЕР, ФЪРМУЕР),се отнася главно към
74 възможността на потребителите да изменят символите, които
75 определят поведението на машината. Понеже цифровата революция
76 доведе до широката употреба на компютрите от технически
77 некомпетентни лица, повечето от традиционния софтуер -- приложни
78 програми, операционни системи, инструкции за числово управление и
79 т. н. -- е, за повечето от потребителите си, фърмуер. Може да е
80 символен, а не електронен в начина, по който е направен, но те не
81 могат да го променят, дори и да искат, нещо което те често, но
82 безсилно и с негодуванние правят. Това "затвърдяване на софтуера"
83 е основното условие на собственическия подход към законовата
84 организация на цифровото обществео, което е темата на този
85 доклад.</para></footnote>.</para>
86
87 <para>Така е било тогава, а сега е така: технологиите базирани на
88 обработката на информация кодирана в цифров вид сега е социално
89 доминираща в повечето аспекти на човешката култура в "развитите"
90 общества. <footnote><para>2. В рамките на сегашното поколение,
91 самата концепция за социално "равитие" се измества от притежанието
92 на индустрия основана на двигател с вътрешно горене към
93 "пост-индустрия" базирана на цифровите комуникации и свързаните с
94 тях форми на икономическа дейност, основани на
95 "знания".</para></footnote>. Преминаването от аналогово към
96 цифрово представяне -- във видеото, музиката, печатането,
97 телекомуникациите и дори хореографията, религиозните церемонии и
98 сексуалното задоволяване (# religious worship, sexual
99 gratification) -- потенциално превръща всички форми на човешката
100 символна дейност във софтуер, то ест -- променими инструкции за
101 описание и управление на поведението на машините. Чрез
102 концептуално постформиране, характено за западното научно мислене,
103 разделението между хардуера и софтуера се наблюдава в природния
104 или социалния свят и е станал нов начин за изразяване на конфликта
105 между идеите на детерминизъм и свободната воля, природата и
106 възпитанието, или гените и културата. (# Какво е backformation?
107 Аналог на transformation ли? By a conceptual back-formation
108 characteristic of Western scientistic thinking, the division
109 between hardware and software is now being observed in the natural
110 or social world, and has become a new way to express the conflict
111 between ideas of determinism and free will, nature and nurture, or
112 genes and culture.) Нашият "хардуер", който е генетично зададен е
113 нашата природа и ни определя. Нашето възпитание е "софтуера",
114 който задава културното ни прграмиране, което е нашата относителна
115 свобода. И така нататък, за неразумно дърдорещите. (# And so on,
116 for those reckless of blather).<footnote><para>3. Всъщност, едно
117 бързо замисляне ще разкрие, че нашите гени са фърмуеър.
118 Еволюцията направи прехода от аналогово към цифрово още преди
119 периода на първите вкаменелости. Но ние не притежавахме властта
120 за управлявани, преки промени. До завчера. През следващото
121 столетие гените също ще се превърнат в софтуер и въпреки че не
122 разглеждам проблема по нататък в това есе, политиеските
123 последствия на несвободността на софтуера в този контекст са още
124 по-плашещи в сравнение с културните артефакти.</para></footnote>
125 Този "софтуер" се превръща в жизнеспособна метафора за цялата
126 символна активност, която очевидно е разведена (еманципирана) от
127 техническия контекст на произхода на думата, въпреки неудобството,
128 което се появява в технически компетентните, когато термина влиза
129 в устите на хората, като се изпуска концептуалното значение на
130 неговия произход.<footnote><para>4. <emphasis>Виж
131 напр.:</emphasis> J. M. Balkin, 1998. <emphasis>Cultural Software:
132 a Theory of Ideology.</emphasis> New Haven: Yale University
133 Press.</para></footnote></para>
134
135
136 <para>Но широкото възприемане на използването на цифровите
137 технологии от тези, които не разбират принципите на действието им,
138 въпреки, че лицензира (#позволява, licenses) широкото метафорично
139 наемане на "софтуера", всъщност не ни позволява да забравим, че
140 сега компютрите са навсякъде под нашата социална кожа. Движението
141 от аналогово към цифрово е по-важно за структурата на социалните и
142 юридическите отношения отколкото по известното, но по-несигурно
143 преминаване от статс към договор (# from status to contract)
144 <footnote><para>5. <emphasis>Виж</emphasis> Henry Sumner Maine,
145 1861. <emphasis>Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History
146 of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Idea.</emphasis> First
147 edition. London: J. Murray.</para></footnote>. Това са лоши
148 новини за тези правни мислители, които не го разбират, и което е
149 причината толкова много преструване на разбиране така добре да
150 процъфтява. Потенциално обаче, нашето велико преминаване е много
151 добра новина за тези, които могат да превърнат новооткритата земя
152 в своя собственост. Това е и причината текущите "притежатели" на
153 софтуера толкова силно да поддържат и насърчават невежеството на
154 всички останали. За тяхно нещастие -- по причини известни на
155 правните теоретици, които все още не са разбрали как да прилагат
156 традиционната си логика в тази сфера -- трикът няма да се
157 задейства. Това есе обяснява защо<footnote><para>6. По принцип не
158 харесвам вмъкването на автобиография в изследователската дейност.
159 Но понеже това тук е мое тъжно задължение, а и голямо удоволствие
160 да оспоря квалифицираността или <emphasis>bona fide-то</emphasis>
161 на кажи-речи всеки, трябва да си позволя преценка на себе си. За
162 първи път бях изложен на занаята (#вещината - craft) на
163 компютърното програмиране през 1971г. Започнах да получавам
164 надник като комерсиален програмист през 1973г. -- на възраст от 13
165 г. и продълавах така в разнообразие от компютърни услуги,
166 инжинерство и многонационални технологически предрпиятия
167 (#enerprises) до 1985г. През 1975 спомогнах за написването на
168 една от първите системи за електронна поща в САЩ. От 1979г. бях
169 зает с проучването и разработката на висши компютърни езици за
170 програмиране в Ай Би Ем. Тези дейности направиха икономически
171 възможно за мен да изучавам исторически науки и юридическото
172 лукавство. Заплатата ми бе достатъчна да заплати таксите за
173 обучението ми, но не - за да изпреваря аргуметна, който
174 икономоджетата ще направят по-надолу - защото програмите ми са
175 били интелектуалната собственост на работодателя ми, а по-скоро,
176 защото караха хардуера, който работодателят ми продаваше, да
177 работи по-добре. Повечето от това, което написах бе на практика
178 свободен софтуер. Въпреки, че след това имах някакъв незначителен
179 технически принос към самото движение свободе софтуер, описано в
180 този документ, основните ми дейности от негово име бяха
181 юридически. В последните пед години служих (естествено без да ми
182 се плаща) като главния юристконсулт на Фондацията за свободен
183 софтуер.</para></footnote>.</para>
184
185 <para>Трябва да започнем като разгледаме техническата същност на
186 подобните устройства, които ни заобикалят в ерата на
187 <quote>софтуера в културата</quote>. CD плеърът е добър пример.
188 Основният мъ вход е поток от битове, който се чете от оптичен диск
189 за съхрание на дании. Този поток описва музиката във вид на
190 замервания, които се правят 44000 пъти в секунда на честотата и
191 амплитудата на два аудио канала. Основният изход на плеъра е
192 аналоговия аудио изход. <footnote><para>7. Естествено - плеърът
193 има вторични входове и изходи на контролни канали - бутоните и
194 инфрачервения датчик за дистанционното управление са входове, а
195 дисплея за времето и поредната песен са изходи.</para></footnote>.
196 Както всичко друго в цифровия свят, музиката както бива видяна от
197 CD плеъра, е просто информация във вид на исла - един популярен
198 запис на Деветата симфония на Бетовен, записана от Артуро
199 Тосканини и Симфоничния оркестър и хор на Ен Би Си е (като
200 пропуснем няколко незначителни цифри) 1276749873424, а особенно
201 перверзният последен запис на Глен Гуд на Вариациите на Голдбърг е
202 също доста съкратен вид) 767459083268.</para>
203
204 <para>Колкото и да е странно, тези две числа са <quote>покрити от
205 авторското право</quote>. Това хипотетично (би трябвало/разбираш
206 ли/supposedly FIXME) да означава, че не можете да притежавате
207 друго копие на тези числа след като веднъж са въплатени в някаква
208 физическа форма, освен ако не сте ги лицензирали. А и не можете
209 да преобразувате 767459083268 в 2347895697 за вашите приятели (за
210 да поправите нелепия избор на Гуд за темпото), без да създадете
211 <quote>творба основана на друга</quote> (derivative
212 work FIXME), за което е необходим лиценз.</para>
213
214 <para>По същото време (FIXME At the same time) пообен оптичен диск
215 за съхранение на данни съдържа друго число, нека това да е
216 7537489532. Това е алгоритъмът за линейно програмиране на големи
217 системи с множество ограничения, който е полезен например, когато
218 искате да постигнете оптимално ползване на оборотните запаси
219 (FIXNE rolling stock) при управлението на товарна железница. Това
220 число САЩ) е <quote>патентовано</quote>, което означава, че не
221 можете да получите числото 7537489532 за себе си или по някакъв
222 друг начин да <quote>упражнявате занаята</quote> (FIXME "practice
223 the art") на патента що се отнася до решаването на проблеми в
224 областта на линейното програмиране, независимо как сте достигнали
225 до идеята, дори и сами да сте се сетили, освен ако нямате лиценз
226 от притежателя на числото.</para>
227
228 <para>А идва и 9892454959483. Това е изходния код на програмата
229 Word на Майкрософт. Освен че <quote>подналежи на авторско
230 право</quote>, числото е й търговска тайна, което означава, че ако
231 го вземете от Майкрософт и го дадете на някой друг, можете да
232 бъдете наказан.</para>
233
234 <para>И най-накрая - ето го и числото 588832161316. То не прави
235 нищо и е просто 767354 на квадрат. Доколкото ми е известно, то не
236 е притежавано по горнит параграфи от никой. Поне засега.</para>
237
238 <para>В този момент трябва да се справим с първото възражение към
239 наученото. То идва от същество, което се нарича доридИС. Този
240 дроид е с префинен ум и изтънчен живот. На него много му се
241 харесват изтънчените вечери на академичните и министерси
242 конференции за ТРИПС (FIXME - няма ли каламбур тука), да не
243 говорим за привилигеията често да се появява на MSNBC (FIXME - има
244 ли някой конкретно предвид или се подиграва на МС). На него му се
245 иска да знам, че допускам грешката да бъркам въплащението на
246 интелектуалната собственост със самата нея. Не числото е
247 патентовано, глупча, само алгоритъма на Камаркар. Числото
248 <emphasis>може</emphasis> може да бъде покрито от авторското
249 право, понеже правото покрива изразните качества на конкретно,
250 осезаемо въплащение на идея което въплащение някои функционални
251 качества могат да бъдат мистериозно слети, стига да не са
252 прекалено слети) (FIXME- какво име предвид), но не покрива
253 алгортъма. А числото не е подлежало на патентоване, само
254 <quote>преподаването</quote> му доколкото се отнася до това
255 железниците да работят по разписание. И числото, което
256 представлява търговската тайна на Майкрософт Уърд можело да бъде
257 търговска тайна, но ако сте го открили самостоятелно (като
258 например извършите аритметическа обработка на други числа издадени
259 от Майкрософт, което е познато като <quote>реверсивно
260 инжинерство</quote>), нама да сте бъдели наказани, поне ако
261 живеете в няои части на Съединените щати.</para>
262
263 <para>Този дроид, подобна на други нему, често е прав. Условието
264 да си дроид е да знаеш всичко за нещо и нищо за всичко останало.
265 Със своевременната си и спешна намеса дроидът установи, за
266 текущата система за интелектуална собственот съдържа множество
267 заплетени и умно намислени черти. Сложнотиите се комбинират,
268 което позволява на професорите да са ерудираним на конгресмените
269 да бъдат спонсорирани за кампаниите си, на адвокаите да носят
270 хубави костюми и мокасини с пискюли (FIXME - tassel loafer,
271 префърцунени налъми с пискюлче), а на Мърдок да е богат.
272 Сложнотиите са се развили в ерата на индустриалното
273 разпространение на информация, когато информацията е била записана
274 в аналогова форма върху физически обекти, които са стрували доста,
275 за да бъдат направени, преместени и продадени. Когато бъдат
276 приложени към цифровата информация, която безпроблемно се движи
277 през мрежата и е с нулеви маргинални разходи за копие, всичко
278 продължава да си работи, най-вече докато не си извадита главата от
279 пясъка (не си отворите затворените очи).</para>
280
281 <para>Но не за това спорих. Исках да посоча нещо друго: нашият
282 свят се състои все повече и повече от не друго, а големи числа
283 (още известни като потоци от битове), и освен това - по причини,
284 които нямат нищо общо с появяващите се свойства на самите числа
285 (FIXME - emergent properties, сигурно от някакъв учебник по
286 физика) - юридическата система в момента се е заела да се отнася
287 към подобни числа по радикално различен начин. Никой не е в
288 състояние да каже като погледне число, което е дълго 100 милиона
289 цифри, дали същото това число е подложено на патентна,
290 авторскоправна защита или такава на търговската тайна, и дали в
291 действителност е <quote>притежавано</quote> въобще от някой. Така
292 че законовата система, която имаме - както и да сме благословени с
293 нейните последици, ако и да сме преподватели по авторско право,
294 конгресмени, огушили се с Гучи потребители (FIXME - gulcher - дали
295 е просто набуквяване) е заставена да третира неразличими неща по
296 различни начини.</para>
297
298 <para>Now, in my role as a legal historian concerned with the secular
299 (that is, very long term) development of legal thought, I claim that
300 legal regimes based on sharp but unpredictable distinctions among
301 similar objects are radically unstable. They fall apart over time
302 because every instance of the rules' application is an invitation to
303 at least one side to claim that instead of fitting in ideal category A
304 the particular object in dispute should be deemed to fit instead in
305 category B, where the rules will be more favorable to the party making
306 the claim. This game - about whether a typewriter should be deemed a
307 musical instrument for purposes of railway rate regulation, or whether
308 a steam shovel is a motor vehicle - is the frequent stuff of legal
309 ingenuity. But when the conventionally-approved legal categories
310 require judges to distinguish among the identical, the game is
311 infinitely lengthy, infinitely costly, and almost infinitely offensive
312 to the unbiased bystander <footnote><para>8. This is not an insight
313 unique to our present enterprise. A closely-related idea forms one of
314 the most important principles in the history of Anglo-American law,
315 perfectly put by Toby Milsom in the following terms:</para>
316 <blockquote><para>The life of the common law has been in the abuse of
317 its elementary ideas. If the rules of property give what now seems an
318 unjust answer, try obligation; and equity has proved that from the
319 materials of obligation you can counterfeit the phenomena of
320 property. If the rules of contract give what now seems an unjust
321 answer, try tort. ... If the rules of one tort, say deceit, give what
322 now seems an unjust answer, try another, try negligence. And so the
323 legal world goes round.</para></blockquote><para>S.F.C. Milsom,
324 1981. <emphasis>Historical Foundations of the Common Law.</emphasis>
325 Second edition. London: Butterworths, p. 6.</para> </footnote>.</para>
326
327 <para>Така че станите могат да харчат колкото си искат пари за
328 законодателите и съдиите, които могат да си позволят, които за
329 новите <quote>собственици</quote> на цифровия свят са доста много,
330 но правилата, които ще си купят, в края на краищата, няма да
331 работят. Рано или късно парадигмите ще се срутят. Естествено,
332 ако по-късно означава след две поколения, разпределението на
333 богатството и властта, които сe утвърдят в това време, може да не
334 са обратими по никакъв по-малко драстичен начин от
335 <emphasis>bellum servile</emphasis> (FIXME - революция?) от
336 разплутите телезриели срещу медийните магнати. Така че да знеем,
337 че историята не е на страната на Бил Гейтс не е достатъчно. Ние
338 предсказваме бъдещето по много ограничен начин - ние знаем, че
339 съществуващиете правила, които все още пламтят с шаблонните
340 вярвания, които твърдо са изброени като подкрепящи ги, вече са
341 безсислени. Страните свободно ще ги употребяват и ще
342 злоупотребяват с тях докато масата с <quote>порядъчно</quote>
343 консервативно мноне не призне смъртта им - с несигурен резултат.
344 Но реалистичната наука следва вече да обръща вниманието си към
345 ясната нужда за нов път на мисълта.</para>
346
347 <para>When we reach this point in the argument, we find ourselves
348 contending with the other primary protagonist of educated idiocy: the
349 econodwarf. Like the IPdroid, the econodwarf is a species of hedgehog,
350 <footnote><para>9. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Isaiah Berlin,
351 1953. <emphasis>The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View
352 of History.</emphasis> New York: Simon and Schuster.</para>
353 </footnote> but where the droid is committed to logic over experience,
354 the econodwarf specializes in an energetic and well-focused but
355 entirely erroneous view of human nature. According to the econodwarf's
356 vision, each human being is an individual possessing "incentives,"
357 which can be retrospectively unearthed by imagining the state of the
358 bank account at various times. So in this instance the econodwarf
359 feels compelled to object that without the rules I am lampooning,
360 there would be no incentive to create the things the rules treat as
361 property: without the ability to exclude others from music there would
362 be no music, because no one could be sure of getting paid for creating
363 it.</para>
364
365 <para>Music is not really our subject; the software I am considering
366 at the moment is the old kind: computer programs. But as he is
367 determined to deal at least cursorily with the subject, and because,
368 as we have seen, it is no longer really possible to distinguish
369 computer programs from music performances, a word or two should be
370 said. At least we can have the satisfaction of indulging in an
371 argument <emphasis>ad pygmeam</emphasis>. When the econodwarf grows
372 rich, in my experience, he attends the opera. But no matter how often
373 he hears <emphasis>Don Giovanni</emphasis> it never occurs to him that
374 Mozart's fate should, on his logic, have entirely discouraged
375 Beethoven, or that we have <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis> even
376 though Mozart knew very well he wouldn't be paid. In fact,
377 <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis>, <emphasis>St. Matthew's
378 Passion</emphasis>, and the motets of the wife-murderer Carlo Gesualdo
379 are all part of the centuries-long tradition of free software, in the
380 more general sense, which the econodwarf never quite
381 acknowledges.</para> <!--<center><img
382 src="anarchism_files/mog1.gif"></center> --> <para> The dwarf's basic
383 problem is that "incentives" is merely a metaphor, and as a metaphor
384 to describe human creative activity it's pretty crummy. I have said
385 this before, <footnote> <para>10. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
386 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/nospeech.html">The
387 Virtual Scholar and Network Liberation.</ulink></para> </footnote> but
388 the better metaphor arose on the day Michael Faraday first noticed
389 what happened when he wrapped a coil of wire around a magnet and spun
390 the magnet. Current flows in such a wire, but we don't ask what the
391 incentive is for the electrons to leave home. We say that the current
392 results from an emergent property of the system, which we call
393 induction. The question we ask is "what's the resistance of the wire?"
394 So Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law says that if you
395 wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
396 planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
397 connected human minds that they create things for one another's
398 pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. The
399 only question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network?
400 Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the
401 resistance of the network is directly proportional to the field
402 strength of the "intellectual property" system. So the right answer to
403 the econodwarf is, resist the resistance.</para>
404
405 <para>Естествено, всичко това звучи много добре на теория.
406 „Съпротивлявай се на съпротивата“ звучи добре, но ще се окажем
407 пред сериозен проблем, каквато и да е теорията, ако открием, че не
408 се произвежда достатъчно софтуерна стока, ако не позволяваме на
409 хората да я притежават. Но джуджетатат и дроидите са формалисти
410 от различно естество, предимството на реализма е, че ако започнеш
411 с фактитв, те винаги са на твоя страна. Оказва се, че да се
412 отнасяме към софтуера като съм собственост, води до правенето на
413 лош софтуер.</para>
414
415 </section>
416 <section>
417 <title>II. Software as Property: The Practical Problem</title>
418
419 <para>In order to understand why turning software into property
420 produces bad software, we need an introduction to the history of the
421 art. In fact, we'd better start with the word "art" itself. The
422 programming of computers combines determinate reasoning with literary
423 invention.</para>
424
425 <para>At first glance, to be sure, source code appears to be a
426 non-literary form of composition <footnote><para>11. Some basic
427 vocabulary is essential. Digital computers actually execute numerical
428 instructions: bitstrings that contain information in the "native"
429 language created by the machine's designers. This is usually referred
430 to as "machine language." The machine languages of hardware are
431 designed for speed of execution at the hardware level, and are not
432 suitable for direct use by human beings. So among the central
433 components of a computer system are "programming languages," which
434 translate expressions convenient for humans into machine language. The
435 most common and relevant, but by no means the only, form of computer
436 language is a "compiler." The compiler performs static translation, so
437 that a file containing human-readable instructions, known as "source
438 code" results in the generation of one or more files of executable
439 machine language, known as "object code."</para> </footnote>. The
440 primary desideratum in a computer program is that it works, that is to
441 say, performs according to specifications formally describing its
442 outputs in terms of its inputs. At this level of generality, the
443 functional content of programs is all that can be seen.</para>
444
445 <para>But working computer programs exist as parts of computer
446 systems, which are interacting collections of hardware, software, and
447 human beings. The human components of a computer system include not
448 only the users, but also the (potentially different) persons who
449 maintain and improve the system. Source code not only communicates
450 with the computer that executes the program, through the intermediary
451 of the compiler that produces machine-language object code, but also
452 with other programmers.</para>
453
454 <para>The function of source code in relation to other human beings is
455 not widely grasped by non-programmers, who tend to think of computer
456 programs as incomprehensible. They would be surprised to learn that
457 the bulk of information contained in most programs is, from the point
458 of view of the compiler or other language processor, "comment," that
459 is, non-functional material. The comments, of course, are addressed to
460 others who may need to fix a problem or to alter or enhance the
461 program's operation. In most programming languages, far more space is
462 spent in telling people what the program does than in telling the
463 computer how to do it.</para>
464
465 <para>The design of programming languages has always proceeded under
466 the dual requirements of complete specification for machine execution
467 and informative description for human readers. One might identify
468 three basic strategies in language design for approaching this dual
469 purpose. The first, pursued initially with respect to the design of
470 languages specific to particular hardware products and collectively
471 known as "assemblers," essentially separated the human- and
472 machine-communication portions of the program. Assembler instructions
473 are very close relatives of machine-language instructions: in general,
474 one line of an assembler program corresponds to one instruction in the
475 native language of the machine. The programmer controls machine
476 operation at the most specific possible level, and (if
477 well-disciplined) engages in running commentary alongside the machine
478 instructions, pausing every few hundred instructions to create "block
479 comments," which provide a summary of the strategy of the program, or
480 document the major data structures the program manipulates.</para>
481
482 <para>A second approach, characteristically depicted by the language
483 COBOL (which stood for "Common Business-Oriented Language"), was to
484 make the program itself look like a set of natural language
485 directions, written in a crabbed but theoretically human-readable
486 style. A line of COBOL code might say, for example "MULTIPLY PRICE
487 TIMES QUANTITY GIVING EXPANSION." At first, when the Pentagon and
488 industry experts began the joint design of COBOL in the early 1960's,
489 this seemed a promising approach. COBOL programs appeared largely
490 self-documenting, allowing both the development of work teams able to
491 collaborate on the creation of large programs, and the training of
492 programmers who, while specialized workers, would not need to
493 understand the machine as intimately as assembler programs had to. But
494 the level of generality at which such programs documented themselves
495 was wrongly selected. A more formulaic and compressed expression of
496 operational detail "expansion = price x quantity," for example, was
497 better suited even to business and financial applications where the
498 readers and writers of programs were accustomed to mathematical
499 expression, while the processes of describing both data structures and
500 the larger operational context of the program were not rendered
501 unnecessary by the wordiness of the language in which the details of
502 execution were specified.</para>
503
504 <para>Accordingly, language designers by the late 1960s began
505 experimenting with forms of expression in which the blending of
506 operational details and non-functional information necessary for
507 modification or repair was more subtle. Some designers chose the path
508 of highly symbolic and compressed languages, in which the programmer
509 manipulated data abstractly, so that "A x B" might mean the
510 multiplication of two integers, two complex numbers, two vast arrays,
511 or any other data type capable of some process called
512 "multiplication," to be undertaken by the computer on the basis of the
513 context for the variables "A" and "B" at the moment of execution
514 <footnote> <para>12. This, I should say, was the path that most of my
515 research and development followed, largely in connection with a
516 language called APL ("A Programming Language") and its successors. It
517 was not, however, the ultimately-dominant approach, for reasons that
518 will be suggested below.</para> </footnote> . Because this approach
519 resulted in extremely concise programs, it was thought, the problem of
520 making code comprehensible to those who would later seek to modify or
521 repair it was simplified. By hiding the technical detail of computer
522 operation and emphasizing the algorithm, languages could be devised
523 that were better than English or other natural languages for the
524 expression of stepwise processes. Commentary would be not only
525 unnecessary but distracting, just as the metaphors used to convey
526 mathematical concepts in English do more to confuse than to
527 enlighten.</para>
528
529 <section>
530 <title>How We Created the Microbrain Mess</title>
531
532 <para>Thus the history of programming languages directly reflected the
533 need to find forms of human-machine communication that were also
534 effective in conveying complex ideas to human readers. "Expressivity"
535 became a property of programming languages, not because it facilitated
536 computation, but because it facilitated the collaborative creation and
537 maintenance of increasingly complex software systems.</para>
538
539 <para>At first impression, this seems to justify the application of
540 traditional copyright thinking to the resulting works. Though
541 substantially involving "functional" elements, computer programs
542 contained "expressive" features of paramount importance. Copyright
543 doctrine recognized the merger of function and expression as
544 characteristic of many kinds of copyrighted works. "Source code,"
545 containing both the machine instructions necessary for functional
546 operation and the expressive "commentary" intended for human readers,
547 was an appropriate candidate for copyright treatment.</para>
548
549 <para>True, so long as it is understood that the expressive component
550 of software was present solely in order to facilitate the making of
551 "derivative works." Were it not for the intention to facilitate
552 alteration, the expressive elements of programs would be entirely
553 supererogatory, and source code would be no more copyrightable than
554 object code, the output of the language processor, purged of all but
555 the program's functional characteristics.</para>
556
557 <para>The state of the computer industry throughout the 1960's and
558 1970's, when the grundnorms of sophisticated computer programming were
559 established, concealed the tension implicit in this situation. In that
560 period, hardware was expensive. Computers were increasingly large and
561 complex collections of machines, and the business of designing and
562 building such an array of machines for general use was dominated, not
563 to say monopolized, by one firm. IBM gave away its software. To be
564 sure, it owned the programs its employees wrote, and it copyrighted
565 the source code. But it also distributed the programs - including the
566 source code - to its customers at no additional charge, and encouraged
567 them to make and share improvements or adaptations of the programs
568 thus distributed. For a dominant hardware manufacturer, this strategy
569 made sense: better programs sold more computers, which is where the
570 profitability of the business rested.</para>
571
572 <para>Computers, in this period, tended to aggregate within particular
573 organizations, but not to communicate broadly with one another. The
574 software needed to operate was distributed not through a network, but
575 on spools of magnetic tape. This distribution system tended to
576 centralize software development, so that while IBM customers were free
577 to make modifications and improvements to programs, those
578 modifications were shared in the first instance with IBM, which then
579 considered whether and in what way to incorporate those changes in the
580 centrally-developed and distributed version of the software. Thus in
581 two important senses the best computer software in the world was free:
582 it cost nothing to acquire, and the terms on which it was furnished
583 both allowed and encouraged experimentation, change, and improvement
584 <footnote><para>13. This description elides some details. By the
585 mid-1970's IBM had acquired meaningful competition in the mainframe
586 computer business, while the large-scale antitrust action brought
587 against it by the U.S. government prompted the decision to "unbundle,"
588 or charge separately, for software. In this less important sense,
589 software ceased to be free. But - without entering into the now-dead
590 but once-heated controversy over IBM's software pricing policies - the
591 unbundling revolution had less effect on the social practices of
592 software manufacture than might be supposed. As a fellow responsible
593 for technical improvement of one programming language product at IBM
594 from 1979 to 1984, for example, I was able to treat the product as
595 "almost free," that is, to discuss with users the changes they had
596 proposed or made in the programs, and to engage with them in
597 cooperative development of the product for the benefit of all
598 users.</para> </footnote>. That the software in question was IBM's
599 property under prevailing copyright law certainly established some
600 theoretical limits on users' ability to distribute their improvements
601 or adaptations to others, but in practice mainframe software was
602 cooperatively developed by the dominant hardware manufacturer and its
603 technically-sophisticated users, employing the manufacturer's
604 distribution resources to propagate the resulting improvements through
605 the user community. The right to exclude others, one of the most
606 important "sticks in the bundle" of property rights (in an image
607 beloved of the United States Supreme Court), was practically
608 unimportant, or even undesirable, at the heart of the software
609 business <footnote> <para>14. This description is highly compressed,
610 and will seem both overly simplified and unduly rosy to those who also
611 worked in the industry during this period of its
612 development. Copyright protection of computer software was a
613 controversial subject in the 1970's, leading to the famous CONTU
614 commission and its mildly pro-copyright recommendations of 1979. And
615 IBM seemed far less cooperative to its users at the time than this
616 sketch makes out. But the most important element is the contrast with
617 the world created by the PC, the Internet, and the dominance of
618 Microsoft, with the resulting impetus for the free software movement,
619 and I am here concentrating on the features that express that
620 contrast.</para></footnote>.</para>
621
622 <para>After 1980, everything was different. The world of mainframe
623 hardware gave way within ten years to the world of the commodity PC.
624 And, as a contingency of the industry's development, the single most
625 important element of the software running on that commodity PC, the
626 operating system, became the sole significant product of a company
627 that made no hardware. High-quality basic software ceased to be part
628 of the product-differentiation strategy of hardware
629 manufacturers. Instead, a firm with an overwhelming share of the
630 market, and with the near-monopolist's ordinary absence of interest in
631 fostering diversity, set the practices of the software industry. In
632 such a context, the right to exclude others from participation in the
633 product's formation became profoundly important. Microsoft's power in
634 the market rested entirely on its ownership of the Windows source
635 code.</para>
636
637 <para>To Microsoft, others' making of "derivative works," otherwise
638 known as repairs and improvements, threatened the central asset of the
639 business. Indeed, as subsequent judicial proceedings have tended to
640 establish, Microsoft's strategy as a business was to find innovative
641 ideas elsewhere in the software marketplace, buy them up and either
642 suppress them or incorporate them in its proprietary product. The
643 maintenance of control over the basic operation of computers
644 manufactured, sold, possessed, and used by others represented profound
645 and profitable leverage over the development of the culture <footnote>
646 <para>15. I discuss the importance of PC software in this context, the
647 evolution of "the market for eyeballs" and "the sponsored life" in
648 other chapters of my forthcoming book, <emphasis>The Invisible
649 Barbecue</emphasis>, of which this essay forms a part.</para>
650 </footnote>.; the right to exclude returned to center stage in the
651 concept of software as property.</para>
652
653 <para>The result, so far as the quality of software was concerned, was
654 disastrous. The monopoly was a wealthy and powerful corporation that
655 employed a large number of programmers, but it could not possibly
656 afford the number of testers, designers, and developers required to
657 produce flexible, robust and technically-innovative software
658 appropriate to the vast array of conditions under which increasingly
659 ubiquitous personal computers operated. Its fundamental marketing
660 strategy involved designing its product for the least
661 technically-sophisticated users, and using "fear, uncertainty, and
662 doubt" (known within Microsoft as "FUD") to drive sophisticated users
663 away from potential competitors, whose long-term survivability in the
664 face of Microsoft's market power was always in question.</para>
665
666 <para>Without the constant interaction between users able to repair
667 and improve and the operating system's manufacturer, the inevitable
668 deterioration of quality could not be arrested. But because the
669 personal computer revolution expanded the number of users
670 exponentially, almost everyone who came in contact with the resulting
671 systems had nothing against which to compare them. Unaware of the
672 standards of stability, reliability, maintainability and effectiveness
673 that had previously been established in the mainframe world, users of
674 personal computers could hardly be expected to understand how badly,
675 in relative terms, the monopoly's software functioned. As the power
676 and capacity of personal computers expanded rapidly, the defects of
677 the software were rendered less obvious amidst the general increase of
678 productivity. Ordinary users, more than half afraid of the technology
679 they almost completely did not understand, actually welcomed the
680 defectiveness of the software. In an economy undergoing mysterious
681 transformations, with the concomitant destabilization of millions of
682 careers, it was tranquilizing, in a perverse way, that no personal
683 computer seemed to be able to run for more than a few consecutive
684 hours without crashing. Although it was frustrating to lose work in
685 progress each time an unnecessary failure occurred, the evident
686 fallibility of computers was intrinsically reassuring <footnote>
687 <para>16. This same pattern of ambivalence, in which bad programming
688 leading to widespread instability in the new technology is
689 simultaneously frightening and reassuring to technical incompetents,
690 can be seen also in the primarily-American phenomenon of Y2K
691 hysteria.</para> </footnote> .</para>
692
693 <para>None of this was necessary. The low quality of personal computer
694 software could have been reversed by including users directly in the
695 inherently evolutionary process of software design and implementation.
696 A Lamarckian mode, in which improvements could be made anywhere, by
697 anyone, and inherited by everyone else, would have wiped out the
698 deficit, restoring to the world of the PC the stability and
699 reliability of the software made in the quasi-propertarian environment
700 of the mainframe era. But the Microsoft business model precluded
701 Lamarckian inheritance of software improvements. Copyright doctrine,
702 in general and as it applies to software in particular, biases the
703 world towards creationism; in this instance, the problem is that BillG
704 the Creator was far from infallible, and in fact he wasn't even
705 trying.</para> <!--<center><img src="anarchism_files/mog2.gif"
706 hspace="0" vspace="0"></center>--> <para>To make the irony more
707 severe, the growth of the network rendered the non-propertarian
708 alternative even more practical. What scholarly and popular writing
709 alike denominate as a thing ("the Internet") is actually the name of a
710 social condition: the fact that everyone in the network society is
711 connected directly, without intermediation, to everyone else
712 <footnote> <para>17. The critical implications of this simple
713 observation about our metaphors are worked out in "How Not to Think
714 about 'The Internet'," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
715 forthcoming.</para> </footnote>. The global interconnection of
716 networks eliminated the bottleneck that had required a centralized
717 software manufacturer to rationalize and distribute the outcome of
718 individual innovation in the era of the mainframe.</para>
719
720 <para>And so, in one of history's little ironies, the global triumph
721 of bad software in the age of the PC was reversed by a surprising
722 combination of forces: the social transformation initiated by the
723 network, a long-discarded European theory of political economy, and a
724 small band of programmers throughout the world mobilized by a single
725 simple idea.</para>
726
727 </section>
728 <section>
729
730 <title>Software Wants to Be Free; or, How We Stopped Worrying and
731 Learned to Love the Bomb</title>
732
733 <para>Long before the network of networks was a practical reality,
734 even before it was an aspiration, there was a desire for computers to
735 operate on the basis of software freely available to everyone. This
736 began as a reaction against propertarian software in the mainframe
737 era, and requires another brief historical digression.</para>
738
739 <para>Even though IBM was the largest seller of general purpose
740 computers in the mainframe era, it was not the largest designer and
741 builder of such hardware. The telephone monopoly, American Telephone
742 &amp; Telegraph, was in fact larger than IBM, but it consumed its
743 products internally. And at the famous Bell Labs research arm of the
744 telephone monopoly, in the late 1960's, the developments in computer
745 languages previously described gave birth to an operating system
746 called Unix.</para>
747
748 <para>The idea of Unix was to create a single, scalable operating
749 system to exist on all the computers, from small to large, that the
750 telephone monopoly made for itself. To achieve this goal meant writing
751 an operating system not in machine language, nor in an assembler whose
752 linguistic form was integral to a particular hardware design, but in a
753 more expressive and generalized language. The one chosen was also a
754 Bell Labs invention, called "C" <footnote> <para>18. Technical readers
755 will again observe that this compresses developments occurring from
756 1969 through 1973.</para> </footnote>. The C language became common,
757 even dominant, for many kinds of programming tasks, and by the late
758 1970's the Unix operating system written in that language had been
759 transferred (or "ported," in professional jargon) to computers made by
760 many manufacturers and of many designs.</para>
761
762 <para>AT&amp;T distributed Unix widely, and because of the very design
763 of the operating system, it had to make that distribution in C source
764 code. But AT&amp;T retained ownership of the source code and
765 compelled users to purchase licenses that prohibited redistribution
766 and the making of derivative works. Large computing centers, whether
767 industrial or academic, could afford to purchase such licenses, but
768 individuals could not, while the license restrictions prevented the
769 community of programmers who used Unix from improving it in an
770 evolutionary rather than episodic fashion. And as programmers
771 throughout the world began to aspire to and even expect a personal
772 computer revolution, the "unfree" status of Unix became a source of
773 concern.</para>
774
775 <para>Between 1981 and 1984, one man envisioned a crusade to change
776 the situation. Richard M. Stallman, then an employee of MIT's
777 Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, conceived the project of
778 independent, collaborative redesign and implementation of an operating
779 system that would be true free software. In Stallman's phrase, free
780 software would be a matter of freedom, not of price. Anyone could
781 freely modify and redistribute such software, or sell it, subject only
782 to the restriction that he not try to reduce the rights of others to
783 whom he passed it along. In this way free software could become a
784 self-organizing project, in which no innovation would be lost through
785 proprietary exercises of rights. The system, Stallman decided, would
786 be called GNU, which stood (in an initial example of a taste for
787 recursive acronyms that has characterized free software ever since),
788 for "GNU's Not Unix." Despite misgivings about the fundamental design
789 of Unix, as well as its terms of distribution, GNU was intended to
790 benefit from the wide if unfree source distribution of Unix. Stallman
791 began Project GNU by writing components of the eventual system that
792 were also designed to work without modification on existing Unix
793 systems. Development of the GNU tools could thus proceed directly in
794 the environment of university and other advanced computing centers
795 around the world.</para>
796
797 <para>The scale of such a project was immense. Somehow, volunteer
798 programmers had to be found, organized, and set to work building all
799 the tools that would be necessary for the ultimate construction.
800 Stallman himself was the primary author of several fundamental tools.
801 Others were contributed by small or large teams of programmers
802 elsewhere, and assigned to Stallman's project or distributed
803 directly. A few locations around the developing network became
804 archives for the source code of these GNU components, and throughout
805 the 1980's the GNU tools gained recognition and acceptance by Unix
806 users throughout the world. The stability, reliability, and
807 maintainability of the GNU tools became a by-word, while Stallman's
808 profound abilities as a designer continued to outpace, and provide
809 goals for, the evolving process. The award to Stallman of a MacArthur
810 Fellowship in 1990 was an appropriate recognition of his conceptual
811 and technical innovations and their social consequences.</para>
812
813 <para>Project GNU, and the Free Software Foundation to which it gave
814 birth in 1985, were not the only source of free software
815 ideas. Several forms of copyright license designed to foster free or
816 partially free software began to develop in the academic community,
817 mostly around the Unix environment. The University of California at
818 Berkeley began the design and implementation of another version of
819 Unix for free distribution in the academic community. BSD Unix, as it
820 came to be known, also treated AT&amp;T's Unix as a design
821 standard. The code was broadly released and constituted a reservoir of
822 tools and techniques, but its license terms limited the range of its
823 application, while the elimination of hardware-specific proprietary
824 code from the distribution meant that no one could actually build a
825 working operating system for any particular computer from BSD. Other
826 university-based work also eventuated in quasi-free software; the
827 graphical user interface (or GUI) for Unix systems called X Windows,
828 for example, was created at MIT and distributed with source code on
829 terms permitting free modification. And in 1989-1990, an undergraduate
830 computer science student at the University of Helsinki, Linus
831 Torvalds, began the project that completed the circuit and fully
832 energized the free software vision.</para>
833
834 <para>What Torvalds did was to begin adapting a computer science
835 teaching tool for real life use. Andrew Tannenbaum's MINIX kernel
836 <footnote> <para>19. Operating systems, even Windows (which hides the
837 fact from its users as thoroughly as possible), are actually
838 collections of components, rather than undivided unities. Most of what
839 an operating system does (manage file systems, control process
840 execution, etc.) can be abstracted from the actual details of the
841 computer hardware on which the operating system runs. Only a small
842 inner core of the system must actually deal with the eccentric
843 peculiarities of particular hardware. Once the operating system is
844 written in a general language such as C, only that inner core, known
845 in the trade as the kernel, will be highly specific to a particular
846 computer architecture.</para> </footnote> , was a staple of Operating
847 Systems courses, providing an example of basic solutions to basic
848 problems. Slowly, and at first without recognizing the intention,
849 Linus began turning the MINIX kernel into an actual kernel for Unix on
850 the Intel x86 processors, the engines that run the world's commodity
851 PCs. As Linus began developing this kernel, which he named Linux, he
852 realized that the best way to make his project work would be to adjust
853 his design decisions so that the existing GNU components would be
854 compatible with his kernel.</para>
855
856 <para>The result of Torvalds' work was the release on the net in 1991
857 of a sketchy working model of a free software kernel for a Unix-like
858 operating system for PCs, fully compatible with and designed
859 convergently with the large and high-quality suite of system
860 components created by Stallman's Project GNU and distributed by the
861 Free Software Foundation. Because Torvalds chose to release the Linux
862 kernel under the Free Software Foundation's General Public License, of
863 which more below, the hundreds and eventually thousands of programmers
864 around the world who chose to contribute their effort towards the
865 further development of the kernel could be sure that their efforts
866 would result in permanently free software that no one could turn into
867 a proprietary product. Everyone knew that everyone else would be able
868 to test, improve, and redistribute their improvements. Torvalds
869 accepted contributions freely, and with a genially effective style
870 maintained overall direction without dampening enthusiasm. The
871 development of the Linux kernel proved that the Internet made it
872 possible to aggregate collections of programmers far larger than any
873 commercial manufacturer could afford, joined almost non-hierarchically
874 in a development project ultimately involving more than one million
875 lines of computer code - a scale of collaboration among geographically
876 dispersed unpaid volunteers previously unimaginable in human history
877 <footnote> <para>20. A careful and creative analysis of how Torvalds
878 made this process work, and what it implies for the social practices
879 of creating software, was provided by Eric S. Raymond in his seminal
880 1997 paper, <ulink
881 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html">The
882 Cathedral and the Bazaar,</ulink> which itself played a significant
883 role in the expansion of the free software idea.</para>
884 </footnote>.</para>
885
886 <para>By 1994, Linux had reached version 1.0, representing a usable
887 production kernel. Level 2.0 was reached in 1996, and by 1998, with
888 the kernel at 2.2.0 and available not only for x86 machines but for a
889 variety of other machine architectures, GNU/Linux - the combination of
890 the Linux kernel and the much larger body of Project GNU components -
891 and Windows NT were the only two operating systems in the world
892 gaining market share. A Microsoft internal assessment of the situation
893 leaked in October 1998 and subsequently acknowledged by the company as
894 genuine concluded that "Linux represents a best-of-breed UNIX, that is
895 trusted in mission critical applications, and - due to it's [sic] open
896 source code - has a long term credibility which exceeds many other
897 competitive OS's." <footnote> <para>21. This is a quotation from what
898 is known in the trade as the "Halloween memo," which can be found, as
899 annotated by Eric Raymond, to whom it was leaked, at <ulink
900 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">
901 http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html</ulink>.</para></footnote>
902 GNU/Linux systems are now used throughout the world, operating
903 everything from Web servers at major electronic commerce sites to
904 "ad-hoc supercomputer" clusters to the network infrastructure of
905 money-center banks. GNU/Linux is found on the space shuttle, and
906 running behind-the-scenes computers at (yes) Microsoft. Industry
907 evaluations of the comparative reliability of Unix systems have
908 repeatedly shown that Linux is far and away the most stable and
909 reliable Unix kernel, with a reliability exceeded only by the GNU
910 tools themselves. GNU/Linux not only out-performs commercial
911 proprietary Unix versions for PCs in benchmarks, but is renowned for
912 its ability to run, undisturbed and uncomplaining, for months on end
913 in high-volume high-stress environments without crashing.</para>
914
915 <para>Other components of the free software movement have been equally
916 successful. Apache, far and away the world's leading Web server
917 program, is free software, as is Perl, the programming language which
918 is the lingua franca for the programmers who build sophisticated Web
919 sites. Netscape Communications now distributes its Netscape
920 Communicator 5.0 browser as free software, under a close variant of
921 the Free Software Foundation's General Public License. Major PC
922 manufacturers, including IBM, have announced plans or are already
923 distributing GNU/Linux as a customer option on their top-of-the-line
924 PCs intended for use as Web- and file servers. Samba, a program that
925 allows GNU/Linux computers to act as Windows NT file servers, is used
926 worldwide as an alternative to Windows NT Server, and provides
927 effective low-end competition to Microsoft in its own home market. By
928 the standards of software quality that have been recognized in the
929 industry for decades - and whose continuing relevance will be clear to
930 you the next time your Windows PC crashes - the news at century's end
931 is unambiguous. The world's most profitable and powerful corporation
932 comes in a distant second, having excluded all but the real victor
933 from the race. Propertarianism joined to capitalist vigor destroyed
934 meaningful commercial competition, but when it came to making good
935 software, anarchism won.</para>
936
937
938 </section>
939 </section>
940 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m3"></a>-->
941 <section>
942 <title>III. Anarchism as a Mode of Production</title>
943
944 <para>It's a pretty story, and if only the IPdroid and the econodwarf
945 hadn't been blinded by theory, they'd have seen it coming. But though
946 some of us had been working for it and predicting it for years, the
947 theoretical consequences are so subversive for the thoughtways that
948 maintain our dwarves and droids in comfort that they can hardly be
949 blamed for refusing to see. The facts proved that something was wrong
950 with the "incentives" metaphor that underprops conventional
951 intellectual property reasoning <footnote> <para>22. As recently as
952 early 1994 a talented and technically competent (though Windows-using)
953 law and economics scholar at a major U.S. law school confidently
954 informed me that free software couldn't possibly exist, because no one
955 would have any incentive to make really sophisticated programs
956 requiring substantial investment of effort only to give them
957 away.</para> </footnote> . But they did more. They provided an initial
958 glimpse into the future of human creativity in a world of global
959 interconnection, and it's not a world made for dwarves and
960 droids.</para>
961
962 <para>My argument, before we paused for refreshment in the real world,
963 can be summarized this way: Software - whether executable programs,
964 music, visual art, liturgy, weaponry, or what have you - consists of
965 bitstreams, which although essentially indistinguishable are treated
966 by a confusing multiplicity of legal categories. This multiplicity is
967 unstable in the long term for reasons integral to the legal process.
968 The unstable diversity of rules is caused by the need to distinguish
969 among kinds of property interests in bitstreams. This need is
970 primarily felt by those who stand to profit from the socially
971 acceptable forms of monopoly created by treating ideas as
972 property. Those of us who are worried about the social inequity and
973 cultural hegemony created by this intellectually unsatisfying and
974 morally repugnant regime are shouted down. Those doing the shouting,
975 the dwarves and the droids, believe that these property rules are
976 necessary not from any overt yearning for life in Murdochworld -
977 though a little luxurious co-optation is always welcome - but because
978 the metaphor of incentives, which they take to be not just an image
979 but an argument, proves that these rules - despite their lamentable
980 consequences - are necessary if we are to make good software. The only
981 way to continue to believe this is to ignore the facts. At the center
982 of the digital revolution, with the executable bitstreams that make
983 everything else possible, propertarian regimes not only do not make
984 things better, they can make things radically worse. Property
985 concepts, whatever else may be wrong with them, do not enable and have
986 in fact retarded progress.</para>
987
988 <para>
989 But what is this mysterious alternative? Free software exists, but
990 what are its mechanisms, and how does it generalize towards a
991 non-propertarian theory of the digital society?</para>
992
993 </section>
994 <section>
995
996 <title>The Legal Theory of Free Software</title>
997
998 <para>There is a myth, like most myths partially founded on reality,
999 that computer programmers are all libertarians. Right-wing ones are
1000 capitalists, cleave to their stock options, and disdain taxes, unions,
1001 and civil rights laws; left-wing ones hate the market and all
1002 government, believe in strong encryption no matter how much nuclear
1003 terrorism it may cause, <footnote> <para>23. This question too
1004 deserves special scrutiny, encrusted as it is with special pleading on
1005 the state-power side. See my brief essay <ulink
1006 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/yu-encrypt.html">"<emphasis>So
1007 Much for Savages</emphasis>: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
1008 Play."</ulink></para> </footnote> and dislike Bill Gates because he's
1009 rich. There is doubtless a foundation for this belief. But the most
1010 significant difference between political thought inside the digirati
1011 and outside it is that in the network society, anarchism (or more
1012 properly, anti-possessive individualism) is a viable political
1013 philosophy.</para>
1014
1015 <para>The center of the free software movement's success, and the
1016 greatest achievement of Richard Stallman, is not a piece of computer
1017 code. The success of free software, including the overwhelming success
1018 of GNU/Linux, results from the ability to harness extraordinary
1019 quantities of high-quality effort for projects of immense size and
1020 profound complexity. And this ability in turn results from the legal
1021 context in which the labor is mobilized. As a visionary designer
1022 Richard Stallman created more than Emacs, GDB, or GNU. He created the
1023 General Public License.</para>
1024
1025 <!-- <center><img src="anarchism_files/mog3.gif" hspace="0"
1026 vspace="0"></center> --> <para>The GPL, <footnote>
1027 <para>24. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
1028 url="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt">GNU General Public License,
1029 Version 2, June 1991.</ulink></para> </footnote> also known as the
1030 copyleft, uses copyright, to paraphrase Toby Milsom, to counterfeit
1031 the phenomena of anarchism. As the license preamble expresses
1032 it:</para>
1033
1034 <blockquote><para>When we speak of free software, we are referring to
1035 freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make
1036 sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software
1037 (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source
1038 code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or
1039 use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do
1040 these things.</para>
1041
1042 <para>To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that
1043 forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the
1044 rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
1045 you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify
1046 it.</para>
1047
1048 <para>For example, if you distribute copies of such a program,
1049 whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the
1050 rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or
1051 can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
1052 know their rights.</para>
1053
1054 <para>Many variants of this basic free software idea have been
1055 expressed in licenses of various kinds, as I have already
1056 indicated. The GPL is different from the other ways of expressing
1057 these values in one crucial respect. Section 2 of the license provides
1058 in pertinent part:</para>
1059
1060 <para>You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any
1061 portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
1062 distribute such modifications or work ..., provided that you also meet
1063 all of these conditions: </para>
1064
1065 <para>...</para>
1066
1067 <para>b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish,
1068 that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or
1069 any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
1070 parties under the terms of this License.</para></blockquote>
1071
1072 <para>Section 2(b) of the GPL is sometimes called "restrictive," but
1073 its intention is liberating. It creates a commons, to which anyone may
1074 add but from which no one may subtract. Because of §2(b), each
1075 contributor to a GPL'd project is assured that she, and all other
1076 users, will be able to run, modify and redistribute the program
1077 indefinitely, that source code will always be available, and that,
1078 unlike commercial software, its longevity cannot be limited by the
1079 contingencies of the marketplace or the decisions of future
1080 developers. This "inheritance" of the GPL has sometimes been
1081 criticized as an example of the free software movement's
1082 anti-commercial bias. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
1083 effect of §2(b) is to make commercial distributors of free software
1084 better competitors against proprietary software businesses. For
1085 confirmation of this point, one can do no better than to ask the
1086 proprietary competitors. As the author of the Microsoft "Halloween"
1087 memorandum, Vinod Vallopillil, put it:</para>
1088
1089 <blockquote><para>The GPL and its aversion to code forking reassures
1090 customers that they aren't riding an evolutionary `dead-end' by
1091 subscribing to a particular commercial version of Linux.</para>
1092
1093 <para>The "evolutionary dead-end" is the core of the software
1094 FUD argument <footnote> <para>25. <ulink
1095 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">V. Vallopillil,
1096 Open Source Software: A (New?) Development Methodology.</ulink></para>
1097 </footnote> .</para></blockquote>
1098
1099 <para>Translated out of Microspeak, this means that the strategy by
1100 which the dominant proprietary manufacturer drives customers away from
1101 competitors - by sowing fear, uncertainty and doubt about other
1102 software's long-term viability - is ineffective with respect to GPL'd
1103 programs. Users of GPL'd code, including those who purchase software
1104 and systems from a commercial reseller, know that future improvements
1105 and repairs will be accessible from the commons, and need not fear
1106 either the disappearance of their supplier or that someone will use a
1107 particularly attractive improvement or a desperately necessary repair
1108 as leverage for "taking the program private."</para>
1109
1110 <para>This use of intellectual property rules to create a commons in
1111 cyberspace is the central institutional structure enabling the
1112 anarchist triumph. Ensuring free access and enabling modification at
1113 each stage in the process means that the evolution of software occurs
1114 in the fast Lamarckian mode: each favorable acquired characteristic of
1115 others' work can be directly inherited. Hence the speed with which the
1116 Linux kernel, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary
1117 predecessors. Because defection is impossible, free riders are
1118 welcome, which resolves one of the central puzzles of collective
1119 action in a propertarian social system.</para>
1120
1121 <para>Non-propertarian production is also directly responsible for the
1122 famous stability and reliability of free software, which arises from
1123 what Eric Raymond calls "Linus' law": With enough eyeballs, all bugs
1124 are shallow. In practical terms, access to source code means that if I
1125 have a problem I can fix it. Because I can fix it, I almost never have
1126 to, because someone else has almost always seen it and fixed it
1127 first.</para>
1128
1129 <para>For the free software community, commitment to anarchist
1130 production may be a moral imperative; as Richard Stallman wrote, it's
1131 about freedom, not about price. Or it may be a matter of utility,
1132 seeking to produce better software than propertarian modes of work
1133 will allow. From the droid point of view, the copyleft represents the
1134 perversion of theory, but better than any other proposal over the past
1135 decades it resolves the problems of applying copyright to the
1136 inextricably merged functional and expressive features of computer
1137 programs. That it produces better software than the alternative does
1138 not imply that traditional copyright principles should now be
1139 prohibited to those who want to own and market inferior software
1140 products, or (more charitably) whose products are too narrow in appeal
1141 for communal production. But our story should serve as a warning to
1142 droids: The world of the future will bear little relation to the world
1143 of the past. The rules are now being bent in two directions. The
1144 corporate owners of "cultural icons" and other assets who seek
1145 ever-longer terms for corporate authors, converting the "limited Time"
1146 of Article I, §8 into a freehold have naturally been whistling music
1147 to the android ear <footnote> <para>26. The looming expiration of
1148 Mickey Mouse's ownership by Disney requires, from the point of view of
1149 that wealthy "campaign contributor," for example, an alteration of the
1150 general copyright law of the United States. See "Not Making it Any
1151 More? Vaporizing the Public Domain," in <emphasis>The Invisible
1152 Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . After all, who bought
1153 the droids their concert tickets? But as the propertarian position
1154 seeks to embed itself ever more strongly, in a conception of copyright
1155 liberated from the minor annoyances of limited terms and fair use, at
1156 the very center of our "cultural software" system, the anarchist
1157 counter-strike has begun. Worse is yet to befall the droids, as we
1158 shall see. But first, we must pay our final devoirs to the
1159 dwarves.</para>
1160
1161 </section>
1162 <section>
1163 <title>Because It's There: Faraday's Magnet and Human Creativity</title>
1164
1165 <para>After all, they deserve an answer. Why do people make free
1166 software if they don't get to profit? Two answers have usually been
1167 given. One is half-right and the other is wrong, but both are
1168 insufficiently simple.</para>
1169
1170 <para>The wrong answer is embedded in numerous references to "the
1171 hacker gift-exchange culture." This use of ethnographic jargon
1172 wandered into the field some years ago and became rapidly, if
1173 misleadingly, ubiquitous. It reminds us only that the
1174 economeretricians have so corrupted our thought processes that any
1175 form of non-market economic behavior seems equal to every other
1176 kind. But gift-exchange, like market barter, is a propertarian
1177 institution. Reciprocity is central to these symbolic enactments of
1178 mutual dependence, and if either the yams or the fish are
1179 short-weighted, trouble results. Free software, at the risk of
1180 repetition, is a commons: no reciprocity ritual is enacted there. A
1181 few people give away code that others sell, use, change, or borrow
1182 wholesale to lift out parts for something else. Notwithstanding the
1183 very large number of people (tens of thousands, at most) who have
1184 contributed to GNU/Linux, this is orders of magnitude less than the
1185 number of users who make no contribution whatever <footnote>
1186 <para>27. A recent industry estimate puts the number of Linux systems
1187 worldwide at 7.5 million. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Josh McHugh, 1998. <ulink
1188 url="http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0810/6203094s1.htm">"Linux: The
1189 Making of a Global Hack,"</ulink> <emphasis>Forbes</emphasis> (August 10). Because the
1190 software is freely obtainable throughout the Net, there is no simple
1191 way to assess actual usage.</para> </footnote>.</para>
1192
1193 <para>A part of the right answer is suggested by the claim that free
1194 software is made by those who seek reputational compensation for their
1195 activity. Famous Linux hackers, the theory is, are known all over the
1196 planet as programming deities. From this they derive either enhanced
1197 self-esteem or indirect material advancement <footnote> <para>28. Eric
1198 Raymond is a partisan of the "ego boost" theory, to which he adds
1199 another faux-ethnographic comparison, of free software composition to
1200 the Kwakiutl potlatch. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Eric S. Raymond, 1998. <ulink
1201 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond/index.html">Homesteading
1202 the Noosphere.</ulink>. But the potlatch, certainly a form of status
1203 competition, is unlike free software for two fundamental reasons: it
1204 is essentially hierarchical, which free software is not, and, as we
1205 have known since Thorstein Veblen first called attention to its
1206 significance, it is a form of conspicuous waste. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Thorstein
1207 Veblen, 1967. <emphasis>The Theory of the Leisure Class.</emphasis> New York:
1208 Viking, p. 75. These are precisely the grounds which distinguish the
1209 anti-hierarchical and utilitiarian free software culture from its
1210 propertarian counterparts.</para></footnote>. But the programming
1211 deities, much as they have contributed to free software, have not done
1212 the bulk of the work. Reputations, as Linus Torvalds himself has often
1213 pointed out, are made by willingly acknowledging that it was all done
1214 by someone else. And, as many observers have noted, the free software
1215 movement has also produced superlative
1216 documentation. Documentation-writing is not what hackers do to attain
1217 cool, and much of the documentation has been written by people who
1218 didn't write the code. Nor must we limit the indirect material
1219 advantages of authorship to increases in reputational capital. Most
1220 free software authors I know have day jobs in the technology
1221 industries, and the skills they hone in the more creative work they do
1222 outside the market no doubt sometimes measurably enhance their value
1223 within it. And as the free software products gained critical mass and
1224 became the basis of a whole new set of business models built around
1225 commercial distribution of that which people can also get for nothing,
1226 an increasing number of people are specifically employed to write free
1227 software. But in order to be employable in the field, they must
1228 already have established themselves there. Plainly, then, this motive
1229 is present, but it isn't the whole explanation.</para>
1230
1231 <para>Indeed, the rest of the answer is just too simple to have
1232 received its due. The best way to understand is to follow the brief
1233 and otherwise unsung career of an initially-grudging free software
1234 author. Microsoft's Vinod Vallopillil, in the course of writing the
1235 competitive analysis of Linux that was leaked as the second of the
1236 famous "Halloween memoranda," bought and installed a Linux system on
1237 one of his office computers. He had trouble because the (commercial)
1238 Linux distribution he installed did not contain a daemon to handle the
1239 DHCP protocol for assignment of dynamic IP addresses. The result was
1240 important enough for us to risk another prolonged exposure to the
1241 Microsoft Writing Style:</para>
1242
1243 <blockquote><para>A small number of Web sites and FAQs later, I found an FTP
1244 site with a Linux DHCP client. The DHCP client was developed by an
1245 engineer employed by Fore Systems (as evidenced by his e-mail address;
1246 I believe, however, that it was developed in his own free time). A
1247 second set of documentation/manuals was written for the DHCP client by
1248 a hacker in <emphasis>Hungary</emphasis> which provided relatively simple
1249 instructions on how to install/load the client.</para>
1250
1251 <para>I downloaded &amp; uncompressed the client and typed two
1252 simple commands:</para>
1253
1254 <para>Make - compiles the client binaries</para>
1255
1256 <para>Make Install -installed the binaries as a Linux Daemon</para>
1257
1258 <para>Typing "DHCPCD" (for DHCP Client Daemon) on the command
1259 line triggered the DHCP discovery process and voila, I had IP
1260 networking running. </para>
1261
1262 <para>Since I had just downloaded the DHCP client code, on an
1263 impulse I played around a bit. Although the client wasn't as
1264 extensible as the DHCP client we are shipping in NT5 (for example, it
1265 won't query for arbitrary options &amp; store results), it was obvious
1266 how I could write the additional code to implement this functionality.
1267 The full client consisted of about 2,600 lines of code.</para>
1268
1269 <para>One example of esoteric, extended functionality that was
1270 clearly patched in by a third party was a set of routines to that
1271 would pad the DHCP request with host-specific strings required by
1272 Cable Modem / ADSL sites.</para>
1273
1274 <para>A few other steps were required to configure the DHCP
1275 client to auto-start and auto-configure my Ethernet interface on boot
1276 but these were documented in the client code and in the DHCP
1277 documentation from the Hungarian developer.</para>
1278
1279 <para>I'm a poorly skilled UNIX programmer but it was
1280 immediately obvious to me how to incrementally extend the DHCP client
1281 code (the feeling was exhilarating and addictive).</para>
1282
1283 <para>Additionally, due directly to GPL + having the full development
1284 environment in front of me, I was in a position where I could write up
1285 my changes and e-mail them out within a couple of hours (in contrast
1286 to how things like this would get done in NT). Engaging in that
1287 process would have prepared me for a larger, more ambitious Linux
1288 project in the future <footnote><para>29. Vinod Vallopillil, <ulink
1289 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween2.html">Linux OS
1290 Competitive Analysis (Halloween II).</ulink> Note Vallopillil's
1291 surprise that a program written in California had been subsequently
1292 documented by a programmer in Hungary.</para>
1293 </footnote>.</para></blockquote>
1294
1295 <para>"The feeling was exhilarating and addictive." Stop the presses:
1296 Microsoft experimentally verifies Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to
1297 Faraday's Law. Wrap the Internet around every brain on the planet and
1298 spin the planet. Software flows in the wires. It's an emergent
1299 property of human minds to create. "Due directly to the GPL," as
1300 Vallopillil rightly pointed out, free software made available to him
1301 an exhilarating increase in his own creativity, of a kind not
1302 achievable in his day job working for the Greatest Programming Company
1303 on Earth. If only he had e-mailed that first addictive fix, who knows
1304 where he'd be now?</para>
1305
1306 <para>So, in the end, my dwarvish friends, it's just a human thing.
1307 Rather like why Figaro sings, why Mozart wrote the music for him to
1308 sing to, and why we all make up new words: Because we can. Homo
1309 ludens, meet Homo faber. The social condition of global
1310 interconnection that we call the Internet makes it possible for all of
1311 us to be creative in new and previously undreamed-of ways. Unless we
1312 allow "ownership" to interfere. Repeat after me, ye dwarves and men:
1313 Resist the resistance!</para>
1314
1315 </section>
1316 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m4"></a>-->
1317
1318 <section>
1319 <title>IV. Their Lordships Die in the Dark?</title>
1320
1321 <para>For the IPdroid, fresh off the plane from a week at Bellagio
1322 paid for by Dreamworks SKG, it's enough to cause indigestion.</para>
1323
1324 <para>Unlock the possibilities of human creativity by connecting
1325 everyone to everyone else? Get the ownership system out of the way so
1326 that we can all add our voices to the choir, even if that means
1327 pasting our singing on top of the Mormon Tabernacle and sending the
1328 output to a friend? No one sitting slack-jawed in front of a televised
1329 mixture of violence and imminent copulation carefully devised to
1330 heighten the young male eyeball's interest in a beer commercial? What
1331 will become of civilization? Or at least of copyright teachers?</para>
1332
1333 <para>But perhaps this is premature. I've only been talking about
1334 software. Real software, the old kind, that runs computers. Not like
1335 the software that runs DVD players, or the kind made by the Grateful
1336 Dead. "Oh yes, the Grateful Dead. Something strange about them, wasn't
1337 there? Didn't prohibit recording at their concerts. Didn't mind if
1338 their fans rather riled the recording industry. Seem to have done all
1339 right, though, you gotta admit. Senator Patrick Leahy, isn't he a
1340 former Deadhead? I wonder if he'll vote to extend corporate authorship
1341 terms to 125 years, so that Disney doesn't lose The Mouse in 2004. And
1342 those DVD players - they're computers, aren't they?"</para>
1343
1344 <para>In the digital society, it's all connected. We can't depend for
1345 the long run on distinguishing one bitstream from another in order to
1346 figure out which rules apply. What happened to software is already
1347 happening to music. Their recording industry lordships are now
1348 scrambling wildly to retain control over distribution, as both
1349 musicians and listeners realize that the middlepeople are no longer
1350 necessary. The Great Potemkin Village of 1999, the so-called Secure
1351 Digital Music Initiative, will have collapsed long before the first
1352 Internet President gets inaugurated, for simple technical reasons as
1353 obvious to those who know as the ones that dictated the triumph of
1354 free software <footnote> <para>30. See "They're Playing Our Song: The
1355 Day the Music Industry Died," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
1356 forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . The anarchist revolution in music is
1357 different from the one in software <emphasis>tout court</emphasis>, but here too -
1358 as any teenager with an MP3 collection of self-released music from
1359 unsigned artists can tell you - theory has been killed off by the
1360 facts. Whether you are Mick Jagger, or a great national artist from
1361 the third world looking for a global audience, or a garret-dweller
1362 reinventing music, the recording industry will soon have nothing to
1363 offer you that you can't get better for free. And music doesn't sound
1364 worse when distributed for free, pay what you want directly to the
1365 artist, and don't pay anything if you don't want to. Give it to your
1366 friends; they might like it.</para>
1367
1368 <para>
1369 What happened to music is also happening to news. The wire services,
1370 as any U.S. law student learns even before taking the near-obligatory
1371 course in Copyright for Droids, have a protectible property interest
1372 in their expression of the news, even if not in the facts the news
1373 reports <footnote><para>31. International News Service v. Associated
1374 Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). With regard to the actual terse, purely
1375 functional expressions of breaking news actually at stake in the
1376 jostling among wire services, this was always a distinction only a
1377 droid could love.</para></footnote>. So why are they now giving all
1378 their output away? Because in the world of the Net, most news is
1379 commodity news. And the original advantage of the news gatherers, that
1380 they were internally connected in ways others were not when
1381 communications were expensive, is gone. Now what matters is collecting
1382 eyeballs to deliver to advertisers. It isn't the wire services that
1383 have the advantage in covering Kosovo, that's for sure. Much less
1384 those paragons of "intellectual" property, their television
1385 lordships. They, with their overpaid pretty people and their massive
1386 technical infrastructure, are about the only organizations in the
1387 world that can't afford to be everywhere all the time. And then they
1388 have to limit themselves to ninety seconds a story, or the eyeball
1389 hunters will go somewhere else. So who makes better news, the
1390 propertarians or the anarchists? We shall soon see.</para>
1391
1392 <para>Oscar Wilde says somewhere that the problem with socialism is
1393 that it takes up too many evenings. The problems with anarchism as a
1394 social system are also about transaction costs. But the digital
1395 revolution alters two aspects of political economy that have been
1396 otherwise invariant throughout human history. All software has zero
1397 marginal cost in the world of the Net, while the costs of social
1398 coordination have been so far reduced as to permit the rapid formation
1399 and dissolution of large-scale and highly diverse social groupings
1400 entirely without geographic limitation <footnote> <para>32. See "No
1401 Prodigal Son: The Political Theory of Universal Interconnection," in
1402 <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . Such
1403 fundamental change in the material circumstances of life necessarily
1404 produces equally fundamental changes in culture. Think not? Tell it to
1405 the Iroquois. And of course such profound shifts in culture are
1406 threats to existing power relations. Think not? Ask the Chinese
1407 Communist Party. Or wait 25 years and see if you can find them for
1408 purposes of making the inquiry.</para>
1409
1410 <para>In this context, the obsolescence of the IPdroid is neither
1411 unforseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into
1412 the desert, still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the
1413 profitably complicated rules for a world that no longer exists. But at
1414 least it will have familiar company, recognizable from all those
1415 glittering parties in Davos, Hollywood, and Brussels. Our Media Lords
1416 are now at handigrips with fate, however much they may feel that the
1417 Force is with them. The rules about bitstreams are now of dubious
1418 utility for maintaining power by co-opting human creativity. Seen
1419 clearly in the light of fact, these Emperors have even fewer clothes
1420 than the models they use to grab our eyeballs. Unless supported by
1421 user-disabling technology, a culture of pervasive surveillance that
1422 permits every reader of every "property" to be logged and charged, and
1423 a smokescreen of droid-breath assuring each and every young person
1424 that human creativity would vanish without the benevolent aristocracy
1425 of BillG the Creator, Lord Murdoch of Everywhere, the Spielmeister and
1426 the Lord High Mouse, their reign is nearly done. But what's at stake
1427 is the control of the scarcest resource of all: our
1428 attention. Conscripting that makes all the money in the world in the
1429 digital economy, and the current lords of the earth will fight for
1430 it. Leagued against them are only the anarchists: nobodies, hippies,
1431 hobbyists, lovers, and artists. The resulting unequal contest is the
1432 great political and legal issue of our time. Aristocracy looks hard
1433 to beat, but that's how it looked in 1788 and 1913 too. It is, as Chou
1434 En-Lai said about the meaning of the French Revolution, too soon to
1435 tell.</para>
1436
1437 </section>
1438 <section>
1439 <title>About the Author</title>
1440
1441 <para>Eben Moglen is Professor of Law &amp; Legal History, Columbia Law School.
1442 E-mail: <ulink url="mailto:moglen@columbia.edu">Mail: moglen@columbia.edu</ulink></para>
1443
1444 <para>Acknowledgments</para>
1445
1446 <para>This paper was prepared for delivery at the Buchmann
1447 International Conference on Law, Technology and Information, at Tel
1448 Aviv University, May 1999; my thanks to the organizers for their kind
1449 invitation. I owe much as always to Pamela Karlan for her insight and
1450 encouragement. I especially wish to thank the programmers throughout
1451 the world who made free software possible.</para>
1452
1453
1454 <blockquote>
1455 <para>
1456 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/contents.gif" alt="Contents" align="bottom" border="0">--></ulink> </para>
1457 <para>
1458 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/index.gif" alt="Index" border="0">--></ulink>
1459 </para>
1460 <para>Copyright <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/copy.html">©</ulink> 1999, First Monday</para></blockquote>
1461
1462
1463 </section>
1464</article>
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