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anarchism: още малко превод. Въвел съм предложенията на Сава Чанков.

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5 <title>Триумфиращият анархизъм</title>
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16 <meta name="Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from
17 being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
18 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
19 <meta name="Keywords" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
20 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Anarchism triumphant">
21 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Free software and the death of copyright">
22 <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Moglen, Eben">
23 <meta name="DC.Subject" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
24 <meta name="DC.Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
25 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
26 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Valauskas, Edward J.">
27 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Dyson, Esther">
28 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Ghosh, Rishab Aiyer">
29 <meta name="DC.Date" content="1999-08-02">
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36<blockquote><img src="anarchism_files/logo.gif" alt="First Monday" align="bottom" border="0" height="40" width="256"><br>
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42 <para><ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html#author"><!-- <img src="anarchism_files/moglen.gif" alt="Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright" border="0">--> </ulink></para>
43
44 <blockquote><para>Разпространението на ядрото за операционни системи
45 Линукс насочи вниманието към движението за свободен софтуер. Това есе
46 показва защо свободният софтуер, който далеч не е нищожен участник в
47 пазара на комерсиален софтуер, е важната първа стъпка в премахването
48 на системата на интелектуална собственост.</para></blockquote>
49
50 <section>
51 <title>Софтуерът като собственост: Теоретичният парадокс</title>
52
53 <para><emphasis>Софтуер</emphasis>: никоя друга дума не въплъщава
54 толкова пълно рактическите и социалните ефекти на цифровата революция.
55 Първоначално терминът е бил чисто технически и е означавал частите на
56 една компютърна система, която за разлика от "хардуера" -- направен
57 непроменим от производителя си в електрониката на системата, е можел
58 свободно да бъде променян. Първият софтуер е представлявал начина на
59 включване на кабели и прекъсвачи на външните панели на електронни
60 устройства, но още с появата на езикови средства за промяната на
61 поведението на компютъра, "софтуер" започнал да обозначава предимно
62 изразяванията в повече или по-малко понятех за хората език, който
63 както описвал, така и контролирал поведението на машината<footnote>
64 <para>1. Тази отлика е била само приблизителна в първоначалния
65 контекст. В края на 60-те определена част от основните операции
66 на хардуера са контролирани от програми, които са цифрово кодирани
67 в електрониката на компютърното оборудване, които не могат да
68 бъдат променяни веднъж след като продукцията е излязла от
69 фабриката. Такива символни, но непроменими компоненти, са били
70 известни като "микрокод" на жаргона на индустрията, но стана
71 обичайно те да се наричат "фърмуеър". Изменчивостта, както бе
72 показано от термина "фърмуеър" (# БЕЛЕЖКА ЗА ЗНАЧЕНИЕТО НА
73 КОРЕНИТЕ НА ДУМИТЕ СОФТУЕР, ХАРДУЕР, ФЪРМУЕР),се отнася главно към
74 възможността на потребителите да изменят символите, които
75 определят поведението на машината. Понеже цифровата революция
76 доведе до широката употреба на компютрите от технически
77 некомпетентни лица, повечето от традиционния софтуер -- приложни
78 програми, операционни системи, инструкции за числово управление и
79 т. н. -- е, за повечето от потребителите си, фърмуер. Може да е
80 символен, а не електронен в начина, по който е направен, но те не
81 могат да го променят, дори и да искат, нещо което те често, но
82 безсилно и с негодуванние правят. Това "затвърдяване на софтуера"
83 е основното условие на собственическия подход към законовата
84 организация на цифровото обществео, което е темата на този
85 доклад.</para></footnote>.</para>
86
87 <para>Така е било тогава, а сега е така: технологиите базирани на
88 обработката на информация кодирана в цифров вид сега е социално
89 доминираща в повечето аспекти на човешката култура в "развитите"
90 общества. <footnote><para>2. В рамките на сегашното поколение,
91 самата концепция за социално "равитие" се измества от притежанието
92 на индустрия основана на двигател с вътрешно горене към
93 "пост-индустрия" базирана на цифровите комуникации и свързаните с
94 тях форми на икономическа дейност, основани на
95 "знания".</para></footnote>. Преминаването от аналогово към
96 цифрово представяне -- във видеото, музиката, печатането,
97 телекомуникациите и дори хореографията, религиозните церемонии и
98 сексуалното задоволяване (# religious worship, sexual
99 gratification) -- потенциално превръща всички форми на човешката
100 символна дейност във софтуер, то ест -- променими инструкции за
101 описание и управление на поведението на машините. Чрез
102 концептуално постформиране, характено за западното научно мислене,
103 разделението между хардуера и софтуера се наблюдава в природния
104 или социалния свят и е станал нов начин за изразяване на конфликта
105 между идеите на детерминизъм и свободната воля, природата и
106 възпитанието, или гените и културата. (# Какво е backformation?
107 Аналог на transformation ли? By a conceptual back-formation
108 characteristic of Western scientistic thinking, the division
109 between hardware and software is now being observed in the natural
110 or social world, and has become a new way to express the conflict
111 between ideas of determinism and free will, nature and nurture, or
112 genes and culture.) Нашият "хардуер", който е генетично зададен е
113 нашата природа и ни определя. Нашето възпитание е "софтуера",
114 който задава културното ни прграмиране, което е нашата относителна
115 свобода. И така нататък, за неразумно дърдорещите. (# And so on,
116 for those reckless of blather).<footnote><para>3. Всъщност, едно
117 бързо замисляне ще разкрие, че нашите гени са фърмуеър.
118 Еволюцията направи прехода от аналогово към цифрово още преди
119 периода на първите вкаменелости. Но ние не притежавахме властта
120 за управлявани, преки промени. До завчера. През следващото
121 столетие гените също ще се превърнат в софтуер и въпреки че не
122 разглеждам проблема по нататък в това есе, политиеските
123 последствия на несвободността на софтуера в този контекст са още
124 по-плашещи в сравнение с културните артефакти.</para></footnote>
125 Този "софтуер" се превръща в жизнеспособна метафора за цялата
126 символна активност, която очевидно е разведена (еманципирана) от
127 техническия контекст на произхода на думата, въпреки неудобството,
128 което се появява в технически компетентните, когато термина влиза
129 в устите на хората, като се изпуска концептуалното значение на
130 неговия произход.<footnote><para>4. <emphasis>Виж
131 напр.:</emphasis> J. M. Balkin, 1998. <emphasis>Cultural Software:
132 a Theory of Ideology.</emphasis> New Haven: Yale University
133 Press.</para></footnote></para>
134
135
136 <para>Но широкото възприемане на използването на цифровите
137 технологии от тези, които не разбират принципите на действието им,
138 въпреки, че лицензира (#позволява, licenses) широкото метафорично
139 наемане на "софтуера", всъщност не ни позволява да забравим, че
140 сега компютрите са навсякъде под нашата социална кожа. Движението
141 от аналогово към цифрово е по-важно за структурата на социалните и
142 юридическите отношения отколкото по известното, но по-несигурно
143 преминаване от статс към договор (# from status to contract)
144 <footnote><para>5. <emphasis>Виж</emphasis> Henry Sumner Maine,
145 1861. <emphasis>Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History
146 of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Idea.</emphasis> First
147 edition. London: J. Murray.</para></footnote>. Това са лоши
148 новини за тези правни мислители, които не го разбират, и което е
149 причината толкова много преструване на разбиране така добре да
150 процъфтява. Потенциално обаче, нашето велико преминаване е много
151 добра новина за тези, които могат да превърнат новооткритата земя
152 в своя собственост. Това е и причината текущите "притежатели" на
153 софтуера толкова силно да поддържат и насърчават невежеството на
154 всички останали. За тяхно нещастие -- по причини известни на
155 правните теоретици, които все още не са разбрали как да прилагат
156 традиционната си логика в тази сфера -- трикът няма да се
157 задейства. Това есе обяснява защо<footnote><para>6. По принцип не
158 харесвам вмъкването на автобиография в изследователската дейност.
159 Но понеже това тук е мое тъжно задължение, а и голямо удоволствие
160 да оспоря квалифицираността или <emphasis>bona fide-то</emphasis>
161 на кажи-речи всеки, трябва да си позволя преценка на себе си. За
162 първи път бях изложен на занаята (#вещината - craft) на
163 компютърното програмиране през 1971г. Започнах да получавам
164 надник като комерсиален програмист през 1973г. -- на възраст от 13
165 г. и продълавах така в разнообразие от компютърни услуги,
166 инжинерство и многонационални технологически предрпиятия
167 (#enerprises) до 1985г. In 1975 I helped write one of the first
168 networked e-mail systems in the United States; from 1979 I was
169 engaged in research and development of advanced computer
170 programming languages at IBM. These activities made it
171 economically possible for me to study the arts of historical
172 scholarship and legal cunning. My wages were sufficient to pay my
173 tuitions, but not - to anticipate an argument that will be made by
174 the econodwarves further along - because my programs were the
175 intellectual property of my employer, but rather because they made
176 the hardware my employer sold work better. Most of what I wrote
177 was effectively free software, as we shall see. Although I
178 subsequently made some inconsiderable technical contributions to
179 the actual free software movement this paper describes, my primary
180 activities on its behalf have been legal: I have served for the
181 past five years (without pay, naturally) as general counsel of the
182 Free Software Foundation.</para></footnote>.</para>
183
184 <para>We need to begin by considering the technical essence of the
185 familiar devices that surround us in the era of "cultural software." A
186 CD player is a good example. Its primary input is a bitstream read
187 from an optical storage disk. The bitstream describes music in terms
188 of measurements, taken 44,000 times per second, of frequency and
189 amplitude in each of two audio channels. The player's primary output
190 is analog audio signals <footnote><para>7. The player, of course, has
191 secondary inputs and outputs in control channels: buttons or infrared
192 remote control are input, and time and track display are
193 output.</para></footnote>. Like everything else in the digital world,
194 music as seen by a CD player is mere numeric information; a particular
195 recording of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony recorded by Arturo Toscanini
196 and the NBC Symphony Orchestra and Chorale is (to drop a few
197 insignificant digits) 1276749873424, while Glenn Gould's peculiarly
198 perverse last recording of the Goldberg Variations is (similarly
199 rather truncated) 767459083268.</para>
200
201 <para>Oddly enough, these two numbers are "copyrighted." This means,
202 supposedly, that you can't possess another copy of these numbers, once
203 fixed in any physical form, unless you have licensed them. And you
204 can't turn 767459083268 into 2347895697 for your friends (thus
205 correcting Gould's ridiculous judgment about tempi) without making a
206 "derivative work," for which a license is necessary.</para>
207
208 <para>At the same time, a similar optical storage disk contains
209 another number, let us call it 7537489532. This one is an algorithm
210 for linear programming of large systems with multiple constraints,
211 useful for example if you want to make optimal use of your rolling
212 stock in running a freight railroad. This number (in the U.S.) is
213 "patented," which means you cannot derive 7537489532 for yourself, or
214 otherwise "practice the art" of the patent with respect to solving
215 linear programming problems no matter how you came by the idea,
216 including finding it out for yourself, unless you have a license from
217 the number's owner.</para>
218
219 <para>Then there's 9892454959483. This one is the source code for
220 Microsoft Word. In addition to being "copyrighted," this one is a
221 trade secret. That means if you take this number from Microsoft and
222 give it to anyone else you can be punished.</para>
223
224 <para>Lastly, there's 588832161316. It doesn't do anything, it's just
225 the square of 767354. As far as I know, it isn't owned by anybody
226 under any of these rubrics. Yet.</para>
227
228 <para>At this point we must deal with our first objection from the
229 learned. It comes from a creature known as the IPdroid. The droid has
230 a sophisticated mind and a cultured life. It appreciates very much the
231 elegant dinners at academic and ministerial conferences about the
232 TRIPs, not to mention the privilege of frequent appearances on MSNBC.
233 It wants you to know that I'm committing the mistake of confusing the
234 embodiment with the intellectual property itself. It's not the number
235 that's patented, stupid, just the Kamarkar algorithm. The number
236 <emphasis>can</emphasis> be copyrighted, because copyright covers the
237 expressive qualities of a particular tangible embodiment of an idea
238 (in which some functional properties may be mysteriously merged,
239 provided that they're not too merged), but not the algorithm. Whereas
240 the number isn't patentable, just the "teaching" of the number with
241 respect to making railroads run on time. And the number representing
242 the source code of Microsoft Word can be a trade secret, but if you
243 find it out for yourself (by performing arithmetic manipulation of
244 other numbers issued by Microsoft, for example, which is known as
245 "reverse engineering"), you're not going to be punished, at least if
246 you live in some parts of the United States.</para>
247
248 <para>This droid, like other droids, is often right. The condition of
249 being a droid is to know everything about something and nothing about
250 anything else. By its timely and urgent intervention the droid has
251 established that the current intellectual property system contains
252 many intricate and ingenious features. The complexities combine to
253 allow professors to be erudite, Congressmen to get campaign
254 contributions, lawyers to wear nice suits and tassel loafers, and
255 Murdoch to be rich. The complexities mostly evolved in an age of
256 industrial information distribution, when information was inscribed in
257 analog forms on physical objects that cost something significant to
258 make, move, and sell. When applied to digital information that moves
259 frictionlessly through the network and has zero marginal cost per
260 copy, everything still works, mostly, as long as you don't stop
261 squinting.</para>
262
263 <para>But that wasn't what I was arguing about. I wanted to point out
264 something else: that our world consists increasingly of nothing but
265 large numbers (also known as bitstreams), and that - for reasons
266 having nothing to do with emergent properties of the numbers
267 themselves - the legal system is presently committed to treating
268 similar numbers radically differently. No one can tell, simply by
269 looking at a number that is 100 million digits long, whether that
270 number is subject to patent, copyright, or trade secret protection, or
271 indeed whether it is "owned" by anyone at all. So the legal system we
272 have - blessed as we are by its consequences if we are copyright
273 teachers, Congressmen, Gucci-gulchers or Big Rupert himself - is
274 compelled to treat indistinguishable things in unlike ways.</para>
275
276 <para>Now, in my role as a legal historian concerned with the secular
277 (that is, very long term) development of legal thought, I claim that
278 legal regimes based on sharp but unpredictable distinctions among
279 similar objects are radically unstable. They fall apart over time
280 because every instance of the rules' application is an invitation to
281 at least one side to claim that instead of fitting in ideal category A
282 the particular object in dispute should be deemed to fit instead in
283 category B, where the rules will be more favorable to the party making
284 the claim. This game - about whether a typewriter should be deemed a
285 musical instrument for purposes of railway rate regulation, or whether
286 a steam shovel is a motor vehicle - is the frequent stuff of legal
287 ingenuity. But when the conventionally-approved legal categories
288 require judges to distinguish among the identical, the game is
289 infinitely lengthy, infinitely costly, and almost infinitely offensive
290 to the unbiased bystander <footnote><para>8. This is not an insight
291 unique to our present enterprise. A closely-related idea forms one of
292 the most important principles in the history of Anglo-American law,
293 perfectly put by Toby Milsom in the following terms:</para>
294 <blockquote><para>The life of the common law has been in the abuse of
295 its elementary ideas. If the rules of property give what now seems an
296 unjust answer, try obligation; and equity has proved that from the
297 materials of obligation you can counterfeit the phenomena of
298 property. If the rules of contract give what now seems an unjust
299 answer, try tort. ... If the rules of one tort, say deceit, give what
300 now seems an unjust answer, try another, try negligence. And so the
301 legal world goes round.</para></blockquote><para>S.F.C. Milsom,
302 1981. <emphasis>Historical Foundations of the Common Law.</emphasis>
303 Second edition. London: Butterworths, p. 6.</para> </footnote>.</para>
304
305 <para>Thus parties can spend all the money they want on all the
306 legislators and judges they can afford - which for the new "owners" of
307 the digital world is quite a few - but the rules they buy aren't going
308 to work in the end. Sooner or later, the paradigms are going to
309 collapse. Of course, if later means two generations from now, the
310 distribution of wealth and power sanctified in the meantime may not be
311 reversible by any course less drastic than a <emphasis>bellum
312 servile</emphasis> of couch potatoes against media magnates. So
313 knowing that history isn't on Bill Gates' side isn't enough. We are
314 predicting the future in a very limited sense: we know that the
315 existing rules, which have yet the fervor of conventional belief
316 solidly enlisted behind them, are no longer meaningful. Parties will
317 use and abuse them freely until the mainstream of "respectable"
318 conservative opinion acknowledges their death, with uncertain
319 results. But realistic scholarship should already be turning its
320 attention to the clear need for new thoughtways.</para>
321
322 <para>When we reach this point in the argument, we find ourselves
323 contending with the other primary protagonist of educated idiocy: the
324 econodwarf. Like the IPdroid, the econodwarf is a species of hedgehog,
325 <footnote><para>9. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Isaiah Berlin,
326 1953. <emphasis>The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View
327 of History.</emphasis> New York: Simon and Schuster.</para>
328 </footnote> but where the droid is committed to logic over experience,
329 the econodwarf specializes in an energetic and well-focused but
330 entirely erroneous view of human nature. According to the econodwarf's
331 vision, each human being is an individual possessing "incentives,"
332 which can be retrospectively unearthed by imagining the state of the
333 bank account at various times. So in this instance the econodwarf
334 feels compelled to object that without the rules I am lampooning,
335 there would be no incentive to create the things the rules treat as
336 property: without the ability to exclude others from music there would
337 be no music, because no one could be sure of getting paid for creating
338 it.</para>
339
340 <para>Music is not really our subject; the software I am considering
341 at the moment is the old kind: computer programs. But as he is
342 determined to deal at least cursorily with the subject, and because,
343 as we have seen, it is no longer really possible to distinguish
344 computer programs from music performances, a word or two should be
345 said. At least we can have the satisfaction of indulging in an
346 argument <emphasis>ad pygmeam</emphasis>. When the econodwarf grows
347 rich, in my experience, he attends the opera. But no matter how often
348 he hears <emphasis>Don Giovanni</emphasis> it never occurs to him that
349 Mozart's fate should, on his logic, have entirely discouraged
350 Beethoven, or that we have <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis> even
351 though Mozart knew very well he wouldn't be paid. In fact,
352 <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis>, <emphasis>St. Matthew's
353 Passion</emphasis>, and the motets of the wife-murderer Carlo Gesualdo
354 are all part of the centuries-long tradition of free software, in the
355 more general sense, which the econodwarf never quite
356 acknowledges.</para> <!--<center><img
357 src="anarchism_files/mog1.gif"></center> --> <para> The dwarf's basic
358 problem is that "incentives" is merely a metaphor, and as a metaphor
359 to describe human creative activity it's pretty crummy. I have said
360 this before, <footnote> <para>10. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
361 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/nospeech.html">The
362 Virtual Scholar and Network Liberation.</ulink></para> </footnote> but
363 the better metaphor arose on the day Michael Faraday first noticed
364 what happened when he wrapped a coil of wire around a magnet and spun
365 the magnet. Current flows in such a wire, but we don't ask what the
366 incentive is for the electrons to leave home. We say that the current
367 results from an emergent property of the system, which we call
368 induction. The question we ask is "what's the resistance of the wire?"
369 So Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law says that if you
370 wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
371 planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
372 connected human minds that they create things for one another's
373 pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. The
374 only question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network?
375 Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the
376 resistance of the network is directly proportional to the field
377 strength of the "intellectual property" system. So the right answer to
378 the econodwarf is, resist the resistance.</para>
379
380 <para>Of course, this is all very well in theory. "Resist the
381 resistance" sounds good, but we'd have a serious problem, theory
382 notwithstanding, if the dwarf were right and we found ourselves
383 under-producing good software because we didn't let people own it. But
384 dwarves and droids are formalists of different kinds, and the
385 advantage of realism is that if you start from the facts the facts are
386 always on your side. It turns out that treating software as property
387 makes bad software.</para>
388
389 </section>
390 <section>
391 <title>II. Software as Property: The Practical Problem</title>
392
393 <para>In order to understand why turning software into property
394 produces bad software, we need an introduction to the history of the
395 art. In fact, we'd better start with the word "art" itself. The
396 programming of computers combines determinate reasoning with literary
397 invention.</para>
398
399 <para>At first glance, to be sure, source code appears to be a
400 non-literary form of composition <footnote><para>11. Some basic
401 vocabulary is essential. Digital computers actually execute numerical
402 instructions: bitstrings that contain information in the "native"
403 language created by the machine's designers. This is usually referred
404 to as "machine language." The machine languages of hardware are
405 designed for speed of execution at the hardware level, and are not
406 suitable for direct use by human beings. So among the central
407 components of a computer system are "programming languages," which
408 translate expressions convenient for humans into machine language. The
409 most common and relevant, but by no means the only, form of computer
410 language is a "compiler." The compiler performs static translation, so
411 that a file containing human-readable instructions, known as "source
412 code" results in the generation of one or more files of executable
413 machine language, known as "object code."</para> </footnote>. The
414 primary desideratum in a computer program is that it works, that is to
415 say, performs according to specifications formally describing its
416 outputs in terms of its inputs. At this level of generality, the
417 functional content of programs is all that can be seen.</para>
418
419 <para>But working computer programs exist as parts of computer
420 systems, which are interacting collections of hardware, software, and
421 human beings. The human components of a computer system include not
422 only the users, but also the (potentially different) persons who
423 maintain and improve the system. Source code not only communicates
424 with the computer that executes the program, through the intermediary
425 of the compiler that produces machine-language object code, but also
426 with other programmers.</para>
427
428 <para>The function of source code in relation to other human beings is
429 not widely grasped by non-programmers, who tend to think of computer
430 programs as incomprehensible. They would be surprised to learn that
431 the bulk of information contained in most programs is, from the point
432 of view of the compiler or other language processor, "comment," that
433 is, non-functional material. The comments, of course, are addressed to
434 others who may need to fix a problem or to alter or enhance the
435 program's operation. In most programming languages, far more space is
436 spent in telling people what the program does than in telling the
437 computer how to do it.</para>
438
439 <para>The design of programming languages has always proceeded under
440 the dual requirements of complete specification for machine execution
441 and informative description for human readers. One might identify
442 three basic strategies in language design for approaching this dual
443 purpose. The first, pursued initially with respect to the design of
444 languages specific to particular hardware products and collectively
445 known as "assemblers," essentially separated the human- and
446 machine-communication portions of the program. Assembler instructions
447 are very close relatives of machine-language instructions: in general,
448 one line of an assembler program corresponds to one instruction in the
449 native language of the machine. The programmer controls machine
450 operation at the most specific possible level, and (if
451 well-disciplined) engages in running commentary alongside the machine
452 instructions, pausing every few hundred instructions to create "block
453 comments," which provide a summary of the strategy of the program, or
454 document the major data structures the program manipulates.</para>
455
456 <para>A second approach, characteristically depicted by the language
457 COBOL (which stood for "Common Business-Oriented Language"), was to
458 make the program itself look like a set of natural language
459 directions, written in a crabbed but theoretically human-readable
460 style. A line of COBOL code might say, for example "MULTIPLY PRICE
461 TIMES QUANTITY GIVING EXPANSION." At first, when the Pentagon and
462 industry experts began the joint design of COBOL in the early 1960's,
463 this seemed a promising approach. COBOL programs appeared largely
464 self-documenting, allowing both the development of work teams able to
465 collaborate on the creation of large programs, and the training of
466 programmers who, while specialized workers, would not need to
467 understand the machine as intimately as assembler programs had to. But
468 the level of generality at which such programs documented themselves
469 was wrongly selected. A more formulaic and compressed expression of
470 operational detail "expansion = price x quantity," for example, was
471 better suited even to business and financial applications where the
472 readers and writers of programs were accustomed to mathematical
473 expression, while the processes of describing both data structures and
474 the larger operational context of the program were not rendered
475 unnecessary by the wordiness of the language in which the details of
476 execution were specified.</para>
477
478 <para>Accordingly, language designers by the late 1960s began
479 experimenting with forms of expression in which the blending of
480 operational details and non-functional information necessary for
481 modification or repair was more subtle. Some designers chose the path
482 of highly symbolic and compressed languages, in which the programmer
483 manipulated data abstractly, so that "A x B" might mean the
484 multiplication of two integers, two complex numbers, two vast arrays,
485 or any other data type capable of some process called
486 "multiplication," to be undertaken by the computer on the basis of the
487 context for the variables "A" and "B" at the moment of execution
488 <footnote> <para>12. This, I should say, was the path that most of my
489 research and development followed, largely in connection with a
490 language called APL ("A Programming Language") and its successors. It
491 was not, however, the ultimately-dominant approach, for reasons that
492 will be suggested below.</para> </footnote> . Because this approach
493 resulted in extremely concise programs, it was thought, the problem of
494 making code comprehensible to those who would later seek to modify or
495 repair it was simplified. By hiding the technical detail of computer
496 operation and emphasizing the algorithm, languages could be devised
497 that were better than English or other natural languages for the
498 expression of stepwise processes. Commentary would be not only
499 unnecessary but distracting, just as the metaphors used to convey
500 mathematical concepts in English do more to confuse than to
501 enlighten.</para>
502
503 <section>
504 <title>How We Created the Microbrain Mess</title>
505
506 <para>Thus the history of programming languages directly reflected the
507 need to find forms of human-machine communication that were also
508 effective in conveying complex ideas to human readers. "Expressivity"
509 became a property of programming languages, not because it facilitated
510 computation, but because it facilitated the collaborative creation and
511 maintenance of increasingly complex software systems.</para>
512
513 <para>At first impression, this seems to justify the application of
514 traditional copyright thinking to the resulting works. Though
515 substantially involving "functional" elements, computer programs
516 contained "expressive" features of paramount importance. Copyright
517 doctrine recognized the merger of function and expression as
518 characteristic of many kinds of copyrighted works. "Source code,"
519 containing both the machine instructions necessary for functional
520 operation and the expressive "commentary" intended for human readers,
521 was an appropriate candidate for copyright treatment.</para>
522
523 <para>True, so long as it is understood that the expressive component
524 of software was present solely in order to facilitate the making of
525 "derivative works." Were it not for the intention to facilitate
526 alteration, the expressive elements of programs would be entirely
527 supererogatory, and source code would be no more copyrightable than
528 object code, the output of the language processor, purged of all but
529 the program's functional characteristics.</para>
530
531 <para>The state of the computer industry throughout the 1960's and
532 1970's, when the grundnorms of sophisticated computer programming were
533 established, concealed the tension implicit in this situation. In that
534 period, hardware was expensive. Computers were increasingly large and
535 complex collections of machines, and the business of designing and
536 building such an array of machines for general use was dominated, not
537 to say monopolized, by one firm. IBM gave away its software. To be
538 sure, it owned the programs its employees wrote, and it copyrighted
539 the source code. But it also distributed the programs - including the
540 source code - to its customers at no additional charge, and encouraged
541 them to make and share improvements or adaptations of the programs
542 thus distributed. For a dominant hardware manufacturer, this strategy
543 made sense: better programs sold more computers, which is where the
544 profitability of the business rested.</para>
545
546 <para>Computers, in this period, tended to aggregate within particular
547 organizations, but not to communicate broadly with one another. The
548 software needed to operate was distributed not through a network, but
549 on spools of magnetic tape. This distribution system tended to
550 centralize software development, so that while IBM customers were free
551 to make modifications and improvements to programs, those
552 modifications were shared in the first instance with IBM, which then
553 considered whether and in what way to incorporate those changes in the
554 centrally-developed and distributed version of the software. Thus in
555 two important senses the best computer software in the world was free:
556 it cost nothing to acquire, and the terms on which it was furnished
557 both allowed and encouraged experimentation, change, and improvement
558 <footnote><para>13. This description elides some details. By the
559 mid-1970's IBM had acquired meaningful competition in the mainframe
560 computer business, while the large-scale antitrust action brought
561 against it by the U.S. government prompted the decision to "unbundle,"
562 or charge separately, for software. In this less important sense,
563 software ceased to be free. But - without entering into the now-dead
564 but once-heated controversy over IBM's software pricing policies - the
565 unbundling revolution had less effect on the social practices of
566 software manufacture than might be supposed. As a fellow responsible
567 for technical improvement of one programming language product at IBM
568 from 1979 to 1984, for example, I was able to treat the product as
569 "almost free," that is, to discuss with users the changes they had
570 proposed or made in the programs, and to engage with them in
571 cooperative development of the product for the benefit of all
572 users.</para> </footnote>. That the software in question was IBM's
573 property under prevailing copyright law certainly established some
574 theoretical limits on users' ability to distribute their improvements
575 or adaptations to others, but in practice mainframe software was
576 cooperatively developed by the dominant hardware manufacturer and its
577 technically-sophisticated users, employing the manufacturer's
578 distribution resources to propagate the resulting improvements through
579 the user community. The right to exclude others, one of the most
580 important "sticks in the bundle" of property rights (in an image
581 beloved of the United States Supreme Court), was practically
582 unimportant, or even undesirable, at the heart of the software
583 business <footnote> <para>14. This description is highly compressed,
584 and will seem both overly simplified and unduly rosy to those who also
585 worked in the industry during this period of its
586 development. Copyright protection of computer software was a
587 controversial subject in the 1970's, leading to the famous CONTU
588 commission and its mildly pro-copyright recommendations of 1979. And
589 IBM seemed far less cooperative to its users at the time than this
590 sketch makes out. But the most important element is the contrast with
591 the world created by the PC, the Internet, and the dominance of
592 Microsoft, with the resulting impetus for the free software movement,
593 and I am here concentrating on the features that express that
594 contrast.</para></footnote>.</para>
595
596 <para>After 1980, everything was different. The world of mainframe
597 hardware gave way within ten years to the world of the commodity PC.
598 And, as a contingency of the industry's development, the single most
599 important element of the software running on that commodity PC, the
600 operating system, became the sole significant product of a company
601 that made no hardware. High-quality basic software ceased to be part
602 of the product-differentiation strategy of hardware
603 manufacturers. Instead, a firm with an overwhelming share of the
604 market, and with the near-monopolist's ordinary absence of interest in
605 fostering diversity, set the practices of the software industry. In
606 such a context, the right to exclude others from participation in the
607 product's formation became profoundly important. Microsoft's power in
608 the market rested entirely on its ownership of the Windows source
609 code.</para>
610
611 <para>To Microsoft, others' making of "derivative works," otherwise
612 known as repairs and improvements, threatened the central asset of the
613 business. Indeed, as subsequent judicial proceedings have tended to
614 establish, Microsoft's strategy as a business was to find innovative
615 ideas elsewhere in the software marketplace, buy them up and either
616 suppress them or incorporate them in its proprietary product. The
617 maintenance of control over the basic operation of computers
618 manufactured, sold, possessed, and used by others represented profound
619 and profitable leverage over the development of the culture <footnote>
620 <para>15. I discuss the importance of PC software in this context, the
621 evolution of "the market for eyeballs" and "the sponsored life" in
622 other chapters of my forthcoming book, <emphasis>The Invisible
623 Barbecue</emphasis>, of which this essay forms a part.</para>
624 </footnote>.; the right to exclude returned to center stage in the
625 concept of software as property.</para>
626
627 <para>The result, so far as the quality of software was concerned, was
628 disastrous. The monopoly was a wealthy and powerful corporation that
629 employed a large number of programmers, but it could not possibly
630 afford the number of testers, designers, and developers required to
631 produce flexible, robust and technically-innovative software
632 appropriate to the vast array of conditions under which increasingly
633 ubiquitous personal computers operated. Its fundamental marketing
634 strategy involved designing its product for the least
635 technically-sophisticated users, and using "fear, uncertainty, and
636 doubt" (known within Microsoft as "FUD") to drive sophisticated users
637 away from potential competitors, whose long-term survivability in the
638 face of Microsoft's market power was always in question.</para>
639
640 <para>Without the constant interaction between users able to repair
641 and improve and the operating system's manufacturer, the inevitable
642 deterioration of quality could not be arrested. But because the
643 personal computer revolution expanded the number of users
644 exponentially, almost everyone who came in contact with the resulting
645 systems had nothing against which to compare them. Unaware of the
646 standards of stability, reliability, maintainability and effectiveness
647 that had previously been established in the mainframe world, users of
648 personal computers could hardly be expected to understand how badly,
649 in relative terms, the monopoly's software functioned. As the power
650 and capacity of personal computers expanded rapidly, the defects of
651 the software were rendered less obvious amidst the general increase of
652 productivity. Ordinary users, more than half afraid of the technology
653 they almost completely did not understand, actually welcomed the
654 defectiveness of the software. In an economy undergoing mysterious
655 transformations, with the concomitant destabilization of millions of
656 careers, it was tranquilizing, in a perverse way, that no personal
657 computer seemed to be able to run for more than a few consecutive
658 hours without crashing. Although it was frustrating to lose work in
659 progress each time an unnecessary failure occurred, the evident
660 fallibility of computers was intrinsically reassuring <footnote>
661 <para>16. This same pattern of ambivalence, in which bad programming
662 leading to widespread instability in the new technology is
663 simultaneously frightening and reassuring to technical incompetents,
664 can be seen also in the primarily-American phenomenon of Y2K
665 hysteria.</para> </footnote> .</para>
666
667 <para>None of this was necessary. The low quality of personal computer
668 software could have been reversed by including users directly in the
669 inherently evolutionary process of software design and implementation.
670 A Lamarckian mode, in which improvements could be made anywhere, by
671 anyone, and inherited by everyone else, would have wiped out the
672 deficit, restoring to the world of the PC the stability and
673 reliability of the software made in the quasi-propertarian environment
674 of the mainframe era. But the Microsoft business model precluded
675 Lamarckian inheritance of software improvements. Copyright doctrine,
676 in general and as it applies to software in particular, biases the
677 world towards creationism; in this instance, the problem is that BillG
678 the Creator was far from infallible, and in fact he wasn't even
679 trying.</para> <!--<center><img src="anarchism_files/mog2.gif"
680 hspace="0" vspace="0"></center>--> <para>To make the irony more
681 severe, the growth of the network rendered the non-propertarian
682 alternative even more practical. What scholarly and popular writing
683 alike denominate as a thing ("the Internet") is actually the name of a
684 social condition: the fact that everyone in the network society is
685 connected directly, without intermediation, to everyone else
686 <footnote> <para>17. The critical implications of this simple
687 observation about our metaphors are worked out in "How Not to Think
688 about 'The Internet'," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
689 forthcoming.</para> </footnote>. The global interconnection of
690 networks eliminated the bottleneck that had required a centralized
691 software manufacturer to rationalize and distribute the outcome of
692 individual innovation in the era of the mainframe.</para>
693
694 <para>And so, in one of history's little ironies, the global triumph
695 of bad software in the age of the PC was reversed by a surprising
696 combination of forces: the social transformation initiated by the
697 network, a long-discarded European theory of political economy, and a
698 small band of programmers throughout the world mobilized by a single
699 simple idea.</para>
700
701 </section>
702 <section>
703
704 <title>Software Wants to Be Free; or, How We Stopped Worrying and
705 Learned to Love the Bomb</title>
706
707 <para>Long before the network of networks was a practical reality,
708 even before it was an aspiration, there was a desire for computers to
709 operate on the basis of software freely available to everyone. This
710 began as a reaction against propertarian software in the mainframe
711 era, and requires another brief historical digression.</para>
712
713 <para>Even though IBM was the largest seller of general purpose
714 computers in the mainframe era, it was not the largest designer and
715 builder of such hardware. The telephone monopoly, American Telephone
716 &amp; Telegraph, was in fact larger than IBM, but it consumed its
717 products internally. And at the famous Bell Labs research arm of the
718 telephone monopoly, in the late 1960's, the developments in computer
719 languages previously described gave birth to an operating system
720 called Unix.</para>
721
722 <para>The idea of Unix was to create a single, scalable operating
723 system to exist on all the computers, from small to large, that the
724 telephone monopoly made for itself. To achieve this goal meant writing
725 an operating system not in machine language, nor in an assembler whose
726 linguistic form was integral to a particular hardware design, but in a
727 more expressive and generalized language. The one chosen was also a
728 Bell Labs invention, called "C" <footnote> <para>18. Technical readers
729 will again observe that this compresses developments occurring from
730 1969 through 1973.</para> </footnote>. The C language became common,
731 even dominant, for many kinds of programming tasks, and by the late
732 1970's the Unix operating system written in that language had been
733 transferred (or "ported," in professional jargon) to computers made by
734 many manufacturers and of many designs.</para>
735
736 <para>AT&amp;T distributed Unix widely, and because of the very design
737 of the operating system, it had to make that distribution in C source
738 code. But AT&amp;T retained ownership of the source code and
739 compelled users to purchase licenses that prohibited redistribution
740 and the making of derivative works. Large computing centers, whether
741 industrial or academic, could afford to purchase such licenses, but
742 individuals could not, while the license restrictions prevented the
743 community of programmers who used Unix from improving it in an
744 evolutionary rather than episodic fashion. And as programmers
745 throughout the world began to aspire to and even expect a personal
746 computer revolution, the "unfree" status of Unix became a source of
747 concern.</para>
748
749 <para>Between 1981 and 1984, one man envisioned a crusade to change
750 the situation. Richard M. Stallman, then an employee of MIT's
751 Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, conceived the project of
752 independent, collaborative redesign and implementation of an operating
753 system that would be true free software. In Stallman's phrase, free
754 software would be a matter of freedom, not of price. Anyone could
755 freely modify and redistribute such software, or sell it, subject only
756 to the restriction that he not try to reduce the rights of others to
757 whom he passed it along. In this way free software could become a
758 self-organizing project, in which no innovation would be lost through
759 proprietary exercises of rights. The system, Stallman decided, would
760 be called GNU, which stood (in an initial example of a taste for
761 recursive acronyms that has characterized free software ever since),
762 for "GNU's Not Unix." Despite misgivings about the fundamental design
763 of Unix, as well as its terms of distribution, GNU was intended to
764 benefit from the wide if unfree source distribution of Unix. Stallman
765 began Project GNU by writing components of the eventual system that
766 were also designed to work without modification on existing Unix
767 systems. Development of the GNU tools could thus proceed directly in
768 the environment of university and other advanced computing centers
769 around the world.</para>
770
771 <para>The scale of such a project was immense. Somehow, volunteer
772 programmers had to be found, organized, and set to work building all
773 the tools that would be necessary for the ultimate construction.
774 Stallman himself was the primary author of several fundamental tools.
775 Others were contributed by small or large teams of programmers
776 elsewhere, and assigned to Stallman's project or distributed
777 directly. A few locations around the developing network became
778 archives for the source code of these GNU components, and throughout
779 the 1980's the GNU tools gained recognition and acceptance by Unix
780 users throughout the world. The stability, reliability, and
781 maintainability of the GNU tools became a by-word, while Stallman's
782 profound abilities as a designer continued to outpace, and provide
783 goals for, the evolving process. The award to Stallman of a MacArthur
784 Fellowship in 1990 was an appropriate recognition of his conceptual
785 and technical innovations and their social consequences.</para>
786
787 <para>Project GNU, and the Free Software Foundation to which it gave
788 birth in 1985, were not the only source of free software
789 ideas. Several forms of copyright license designed to foster free or
790 partially free software began to develop in the academic community,
791 mostly around the Unix environment. The University of California at
792 Berkeley began the design and implementation of another version of
793 Unix for free distribution in the academic community. BSD Unix, as it
794 came to be known, also treated AT&amp;T's Unix as a design
795 standard. The code was broadly released and constituted a reservoir of
796 tools and techniques, but its license terms limited the range of its
797 application, while the elimination of hardware-specific proprietary
798 code from the distribution meant that no one could actually build a
799 working operating system for any particular computer from BSD. Other
800 university-based work also eventuated in quasi-free software; the
801 graphical user interface (or GUI) for Unix systems called X Windows,
802 for example, was created at MIT and distributed with source code on
803 terms permitting free modification. And in 1989-1990, an undergraduate
804 computer science student at the University of Helsinki, Linus
805 Torvalds, began the project that completed the circuit and fully
806 energized the free software vision.</para>
807
808 <para>What Torvalds did was to begin adapting a computer science
809 teaching tool for real life use. Andrew Tannenbaum's MINIX kernel
810 <footnote> <para>19. Operating systems, even Windows (which hides the
811 fact from its users as thoroughly as possible), are actually
812 collections of components, rather than undivided unities. Most of what
813 an operating system does (manage file systems, control process
814 execution, etc.) can be abstracted from the actual details of the
815 computer hardware on which the operating system runs. Only a small
816 inner core of the system must actually deal with the eccentric
817 peculiarities of particular hardware. Once the operating system is
818 written in a general language such as C, only that inner core, known
819 in the trade as the kernel, will be highly specific to a particular
820 computer architecture.</para> </footnote> , was a staple of Operating
821 Systems courses, providing an example of basic solutions to basic
822 problems. Slowly, and at first without recognizing the intention,
823 Linus began turning the MINIX kernel into an actual kernel for Unix on
824 the Intel x86 processors, the engines that run the world's commodity
825 PCs. As Linus began developing this kernel, which he named Linux, he
826 realized that the best way to make his project work would be to adjust
827 his design decisions so that the existing GNU components would be
828 compatible with his kernel.</para>
829
830 <para>The result of Torvalds' work was the release on the net in 1991
831 of a sketchy working model of a free software kernel for a Unix-like
832 operating system for PCs, fully compatible with and designed
833 convergently with the large and high-quality suite of system
834 components created by Stallman's Project GNU and distributed by the
835 Free Software Foundation. Because Torvalds chose to release the Linux
836 kernel under the Free Software Foundation's General Public License, of
837 which more below, the hundreds and eventually thousands of programmers
838 around the world who chose to contribute their effort towards the
839 further development of the kernel could be sure that their efforts
840 would result in permanently free software that no one could turn into
841 a proprietary product. Everyone knew that everyone else would be able
842 to test, improve, and redistribute their improvements. Torvalds
843 accepted contributions freely, and with a genially effective style
844 maintained overall direction without dampening enthusiasm. The
845 development of the Linux kernel proved that the Internet made it
846 possible to aggregate collections of programmers far larger than any
847 commercial manufacturer could afford, joined almost non-hierarchically
848 in a development project ultimately involving more than one million
849 lines of computer code - a scale of collaboration among geographically
850 dispersed unpaid volunteers previously unimaginable in human history
851 <footnote> <para>20. A careful and creative analysis of how Torvalds
852 made this process work, and what it implies for the social practices
853 of creating software, was provided by Eric S. Raymond in his seminal
854 1997 paper, <ulink
855 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html">The
856 Cathedral and the Bazaar,</ulink> which itself played a significant
857 role in the expansion of the free software idea.</para>
858 </footnote>.</para>
859
860 <para>By 1994, Linux had reached version 1.0, representing a usable
861 production kernel. Level 2.0 was reached in 1996, and by 1998, with
862 the kernel at 2.2.0 and available not only for x86 machines but for a
863 variety of other machine architectures, GNU/Linux - the combination of
864 the Linux kernel and the much larger body of Project GNU components -
865 and Windows NT were the only two operating systems in the world
866 gaining market share. A Microsoft internal assessment of the situation
867 leaked in October 1998 and subsequently acknowledged by the company as
868 genuine concluded that "Linux represents a best-of-breed UNIX, that is
869 trusted in mission critical applications, and - due to it's [sic] open
870 source code - has a long term credibility which exceeds many other
871 competitive OS's." <footnote> <para>21. This is a quotation from what
872 is known in the trade as the "Halloween memo," which can be found, as
873 annotated by Eric Raymond, to whom it was leaked, at <ulink
874 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">
875 http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html</ulink>.</para></footnote>
876 GNU/Linux systems are now used throughout the world, operating
877 everything from Web servers at major electronic commerce sites to
878 "ad-hoc supercomputer" clusters to the network infrastructure of
879 money-center banks. GNU/Linux is found on the space shuttle, and
880 running behind-the-scenes computers at (yes) Microsoft. Industry
881 evaluations of the comparative reliability of Unix systems have
882 repeatedly shown that Linux is far and away the most stable and
883 reliable Unix kernel, with a reliability exceeded only by the GNU
884 tools themselves. GNU/Linux not only out-performs commercial
885 proprietary Unix versions for PCs in benchmarks, but is renowned for
886 its ability to run, undisturbed and uncomplaining, for months on end
887 in high-volume high-stress environments without crashing.</para>
888
889 <para>Other components of the free software movement have been equally
890 successful. Apache, far and away the world's leading Web server
891 program, is free software, as is Perl, the programming language which
892 is the lingua franca for the programmers who build sophisticated Web
893 sites. Netscape Communications now distributes its Netscape
894 Communicator 5.0 browser as free software, under a close variant of
895 the Free Software Foundation's General Public License. Major PC
896 manufacturers, including IBM, have announced plans or are already
897 distributing GNU/Linux as a customer option on their top-of-the-line
898 PCs intended for use as Web- and file servers. Samba, a program that
899 allows GNU/Linux computers to act as Windows NT file servers, is used
900 worldwide as an alternative to Windows NT Server, and provides
901 effective low-end competition to Microsoft in its own home market. By
902 the standards of software quality that have been recognized in the
903 industry for decades - and whose continuing relevance will be clear to
904 you the next time your Windows PC crashes - the news at century's end
905 is unambiguous. The world's most profitable and powerful corporation
906 comes in a distant second, having excluded all but the real victor
907 from the race. Propertarianism joined to capitalist vigor destroyed
908 meaningful commercial competition, but when it came to making good
909 software, anarchism won.</para>
910
911
912 </section>
913 </section>
914 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m3"></a>-->
915 <section>
916 <title>III. Anarchism as a Mode of Production</title>
917
918 <para>It's a pretty story, and if only the IPdroid and the econodwarf
919 hadn't been blinded by theory, they'd have seen it coming. But though
920 some of us had been working for it and predicting it for years, the
921 theoretical consequences are so subversive for the thoughtways that
922 maintain our dwarves and droids in comfort that they can hardly be
923 blamed for refusing to see. The facts proved that something was wrong
924 with the "incentives" metaphor that underprops conventional
925 intellectual property reasoning <footnote> <para>22. As recently as
926 early 1994 a talented and technically competent (though Windows-using)
927 law and economics scholar at a major U.S. law school confidently
928 informed me that free software couldn't possibly exist, because no one
929 would have any incentive to make really sophisticated programs
930 requiring substantial investment of effort only to give them
931 away.</para> </footnote> . But they did more. They provided an initial
932 glimpse into the future of human creativity in a world of global
933 interconnection, and it's not a world made for dwarves and
934 droids.</para>
935
936 <para>My argument, before we paused for refreshment in the real world,
937 can be summarized this way: Software - whether executable programs,
938 music, visual art, liturgy, weaponry, or what have you - consists of
939 bitstreams, which although essentially indistinguishable are treated
940 by a confusing multiplicity of legal categories. This multiplicity is
941 unstable in the long term for reasons integral to the legal process.
942 The unstable diversity of rules is caused by the need to distinguish
943 among kinds of property interests in bitstreams. This need is
944 primarily felt by those who stand to profit from the socially
945 acceptable forms of monopoly created by treating ideas as
946 property. Those of us who are worried about the social inequity and
947 cultural hegemony created by this intellectually unsatisfying and
948 morally repugnant regime are shouted down. Those doing the shouting,
949 the dwarves and the droids, believe that these property rules are
950 necessary not from any overt yearning for life in Murdochworld -
951 though a little luxurious co-optation is always welcome - but because
952 the metaphor of incentives, which they take to be not just an image
953 but an argument, proves that these rules - despite their lamentable
954 consequences - are necessary if we are to make good software. The only
955 way to continue to believe this is to ignore the facts. At the center
956 of the digital revolution, with the executable bitstreams that make
957 everything else possible, propertarian regimes not only do not make
958 things better, they can make things radically worse. Property
959 concepts, whatever else may be wrong with them, do not enable and have
960 in fact retarded progress.</para>
961
962 <para>
963 But what is this mysterious alternative? Free software exists, but
964 what are its mechanisms, and how does it generalize towards a
965 non-propertarian theory of the digital society?</para>
966
967 </section>
968 <section>
969
970 <title>The Legal Theory of Free Software</title>
971
972 <para>There is a myth, like most myths partially founded on reality,
973 that computer programmers are all libertarians. Right-wing ones are
974 capitalists, cleave to their stock options, and disdain taxes, unions,
975 and civil rights laws; left-wing ones hate the market and all
976 government, believe in strong encryption no matter how much nuclear
977 terrorism it may cause, <footnote> <para>23. This question too
978 deserves special scrutiny, encrusted as it is with special pleading on
979 the state-power side. See my brief essay <ulink
980 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/yu-encrypt.html">"<emphasis>So
981 Much for Savages</emphasis>: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
982 Play."</ulink></para> </footnote> and dislike Bill Gates because he's
983 rich. There is doubtless a foundation for this belief. But the most
984 significant difference between political thought inside the digirati
985 and outside it is that in the network society, anarchism (or more
986 properly, anti-possessive individualism) is a viable political
987 philosophy.</para>
988
989 <para>The center of the free software movement's success, and the
990 greatest achievement of Richard Stallman, is not a piece of computer
991 code. The success of free software, including the overwhelming success
992 of GNU/Linux, results from the ability to harness extraordinary
993 quantities of high-quality effort for projects of immense size and
994 profound complexity. And this ability in turn results from the legal
995 context in which the labor is mobilized. As a visionary designer
996 Richard Stallman created more than Emacs, GDB, or GNU. He created the
997 General Public License.</para>
998
999 <!-- <center><img src="anarchism_files/mog3.gif" hspace="0"
1000 vspace="0"></center> --> <para>The GPL, <footnote>
1001 <para>24. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
1002 url="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt">GNU General Public License,
1003 Version 2, June 1991.</ulink></para> </footnote> also known as the
1004 copyleft, uses copyright, to paraphrase Toby Milsom, to counterfeit
1005 the phenomena of anarchism. As the license preamble expresses
1006 it:</para>
1007
1008 <blockquote><para>When we speak of free software, we are referring to
1009 freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make
1010 sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software
1011 (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source
1012 code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or
1013 use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do
1014 these things.</para>
1015
1016 <para>To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that
1017 forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the
1018 rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
1019 you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify
1020 it.</para>
1021
1022 <para>For example, if you distribute copies of such a program,
1023 whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the
1024 rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or
1025 can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
1026 know their rights.</para>
1027
1028 <para>Many variants of this basic free software idea have been
1029 expressed in licenses of various kinds, as I have already
1030 indicated. The GPL is different from the other ways of expressing
1031 these values in one crucial respect. Section 2 of the license provides
1032 in pertinent part:</para>
1033
1034 <para>You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any
1035 portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
1036 distribute such modifications or work ..., provided that you also meet
1037 all of these conditions: </para>
1038
1039 <para>...</para>
1040
1041 <para>b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish,
1042 that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or
1043 any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
1044 parties under the terms of this License.</para></blockquote>
1045
1046 <para>Section 2(b) of the GPL is sometimes called "restrictive," but
1047 its intention is liberating. It creates a commons, to which anyone may
1048 add but from which no one may subtract. Because of §2(b), each
1049 contributor to a GPL'd project is assured that she, and all other
1050 users, will be able to run, modify and redistribute the program
1051 indefinitely, that source code will always be available, and that,
1052 unlike commercial software, its longevity cannot be limited by the
1053 contingencies of the marketplace or the decisions of future
1054 developers. This "inheritance" of the GPL has sometimes been
1055 criticized as an example of the free software movement's
1056 anti-commercial bias. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
1057 effect of §2(b) is to make commercial distributors of free software
1058 better competitors against proprietary software businesses. For
1059 confirmation of this point, one can do no better than to ask the
1060 proprietary competitors. As the author of the Microsoft "Halloween"
1061 memorandum, Vinod Vallopillil, put it:</para>
1062
1063 <blockquote><para>The GPL and its aversion to code forking reassures
1064 customers that they aren't riding an evolutionary `dead-end' by
1065 subscribing to a particular commercial version of Linux.</para>
1066
1067 <para>The "evolutionary dead-end" is the core of the software
1068 FUD argument <footnote> <para>25. <ulink
1069 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">V. Vallopillil,
1070 Open Source Software: A (New?) Development Methodology.</ulink></para>
1071 </footnote> .</para></blockquote>
1072
1073 <para>Translated out of Microspeak, this means that the strategy by
1074 which the dominant proprietary manufacturer drives customers away from
1075 competitors - by sowing fear, uncertainty and doubt about other
1076 software's long-term viability - is ineffective with respect to GPL'd
1077 programs. Users of GPL'd code, including those who purchase software
1078 and systems from a commercial reseller, know that future improvements
1079 and repairs will be accessible from the commons, and need not fear
1080 either the disappearance of their supplier or that someone will use a
1081 particularly attractive improvement or a desperately necessary repair
1082 as leverage for "taking the program private."</para>
1083
1084 <para>This use of intellectual property rules to create a commons in
1085 cyberspace is the central institutional structure enabling the
1086 anarchist triumph. Ensuring free access and enabling modification at
1087 each stage in the process means that the evolution of software occurs
1088 in the fast Lamarckian mode: each favorable acquired characteristic of
1089 others' work can be directly inherited. Hence the speed with which the
1090 Linux kernel, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary
1091 predecessors. Because defection is impossible, free riders are
1092 welcome, which resolves one of the central puzzles of collective
1093 action in a propertarian social system.</para>
1094
1095 <para>Non-propertarian production is also directly responsible for the
1096 famous stability and reliability of free software, which arises from
1097 what Eric Raymond calls "Linus' law": With enough eyeballs, all bugs
1098 are shallow. In practical terms, access to source code means that if I
1099 have a problem I can fix it. Because I can fix it, I almost never have
1100 to, because someone else has almost always seen it and fixed it
1101 first.</para>
1102
1103 <para>For the free software community, commitment to anarchist
1104 production may be a moral imperative; as Richard Stallman wrote, it's
1105 about freedom, not about price. Or it may be a matter of utility,
1106 seeking to produce better software than propertarian modes of work
1107 will allow. From the droid point of view, the copyleft represents the
1108 perversion of theory, but better than any other proposal over the past
1109 decades it resolves the problems of applying copyright to the
1110 inextricably merged functional and expressive features of computer
1111 programs. That it produces better software than the alternative does
1112 not imply that traditional copyright principles should now be
1113 prohibited to those who want to own and market inferior software
1114 products, or (more charitably) whose products are too narrow in appeal
1115 for communal production. But our story should serve as a warning to
1116 droids: The world of the future will bear little relation to the world
1117 of the past. The rules are now being bent in two directions. The
1118 corporate owners of "cultural icons" and other assets who seek
1119 ever-longer terms for corporate authors, converting the "limited Time"
1120 of Article I, §8 into a freehold have naturally been whistling music
1121 to the android ear <footnote> <para>26. The looming expiration of
1122 Mickey Mouse's ownership by Disney requires, from the point of view of
1123 that wealthy "campaign contributor," for example, an alteration of the
1124 general copyright law of the United States. See "Not Making it Any
1125 More? Vaporizing the Public Domain," in <emphasis>The Invisible
1126 Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . After all, who bought
1127 the droids their concert tickets? But as the propertarian position
1128 seeks to embed itself ever more strongly, in a conception of copyright
1129 liberated from the minor annoyances of limited terms and fair use, at
1130 the very center of our "cultural software" system, the anarchist
1131 counter-strike has begun. Worse is yet to befall the droids, as we
1132 shall see. But first, we must pay our final devoirs to the
1133 dwarves.</para>
1134
1135 </section>
1136 <section>
1137 <title>Because It's There: Faraday's Magnet and Human Creativity</title>
1138
1139 <para>After all, they deserve an answer. Why do people make free
1140 software if they don't get to profit? Two answers have usually been
1141 given. One is half-right and the other is wrong, but both are
1142 insufficiently simple.</para>
1143
1144 <para>The wrong answer is embedded in numerous references to "the
1145 hacker gift-exchange culture." This use of ethnographic jargon
1146 wandered into the field some years ago and became rapidly, if
1147 misleadingly, ubiquitous. It reminds us only that the
1148 economeretricians have so corrupted our thought processes that any
1149 form of non-market economic behavior seems equal to every other
1150 kind. But gift-exchange, like market barter, is a propertarian
1151 institution. Reciprocity is central to these symbolic enactments of
1152 mutual dependence, and if either the yams or the fish are
1153 short-weighted, trouble results. Free software, at the risk of
1154 repetition, is a commons: no reciprocity ritual is enacted there. A
1155 few people give away code that others sell, use, change, or borrow
1156 wholesale to lift out parts for something else. Notwithstanding the
1157 very large number of people (tens of thousands, at most) who have
1158 contributed to GNU/Linux, this is orders of magnitude less than the
1159 number of users who make no contribution whatever <footnote>
1160 <para>27. A recent industry estimate puts the number of Linux systems
1161 worldwide at 7.5 million. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Josh McHugh, 1998. <ulink
1162 url="http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0810/6203094s1.htm">"Linux: The
1163 Making of a Global Hack,"</ulink> <emphasis>Forbes</emphasis> (August 10). Because the
1164 software is freely obtainable throughout the Net, there is no simple
1165 way to assess actual usage.</para> </footnote>.</para>
1166
1167 <para>A part of the right answer is suggested by the claim that free
1168 software is made by those who seek reputational compensation for their
1169 activity. Famous Linux hackers, the theory is, are known all over the
1170 planet as programming deities. From this they derive either enhanced
1171 self-esteem or indirect material advancement <footnote> <para>28. Eric
1172 Raymond is a partisan of the "ego boost" theory, to which he adds
1173 another faux-ethnographic comparison, of free software composition to
1174 the Kwakiutl potlatch. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Eric S. Raymond, 1998. <ulink
1175 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond/index.html">Homesteading
1176 the Noosphere.</ulink>. But the potlatch, certainly a form of status
1177 competition, is unlike free software for two fundamental reasons: it
1178 is essentially hierarchical, which free software is not, and, as we
1179 have known since Thorstein Veblen first called attention to its
1180 significance, it is a form of conspicuous waste. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Thorstein
1181 Veblen, 1967. <emphasis>The Theory of the Leisure Class.</emphasis> New York:
1182 Viking, p. 75. These are precisely the grounds which distinguish the
1183 anti-hierarchical and utilitiarian free software culture from its
1184 propertarian counterparts.</para></footnote>. But the programming
1185 deities, much as they have contributed to free software, have not done
1186 the bulk of the work. Reputations, as Linus Torvalds himself has often
1187 pointed out, are made by willingly acknowledging that it was all done
1188 by someone else. And, as many observers have noted, the free software
1189 movement has also produced superlative
1190 documentation. Documentation-writing is not what hackers do to attain
1191 cool, and much of the documentation has been written by people who
1192 didn't write the code. Nor must we limit the indirect material
1193 advantages of authorship to increases in reputational capital. Most
1194 free software authors I know have day jobs in the technology
1195 industries, and the skills they hone in the more creative work they do
1196 outside the market no doubt sometimes measurably enhance their value
1197 within it. And as the free software products gained critical mass and
1198 became the basis of a whole new set of business models built around
1199 commercial distribution of that which people can also get for nothing,
1200 an increasing number of people are specifically employed to write free
1201 software. But in order to be employable in the field, they must
1202 already have established themselves there. Plainly, then, this motive
1203 is present, but it isn't the whole explanation.</para>
1204
1205 <para>Indeed, the rest of the answer is just too simple to have
1206 received its due. The best way to understand is to follow the brief
1207 and otherwise unsung career of an initially-grudging free software
1208 author. Microsoft's Vinod Vallopillil, in the course of writing the
1209 competitive analysis of Linux that was leaked as the second of the
1210 famous "Halloween memoranda," bought and installed a Linux system on
1211 one of his office computers. He had trouble because the (commercial)
1212 Linux distribution he installed did not contain a daemon to handle the
1213 DHCP protocol for assignment of dynamic IP addresses. The result was
1214 important enough for us to risk another prolonged exposure to the
1215 Microsoft Writing Style:</para>
1216
1217 <blockquote><para>A small number of Web sites and FAQs later, I found an FTP
1218 site with a Linux DHCP client. The DHCP client was developed by an
1219 engineer employed by Fore Systems (as evidenced by his e-mail address;
1220 I believe, however, that it was developed in his own free time). A
1221 second set of documentation/manuals was written for the DHCP client by
1222 a hacker in <emphasis>Hungary</emphasis> which provided relatively simple
1223 instructions on how to install/load the client.</para>
1224
1225 <para>I downloaded &amp; uncompressed the client and typed two
1226 simple commands:</para>
1227
1228 <para>Make - compiles the client binaries</para>
1229
1230 <para>Make Install -installed the binaries as a Linux Daemon</para>
1231
1232 <para>Typing "DHCPCD" (for DHCP Client Daemon) on the command
1233 line triggered the DHCP discovery process and voila, I had IP
1234 networking running. </para>
1235
1236 <para>Since I had just downloaded the DHCP client code, on an
1237 impulse I played around a bit. Although the client wasn't as
1238 extensible as the DHCP client we are shipping in NT5 (for example, it
1239 won't query for arbitrary options &amp; store results), it was obvious
1240 how I could write the additional code to implement this functionality.
1241 The full client consisted of about 2,600 lines of code.</para>
1242
1243 <para>One example of esoteric, extended functionality that was
1244 clearly patched in by a third party was a set of routines to that
1245 would pad the DHCP request with host-specific strings required by
1246 Cable Modem / ADSL sites.</para>
1247
1248 <para>A few other steps were required to configure the DHCP
1249 client to auto-start and auto-configure my Ethernet interface on boot
1250 but these were documented in the client code and in the DHCP
1251 documentation from the Hungarian developer.</para>
1252
1253 <para>I'm a poorly skilled UNIX programmer but it was
1254 immediately obvious to me how to incrementally extend the DHCP client
1255 code (the feeling was exhilarating and addictive).</para>
1256
1257 <para>Additionally, due directly to GPL + having the full development
1258 environment in front of me, I was in a position where I could write up
1259 my changes and e-mail them out within a couple of hours (in contrast
1260 to how things like this would get done in NT). Engaging in that
1261 process would have prepared me for a larger, more ambitious Linux
1262 project in the future <footnote><para>29. Vinod Vallopillil, <ulink
1263 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween2.html">Linux OS
1264 Competitive Analysis (Halloween II).</ulink> Note Vallopillil's
1265 surprise that a program written in California had been subsequently
1266 documented by a programmer in Hungary.</para>
1267 </footnote>.</para></blockquote>
1268
1269 <para>"The feeling was exhilarating and addictive." Stop the presses:
1270 Microsoft experimentally verifies Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to
1271 Faraday's Law. Wrap the Internet around every brain on the planet and
1272 spin the planet. Software flows in the wires. It's an emergent
1273 property of human minds to create. "Due directly to the GPL," as
1274 Vallopillil rightly pointed out, free software made available to him
1275 an exhilarating increase in his own creativity, of a kind not
1276 achievable in his day job working for the Greatest Programming Company
1277 on Earth. If only he had e-mailed that first addictive fix, who knows
1278 where he'd be now?</para>
1279
1280 <para>So, in the end, my dwarvish friends, it's just a human thing.
1281 Rather like why Figaro sings, why Mozart wrote the music for him to
1282 sing to, and why we all make up new words: Because we can. Homo
1283 ludens, meet Homo faber. The social condition of global
1284 interconnection that we call the Internet makes it possible for all of
1285 us to be creative in new and previously undreamed-of ways. Unless we
1286 allow "ownership" to interfere. Repeat after me, ye dwarves and men:
1287 Resist the resistance!</para>
1288
1289 </section>
1290 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m4"></a>-->
1291
1292 <section>
1293 <title>IV. Their Lordships Die in the Dark?</title>
1294
1295 <para>For the IPdroid, fresh off the plane from a week at Bellagio
1296 paid for by Dreamworks SKG, it's enough to cause indigestion.</para>
1297
1298 <para>Unlock the possibilities of human creativity by connecting
1299 everyone to everyone else? Get the ownership system out of the way so
1300 that we can all add our voices to the choir, even if that means
1301 pasting our singing on top of the Mormon Tabernacle and sending the
1302 output to a friend? No one sitting slack-jawed in front of a televised
1303 mixture of violence and imminent copulation carefully devised to
1304 heighten the young male eyeball's interest in a beer commercial? What
1305 will become of civilization? Or at least of copyright teachers?</para>
1306
1307 <para>But perhaps this is premature. I've only been talking about
1308 software. Real software, the old kind, that runs computers. Not like
1309 the software that runs DVD players, or the kind made by the Grateful
1310 Dead. "Oh yes, the Grateful Dead. Something strange about them, wasn't
1311 there? Didn't prohibit recording at their concerts. Didn't mind if
1312 their fans rather riled the recording industry. Seem to have done all
1313 right, though, you gotta admit. Senator Patrick Leahy, isn't he a
1314 former Deadhead? I wonder if he'll vote to extend corporate authorship
1315 terms to 125 years, so that Disney doesn't lose The Mouse in 2004. And
1316 those DVD players - they're computers, aren't they?"</para>
1317
1318 <para>In the digital society, it's all connected. We can't depend for
1319 the long run on distinguishing one bitstream from another in order to
1320 figure out which rules apply. What happened to software is already
1321 happening to music. Their recording industry lordships are now
1322 scrambling wildly to retain control over distribution, as both
1323 musicians and listeners realize that the middlepeople are no longer
1324 necessary. The Great Potemkin Village of 1999, the so-called Secure
1325 Digital Music Initiative, will have collapsed long before the first
1326 Internet President gets inaugurated, for simple technical reasons as
1327 obvious to those who know as the ones that dictated the triumph of
1328 free software <footnote> <para>30. See "They're Playing Our Song: The
1329 Day the Music Industry Died," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
1330 forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . The anarchist revolution in music is
1331 different from the one in software <emphasis>tout court</emphasis>, but here too -
1332 as any teenager with an MP3 collection of self-released music from
1333 unsigned artists can tell you - theory has been killed off by the
1334 facts. Whether you are Mick Jagger, or a great national artist from
1335 the third world looking for a global audience, or a garret-dweller
1336 reinventing music, the recording industry will soon have nothing to
1337 offer you that you can't get better for free. And music doesn't sound
1338 worse when distributed for free, pay what you want directly to the
1339 artist, and don't pay anything if you don't want to. Give it to your
1340 friends; they might like it.</para>
1341
1342 <para>
1343 What happened to music is also happening to news. The wire services,
1344 as any U.S. law student learns even before taking the near-obligatory
1345 course in Copyright for Droids, have a protectible property interest
1346 in their expression of the news, even if not in the facts the news
1347 reports <footnote><para>31. International News Service v. Associated
1348 Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). With regard to the actual terse, purely
1349 functional expressions of breaking news actually at stake in the
1350 jostling among wire services, this was always a distinction only a
1351 droid could love.</para></footnote>. So why are they now giving all
1352 their output away? Because in the world of the Net, most news is
1353 commodity news. And the original advantage of the news gatherers, that
1354 they were internally connected in ways others were not when
1355 communications were expensive, is gone. Now what matters is collecting
1356 eyeballs to deliver to advertisers. It isn't the wire services that
1357 have the advantage in covering Kosovo, that's for sure. Much less
1358 those paragons of "intellectual" property, their television
1359 lordships. They, with their overpaid pretty people and their massive
1360 technical infrastructure, are about the only organizations in the
1361 world that can't afford to be everywhere all the time. And then they
1362 have to limit themselves to ninety seconds a story, or the eyeball
1363 hunters will go somewhere else. So who makes better news, the
1364 propertarians or the anarchists? We shall soon see.</para>
1365
1366 <para>Oscar Wilde says somewhere that the problem with socialism is
1367 that it takes up too many evenings. The problems with anarchism as a
1368 social system are also about transaction costs. But the digital
1369 revolution alters two aspects of political economy that have been
1370 otherwise invariant throughout human history. All software has zero
1371 marginal cost in the world of the Net, while the costs of social
1372 coordination have been so far reduced as to permit the rapid formation
1373 and dissolution of large-scale and highly diverse social groupings
1374 entirely without geographic limitation <footnote> <para>32. See "No
1375 Prodigal Son: The Political Theory of Universal Interconnection," in
1376 <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . Such
1377 fundamental change in the material circumstances of life necessarily
1378 produces equally fundamental changes in culture. Think not? Tell it to
1379 the Iroquois. And of course such profound shifts in culture are
1380 threats to existing power relations. Think not? Ask the Chinese
1381 Communist Party. Or wait 25 years and see if you can find them for
1382 purposes of making the inquiry.</para>
1383
1384 <para>In this context, the obsolescence of the IPdroid is neither
1385 unforseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into
1386 the desert, still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the
1387 profitably complicated rules for a world that no longer exists. But at
1388 least it will have familiar company, recognizable from all those
1389 glittering parties in Davos, Hollywood, and Brussels. Our Media Lords
1390 are now at handigrips with fate, however much they may feel that the
1391 Force is with them. The rules about bitstreams are now of dubious
1392 utility for maintaining power by co-opting human creativity. Seen
1393 clearly in the light of fact, these Emperors have even fewer clothes
1394 than the models they use to grab our eyeballs. Unless supported by
1395 user-disabling technology, a culture of pervasive surveillance that
1396 permits every reader of every "property" to be logged and charged, and
1397 a smokescreen of droid-breath assuring each and every young person
1398 that human creativity would vanish without the benevolent aristocracy
1399 of BillG the Creator, Lord Murdoch of Everywhere, the Spielmeister and
1400 the Lord High Mouse, their reign is nearly done. But what's at stake
1401 is the control of the scarcest resource of all: our
1402 attention. Conscripting that makes all the money in the world in the
1403 digital economy, and the current lords of the earth will fight for
1404 it. Leagued against them are only the anarchists: nobodies, hippies,
1405 hobbyists, lovers, and artists. The resulting unequal contest is the
1406 great political and legal issue of our time. Aristocracy looks hard
1407 to beat, but that's how it looked in 1788 and 1913 too. It is, as Chou
1408 En-Lai said about the meaning of the French Revolution, too soon to
1409 tell.</para>
1410
1411 </section>
1412 <section>
1413 <title>About the Author</title>
1414
1415 <para>Eben Moglen is Professor of Law &amp; Legal History, Columbia Law School.
1416 E-mail: <ulink url="mailto:moglen@columbia.edu">Mail: moglen@columbia.edu</ulink></para>
1417
1418 <para>Acknowledgments</para>
1419
1420 <para>This paper was prepared for delivery at the Buchmann
1421 International Conference on Law, Technology and Information, at Tel
1422 Aviv University, May 1999; my thanks to the organizers for their kind
1423 invitation. I owe much as always to Pamela Karlan for her insight and
1424 encouragement. I especially wish to thank the programmers throughout
1425 the world who made free software possible.</para>
1426
1427
1428 <blockquote>
1429 <para>
1430 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/contents.gif" alt="Contents" align="bottom" border="0">--></ulink> </para>
1431 <para>
1432 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/index.gif" alt="Index" border="0">--></ulink>
1433 </para>
1434 <para>Copyright <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/copy.html">©</ulink> 1999, First Monday</para></blockquote>
1435
1436
1437 </section>
1438</article>
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