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r1182@kochinka: ash | 2007-03-16 08:26:47 +0200
anarchism: съвсем мъничко превод.

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5 <title>Триумфиращият анархизъм</title>
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16 <meta name="Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from
17 being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
18 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
19 <meta name="Keywords" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
20 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Anarchism triumphant">
21 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Free software and the death of copyright">
22 <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Moglen, Eben">
23 <meta name="DC.Subject" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
24 <meta name="DC.Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
25 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
26 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Valauskas, Edward J.">
27 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Dyson, Esther">
28 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Ghosh, Rishab Aiyer">
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36<blockquote><img src="anarchism_files/logo.gif" alt="First Monday" align="bottom" border="0" height="40" width="256"><br>
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42 <para><ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html#author"><!-- <img src="anarchism_files/moglen.gif" alt="Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright" border="0">--> </ulink></para>
43
44 <blockquote><para>Разпространението на ядрото за операционни системи
45 Линукс насочи вниманието към движението за свободен софтуер. Това есе
46 показва защо свободният софтуер, който далеч не е нищожен участник в
47 пазара на комерсиален софтуер, е важната първа стъпка в премахването
48 на системата на интелектуална собственост.</para></blockquote>
49
50 <section>
51 <title>Софтуерът като собственост: Теоретичният парадокс</title>
52
53 <para><emphasis>Софтуер</emphasis>: никоя друга дума не въплъщава
54 толкова пълно рактическите и социалните ефекти на цифровата революция.
55 Първоначално терминът е бил чисто технически и е означавал частите на
56 една компютърна система, която за разлика от "хардуера" -- направен
57 непроменим от производителя си в електрониката на системата, е можел
58 свободно да бъде променян. Първият софтуер е представлявал начина на
59 включване на кабели и прекъсвачи на външните панели на електронни
60 устройства, но още с появата на езикови средства за промяната на
61 поведението на компютъра, "софтуер" започнал да обозначава предимно
62 изразяванията в повече или по-малко понятех за хората език, който
63 както описвал, така и контролирал поведението на машината<footnote>
64 <para>1. Тази отлика е била само приблизителна в първоначалния
65 контекст. В края на 60-те определена част от основните операции
66 на хардуера са контролирани от програми, които са цифрово кодирани
67 в електрониката на компютърното оборудване, които не могат да
68 бъдат променяни веднъж след като продукцията е излязла от
69 фабриката. Такива символни, но непроменими компоненти, са били
70 известни като "микрокод" на жаргона на индустрията, но стана
71 обичайно те да се наричат "фърмуеър". Изменчивостта, както бе
72 показано от термина "фърмуеър" (# БЕЛЕЖКА ЗА ЗНАЧЕНИЕТО НА
73 КОРЕНИТЕ НА ДУМИТЕ СОФТУЕР, ХАРДУЕР, ФЪРМУЕР),се отнася главно към
74 възможността на потребителите да изменят символите, които
75 определят поведението на машината. Понеже цифровата революция
76 доведе до широката употреба на компютрите от технически
77 некомпетентни лица, повечето от традиционния софтуер -- приложни
78 програми, операционни системи, инструкции за числово управление и
79 т. н. -- е, за повечето от потребителите си, фърмуер. Може да е
80 символен, а не електронен в начина, по който е направен, но те не
81 могат да го променят, дори и да искат, нещо което те често, но
82 безсилно и с негодуванние правят. Това "затвърдяване на софтуера"
83 е основното условие на собственическия подход към законовата
84 организация на цифровото обществео, което е темата на този
85 доклад.</para></footnote>.</para>
86
87 <para>Така е било тогава, а сега е така: технологиите базирани на
88 обработката на информация кодирана в цифров вид сега е социално
89 доминираща в повечето аспекти на човешката култура в "развитите"
90 общества. <footnote><para>2. В рамките на сегашното поколение,
91 самата концепция за социално "равитие" се измества от притежанието
92 на индустрия основана на двигател с вътрешно горене към
93 "пост-индустрия" базирана на цифровите комуникации и свързаните с
94 тях форми на икономическа дейност, основани на
95 "знания".</para></footnote>. Преминаването от аналогово към
96 цифрово представяне -- във видеото, музиката, печатането,
97 телекомуникациите и дори хореографията, религиозните церемонии и
98 сексуалното задоволяване (# religious worship, sexual
99 gratification) -- потенциално превръща всички форми на човешката
100 символна дейност във софтуер, то ест -- променими инструкции за
101 описание и управление на поведението на машините. Чрез
102 концептуално постформиране, характено за западното научно мислене,
103 разделението между хардуера и софтуера се наблюдава в природния
104 или социалния свят и е станал нов начин за изразяване на конфликта
105 между идеите на детерминизъм и свободната воля, природата и
106 възпитанието, или гените и културата. (# Какво е backformation?
107 Аналог на transformation ли? By a conceptual back-formation
108 characteristic of Western scientistic thinking, the division
109 between hardware and software is now being observed in the natural
110 or social world, and has become a new way to express the conflict
111 between ideas of determinism and free will, nature and nurture, or
112 genes and culture.) Нашият "хардуер", който е генетично зададен е
113 нашата природа и ни определя. Нашето възпитание е "софтуера",
114 който задава културното ни прграмиране, което е нашата относителна
115 свобода. И така нататък, за неразумно дърдорещите. (# And so on,
116 for those reckless of blather).<footnote><para>3. Всъщност, едно
117 бързо замисляне ще разкрие, че нашите гени са фърмуеър.
118 Еволюцията направи прехода от аналогово към цифрово още преди
119 периода на първите вкаменелости. Но ние не притежавахме властта
120 за управлявани, преки промени. До завчера. През следващото
121 столетие гените също ще се превърнат в софтуер и въпреки че не
122 разглеждам проблема по нататък в това есе, политиеските
123 последствия на несвободността на софтуера в този контекст са още
124 по-плашещи в сравнение с културните артефакти.</para></footnote>
125 Този "софтуер" се превръща в жизнеспособна метафора за цялата
126 символна активност, която очевидно е разведена (еманципирана) от
127 техническия контекст на произхода на думата, въпреки неудобството,
128 което се появява в технически компетентните, когато термина влиза
129 в устите на хората, като се изпуска концептуалното значение на
130 неговия произход.<footnote><para>4. <emphasis>Виж
131 напр.:</emphasis> J. M. Balkin, 1998. <emphasis>Cultural Software:
132 a Theory of Ideology.</emphasis> New Haven: Yale University
133 Press.</para></footnote></para>
134
135
136 <para>Но широкото възприемане на използването на цифровите
137 технологии от тези, които не разбират принципите на действието им,
138 въпреки, че лицензира (#позволява, licenses) широкото метафорично
139 наемане на "софтуера", всъщност не ни позволява да забравим, че
140 сега компютрите са навсякъде под нашата социална кожа. Движението
141 от аналогово към цифрово е по-важно за структурата на социалните и
142 юридическите отношения отколкото по известното, но по-несигурно
143 преминаване от статс към договор (# from status to contract)
144 <footnote><para>5. <emphasis>Виж</emphasis> Henry Sumner Maine,
145 1861. <emphasis>Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History
146 of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Idea.</emphasis> First
147 edition. London: J. Murray.</para></footnote>. Това са лоши
148 новини за тези правни мислители, които не го разбират, и което е
149 причината толкова много преструване на разбиране така добре да
150 процъфтява. Потенциално обаче, нашето велико преминаване е много
151 добра новина за тези, които могат да превърнат новооткритата земя
152 в своя собственост. Това е и причината текущите "притежатели" на
153 софтуера толкова силно да поддържат и насърчават невежеството на
154 всички останали. За тяхно нещастие -- по причини известни на
155 правните теоретици, които все още не са разбрали как да прилагат
156 традиционната си логика в тази сфера -- трикът няма да се
157 задейства. Това есе обяснява защо<footnote><para>6. По принцип не
158 харесвам вмъкването на автобиография в изследователската дейност.
159 Но понеже това тук е мое тъжно задължение, а и голямо удоволствие
160 да оспоря квалифицираността или <emphasis>bona fide-то</emphasis>
161 на кажи-речи всеки, трябва да си позволя преценка на себе си. За
162 първи път бях изложен на занаята (#вещината - craft) на
163 компютърното програмиране през 1971г. Започнах да получавам
164 надник като комерсиален програмист през 1973г. -- на възраст от 13
165 г. и продълавах така в разнообразие от компютърни услуги,
166 инжинерство и многонационални технологически предрпиятия
167 (#enerprises) до 1985г. През 1975 спомогнах за написването на
168 една от първите системи за електронна поща в САЩ. От 1979г. бях
169 зает с проучването и разработката на висши компютърни езици за
170 програмиране в Ай Би Ем. Тези дейности направиха икономически
171 възможно за мен да изучавам и I was
172 engaged in research and development of advanced computer
173 programming languages at IBM. These activities made it
174 economically possible for me to study the arts of historical
175 scholarship and legal cunning. My wages were sufficient to pay my
176 tuitions, but not - to anticipate an argument that will be made by
177 the econodwarves further along - because my programs were the
178 intellectual property of my employer, but rather because they made
179 the hardware my employer sold work better. Most of what I wrote
180 was effectively free software, as we shall see. Although I
181 subsequently made some inconsiderable technical contributions to
182 the actual free software movement this paper describes, my primary
183 activities on its behalf have been legal: I have served for the
184 past five years (without pay, naturally) as general counsel of the
185 Free Software Foundation.</para></footnote>.</para>
186
187 <para>We need to begin by considering the technical essence of the
188 familiar devices that surround us in the era of "cultural software." A
189 CD player is a good example. Its primary input is a bitstream read
190 from an optical storage disk. The bitstream describes music in terms
191 of measurements, taken 44,000 times per second, of frequency and
192 amplitude in each of two audio channels. The player's primary output
193 is analog audio signals <footnote><para>7. The player, of course, has
194 secondary inputs and outputs in control channels: buttons or infrared
195 remote control are input, and time and track display are
196 output.</para></footnote>. Like everything else in the digital world,
197 music as seen by a CD player is mere numeric information; a particular
198 recording of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony recorded by Arturo Toscanini
199 and the NBC Symphony Orchestra and Chorale is (to drop a few
200 insignificant digits) 1276749873424, while Glenn Gould's peculiarly
201 perverse last recording of the Goldberg Variations is (similarly
202 rather truncated) 767459083268.</para>
203
204 <para>Oddly enough, these two numbers are "copyrighted." This means,
205 supposedly, that you can't possess another copy of these numbers, once
206 fixed in any physical form, unless you have licensed them. And you
207 can't turn 767459083268 into 2347895697 for your friends (thus
208 correcting Gould's ridiculous judgment about tempi) without making a
209 "derivative work," for which a license is necessary.</para>
210
211 <para>At the same time, a similar optical storage disk contains
212 another number, let us call it 7537489532. This one is an algorithm
213 for linear programming of large systems with multiple constraints,
214 useful for example if you want to make optimal use of your rolling
215 stock in running a freight railroad. This number (in the U.S.) is
216 "patented," which means you cannot derive 7537489532 for yourself, or
217 otherwise "practice the art" of the patent with respect to solving
218 linear programming problems no matter how you came by the idea,
219 including finding it out for yourself, unless you have a license from
220 the number's owner.</para>
221
222 <para>Then there's 9892454959483. This one is the source code for
223 Microsoft Word. In addition to being "copyrighted," this one is a
224 trade secret. That means if you take this number from Microsoft and
225 give it to anyone else you can be punished.</para>
226
227 <para>Lastly, there's 588832161316. It doesn't do anything, it's just
228 the square of 767354. As far as I know, it isn't owned by anybody
229 under any of these rubrics. Yet.</para>
230
231 <para>At this point we must deal with our first objection from the
232 learned. It comes from a creature known as the IPdroid. The droid has
233 a sophisticated mind and a cultured life. It appreciates very much the
234 elegant dinners at academic and ministerial conferences about the
235 TRIPs, not to mention the privilege of frequent appearances on MSNBC.
236 It wants you to know that I'm committing the mistake of confusing the
237 embodiment with the intellectual property itself. It's not the number
238 that's patented, stupid, just the Kamarkar algorithm. The number
239 <emphasis>can</emphasis> be copyrighted, because copyright covers the
240 expressive qualities of a particular tangible embodiment of an idea
241 (in which some functional properties may be mysteriously merged,
242 provided that they're not too merged), but not the algorithm. Whereas
243 the number isn't patentable, just the "teaching" of the number with
244 respect to making railroads run on time. And the number representing
245 the source code of Microsoft Word can be a trade secret, but if you
246 find it out for yourself (by performing arithmetic manipulation of
247 other numbers issued by Microsoft, for example, which is known as
248 "reverse engineering"), you're not going to be punished, at least if
249 you live in some parts of the United States.</para>
250
251 <para>This droid, like other droids, is often right. The condition of
252 being a droid is to know everything about something and nothing about
253 anything else. By its timely and urgent intervention the droid has
254 established that the current intellectual property system contains
255 many intricate and ingenious features. The complexities combine to
256 allow professors to be erudite, Congressmen to get campaign
257 contributions, lawyers to wear nice suits and tassel loafers, and
258 Murdoch to be rich. The complexities mostly evolved in an age of
259 industrial information distribution, when information was inscribed in
260 analog forms on physical objects that cost something significant to
261 make, move, and sell. When applied to digital information that moves
262 frictionlessly through the network and has zero marginal cost per
263 copy, everything still works, mostly, as long as you don't stop
264 squinting.</para>
265
266 <para>But that wasn't what I was arguing about. I wanted to point out
267 something else: that our world consists increasingly of nothing but
268 large numbers (also known as bitstreams), and that - for reasons
269 having nothing to do with emergent properties of the numbers
270 themselves - the legal system is presently committed to treating
271 similar numbers radically differently. No one can tell, simply by
272 looking at a number that is 100 million digits long, whether that
273 number is subject to patent, copyright, or trade secret protection, or
274 indeed whether it is "owned" by anyone at all. So the legal system we
275 have - blessed as we are by its consequences if we are copyright
276 teachers, Congressmen, Gucci-gulchers or Big Rupert himself - is
277 compelled to treat indistinguishable things in unlike ways.</para>
278
279 <para>Now, in my role as a legal historian concerned with the secular
280 (that is, very long term) development of legal thought, I claim that
281 legal regimes based on sharp but unpredictable distinctions among
282 similar objects are radically unstable. They fall apart over time
283 because every instance of the rules' application is an invitation to
284 at least one side to claim that instead of fitting in ideal category A
285 the particular object in dispute should be deemed to fit instead in
286 category B, where the rules will be more favorable to the party making
287 the claim. This game - about whether a typewriter should be deemed a
288 musical instrument for purposes of railway rate regulation, or whether
289 a steam shovel is a motor vehicle - is the frequent stuff of legal
290 ingenuity. But when the conventionally-approved legal categories
291 require judges to distinguish among the identical, the game is
292 infinitely lengthy, infinitely costly, and almost infinitely offensive
293 to the unbiased bystander <footnote><para>8. This is not an insight
294 unique to our present enterprise. A closely-related idea forms one of
295 the most important principles in the history of Anglo-American law,
296 perfectly put by Toby Milsom in the following terms:</para>
297 <blockquote><para>The life of the common law has been in the abuse of
298 its elementary ideas. If the rules of property give what now seems an
299 unjust answer, try obligation; and equity has proved that from the
300 materials of obligation you can counterfeit the phenomena of
301 property. If the rules of contract give what now seems an unjust
302 answer, try tort. ... If the rules of one tort, say deceit, give what
303 now seems an unjust answer, try another, try negligence. And so the
304 legal world goes round.</para></blockquote><para>S.F.C. Milsom,
305 1981. <emphasis>Historical Foundations of the Common Law.</emphasis>
306 Second edition. London: Butterworths, p. 6.</para> </footnote>.</para>
307
308 <para>Thus parties can spend all the money they want on all the
309 legislators and judges they can afford - which for the new "owners" of
310 the digital world is quite a few - but the rules they buy aren't going
311 to work in the end. Sooner or later, the paradigms are going to
312 collapse. Of course, if later means two generations from now, the
313 distribution of wealth and power sanctified in the meantime may not be
314 reversible by any course less drastic than a <emphasis>bellum
315 servile</emphasis> of couch potatoes against media magnates. So
316 knowing that history isn't on Bill Gates' side isn't enough. We are
317 predicting the future in a very limited sense: we know that the
318 existing rules, which have yet the fervor of conventional belief
319 solidly enlisted behind them, are no longer meaningful. Parties will
320 use and abuse them freely until the mainstream of "respectable"
321 conservative opinion acknowledges their death, with uncertain
322 results. But realistic scholarship should already be turning its
323 attention to the clear need for new thoughtways.</para>
324
325 <para>When we reach this point in the argument, we find ourselves
326 contending with the other primary protagonist of educated idiocy: the
327 econodwarf. Like the IPdroid, the econodwarf is a species of hedgehog,
328 <footnote><para>9. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Isaiah Berlin,
329 1953. <emphasis>The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View
330 of History.</emphasis> New York: Simon and Schuster.</para>
331 </footnote> but where the droid is committed to logic over experience,
332 the econodwarf specializes in an energetic and well-focused but
333 entirely erroneous view of human nature. According to the econodwarf's
334 vision, each human being is an individual possessing "incentives,"
335 which can be retrospectively unearthed by imagining the state of the
336 bank account at various times. So in this instance the econodwarf
337 feels compelled to object that without the rules I am lampooning,
338 there would be no incentive to create the things the rules treat as
339 property: without the ability to exclude others from music there would
340 be no music, because no one could be sure of getting paid for creating
341 it.</para>
342
343 <para>Music is not really our subject; the software I am considering
344 at the moment is the old kind: computer programs. But as he is
345 determined to deal at least cursorily with the subject, and because,
346 as we have seen, it is no longer really possible to distinguish
347 computer programs from music performances, a word or two should be
348 said. At least we can have the satisfaction of indulging in an
349 argument <emphasis>ad pygmeam</emphasis>. When the econodwarf grows
350 rich, in my experience, he attends the opera. But no matter how often
351 he hears <emphasis>Don Giovanni</emphasis> it never occurs to him that
352 Mozart's fate should, on his logic, have entirely discouraged
353 Beethoven, or that we have <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis> even
354 though Mozart knew very well he wouldn't be paid. In fact,
355 <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis>, <emphasis>St. Matthew's
356 Passion</emphasis>, and the motets of the wife-murderer Carlo Gesualdo
357 are all part of the centuries-long tradition of free software, in the
358 more general sense, which the econodwarf never quite
359 acknowledges.</para> <!--<center><img
360 src="anarchism_files/mog1.gif"></center> --> <para> The dwarf's basic
361 problem is that "incentives" is merely a metaphor, and as a metaphor
362 to describe human creative activity it's pretty crummy. I have said
363 this before, <footnote> <para>10. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
364 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/nospeech.html">The
365 Virtual Scholar and Network Liberation.</ulink></para> </footnote> but
366 the better metaphor arose on the day Michael Faraday first noticed
367 what happened when he wrapped a coil of wire around a magnet and spun
368 the magnet. Current flows in such a wire, but we don't ask what the
369 incentive is for the electrons to leave home. We say that the current
370 results from an emergent property of the system, which we call
371 induction. The question we ask is "what's the resistance of the wire?"
372 So Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law says that if you
373 wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
374 planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
375 connected human minds that they create things for one another's
376 pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. The
377 only question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network?
378 Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the
379 resistance of the network is directly proportional to the field
380 strength of the "intellectual property" system. So the right answer to
381 the econodwarf is, resist the resistance.</para>
382
383 <para>Естествено, всичко това звучи много добре на теория.
384 „Съпротивлявай се на съпротивата“ звучи добре, но ще се окажем
385 пред сериозен проблем, каквато и да е теорията, ако открием, че не
386 се произвежда достатъчно софтуерна стока, ако не позволяваме на
387 хората да я притежават. Но джуджетатат и дроидите са формалисти
388 от различно естество, предимството на реализма е, че ако започнеш
389 с фактитв, те винаги са на твоя страна. Оказва се, че да се
390 отнасяме към софтуера като съм собственост, води до правенето на
391 лош софтуер.</para>
392
393 </section>
394 <section>
395 <title>II. Software as Property: The Practical Problem</title>
396
397 <para>In order to understand why turning software into property
398 produces bad software, we need an introduction to the history of the
399 art. In fact, we'd better start with the word "art" itself. The
400 programming of computers combines determinate reasoning with literary
401 invention.</para>
402
403 <para>At first glance, to be sure, source code appears to be a
404 non-literary form of composition <footnote><para>11. Some basic
405 vocabulary is essential. Digital computers actually execute numerical
406 instructions: bitstrings that contain information in the "native"
407 language created by the machine's designers. This is usually referred
408 to as "machine language." The machine languages of hardware are
409 designed for speed of execution at the hardware level, and are not
410 suitable for direct use by human beings. So among the central
411 components of a computer system are "programming languages," which
412 translate expressions convenient for humans into machine language. The
413 most common and relevant, but by no means the only, form of computer
414 language is a "compiler." The compiler performs static translation, so
415 that a file containing human-readable instructions, known as "source
416 code" results in the generation of one or more files of executable
417 machine language, known as "object code."</para> </footnote>. The
418 primary desideratum in a computer program is that it works, that is to
419 say, performs according to specifications formally describing its
420 outputs in terms of its inputs. At this level of generality, the
421 functional content of programs is all that can be seen.</para>
422
423 <para>But working computer programs exist as parts of computer
424 systems, which are interacting collections of hardware, software, and
425 human beings. The human components of a computer system include not
426 only the users, but also the (potentially different) persons who
427 maintain and improve the system. Source code not only communicates
428 with the computer that executes the program, through the intermediary
429 of the compiler that produces machine-language object code, but also
430 with other programmers.</para>
431
432 <para>The function of source code in relation to other human beings is
433 not widely grasped by non-programmers, who tend to think of computer
434 programs as incomprehensible. They would be surprised to learn that
435 the bulk of information contained in most programs is, from the point
436 of view of the compiler or other language processor, "comment," that
437 is, non-functional material. The comments, of course, are addressed to
438 others who may need to fix a problem or to alter or enhance the
439 program's operation. In most programming languages, far more space is
440 spent in telling people what the program does than in telling the
441 computer how to do it.</para>
442
443 <para>The design of programming languages has always proceeded under
444 the dual requirements of complete specification for machine execution
445 and informative description for human readers. One might identify
446 three basic strategies in language design for approaching this dual
447 purpose. The first, pursued initially with respect to the design of
448 languages specific to particular hardware products and collectively
449 known as "assemblers," essentially separated the human- and
450 machine-communication portions of the program. Assembler instructions
451 are very close relatives of machine-language instructions: in general,
452 one line of an assembler program corresponds to one instruction in the
453 native language of the machine. The programmer controls machine
454 operation at the most specific possible level, and (if
455 well-disciplined) engages in running commentary alongside the machine
456 instructions, pausing every few hundred instructions to create "block
457 comments," which provide a summary of the strategy of the program, or
458 document the major data structures the program manipulates.</para>
459
460 <para>A second approach, characteristically depicted by the language
461 COBOL (which stood for "Common Business-Oriented Language"), was to
462 make the program itself look like a set of natural language
463 directions, written in a crabbed but theoretically human-readable
464 style. A line of COBOL code might say, for example "MULTIPLY PRICE
465 TIMES QUANTITY GIVING EXPANSION." At first, when the Pentagon and
466 industry experts began the joint design of COBOL in the early 1960's,
467 this seemed a promising approach. COBOL programs appeared largely
468 self-documenting, allowing both the development of work teams able to
469 collaborate on the creation of large programs, and the training of
470 programmers who, while specialized workers, would not need to
471 understand the machine as intimately as assembler programs had to. But
472 the level of generality at which such programs documented themselves
473 was wrongly selected. A more formulaic and compressed expression of
474 operational detail "expansion = price x quantity," for example, was
475 better suited even to business and financial applications where the
476 readers and writers of programs were accustomed to mathematical
477 expression, while the processes of describing both data structures and
478 the larger operational context of the program were not rendered
479 unnecessary by the wordiness of the language in which the details of
480 execution were specified.</para>
481
482 <para>Accordingly, language designers by the late 1960s began
483 experimenting with forms of expression in which the blending of
484 operational details and non-functional information necessary for
485 modification or repair was more subtle. Some designers chose the path
486 of highly symbolic and compressed languages, in which the programmer
487 manipulated data abstractly, so that "A x B" might mean the
488 multiplication of two integers, two complex numbers, two vast arrays,
489 or any other data type capable of some process called
490 "multiplication," to be undertaken by the computer on the basis of the
491 context for the variables "A" and "B" at the moment of execution
492 <footnote> <para>12. This, I should say, was the path that most of my
493 research and development followed, largely in connection with a
494 language called APL ("A Programming Language") and its successors. It
495 was not, however, the ultimately-dominant approach, for reasons that
496 will be suggested below.</para> </footnote> . Because this approach
497 resulted in extremely concise programs, it was thought, the problem of
498 making code comprehensible to those who would later seek to modify or
499 repair it was simplified. By hiding the technical detail of computer
500 operation and emphasizing the algorithm, languages could be devised
501 that were better than English or other natural languages for the
502 expression of stepwise processes. Commentary would be not only
503 unnecessary but distracting, just as the metaphors used to convey
504 mathematical concepts in English do more to confuse than to
505 enlighten.</para>
506
507 <section>
508 <title>How We Created the Microbrain Mess</title>
509
510 <para>Thus the history of programming languages directly reflected the
511 need to find forms of human-machine communication that were also
512 effective in conveying complex ideas to human readers. "Expressivity"
513 became a property of programming languages, not because it facilitated
514 computation, but because it facilitated the collaborative creation and
515 maintenance of increasingly complex software systems.</para>
516
517 <para>At first impression, this seems to justify the application of
518 traditional copyright thinking to the resulting works. Though
519 substantially involving "functional" elements, computer programs
520 contained "expressive" features of paramount importance. Copyright
521 doctrine recognized the merger of function and expression as
522 characteristic of many kinds of copyrighted works. "Source code,"
523 containing both the machine instructions necessary for functional
524 operation and the expressive "commentary" intended for human readers,
525 was an appropriate candidate for copyright treatment.</para>
526
527 <para>True, so long as it is understood that the expressive component
528 of software was present solely in order to facilitate the making of
529 "derivative works." Were it not for the intention to facilitate
530 alteration, the expressive elements of programs would be entirely
531 supererogatory, and source code would be no more copyrightable than
532 object code, the output of the language processor, purged of all but
533 the program's functional characteristics.</para>
534
535 <para>The state of the computer industry throughout the 1960's and
536 1970's, when the grundnorms of sophisticated computer programming were
537 established, concealed the tension implicit in this situation. In that
538 period, hardware was expensive. Computers were increasingly large and
539 complex collections of machines, and the business of designing and
540 building such an array of machines for general use was dominated, not
541 to say monopolized, by one firm. IBM gave away its software. To be
542 sure, it owned the programs its employees wrote, and it copyrighted
543 the source code. But it also distributed the programs - including the
544 source code - to its customers at no additional charge, and encouraged
545 them to make and share improvements or adaptations of the programs
546 thus distributed. For a dominant hardware manufacturer, this strategy
547 made sense: better programs sold more computers, which is where the
548 profitability of the business rested.</para>
549
550 <para>Computers, in this period, tended to aggregate within particular
551 organizations, but not to communicate broadly with one another. The
552 software needed to operate was distributed not through a network, but
553 on spools of magnetic tape. This distribution system tended to
554 centralize software development, so that while IBM customers were free
555 to make modifications and improvements to programs, those
556 modifications were shared in the first instance with IBM, which then
557 considered whether and in what way to incorporate those changes in the
558 centrally-developed and distributed version of the software. Thus in
559 two important senses the best computer software in the world was free:
560 it cost nothing to acquire, and the terms on which it was furnished
561 both allowed and encouraged experimentation, change, and improvement
562 <footnote><para>13. This description elides some details. By the
563 mid-1970's IBM had acquired meaningful competition in the mainframe
564 computer business, while the large-scale antitrust action brought
565 against it by the U.S. government prompted the decision to "unbundle,"
566 or charge separately, for software. In this less important sense,
567 software ceased to be free. But - without entering into the now-dead
568 but once-heated controversy over IBM's software pricing policies - the
569 unbundling revolution had less effect on the social practices of
570 software manufacture than might be supposed. As a fellow responsible
571 for technical improvement of one programming language product at IBM
572 from 1979 to 1984, for example, I was able to treat the product as
573 "almost free," that is, to discuss with users the changes they had
574 proposed or made in the programs, and to engage with them in
575 cooperative development of the product for the benefit of all
576 users.</para> </footnote>. That the software in question was IBM's
577 property under prevailing copyright law certainly established some
578 theoretical limits on users' ability to distribute their improvements
579 or adaptations to others, but in practice mainframe software was
580 cooperatively developed by the dominant hardware manufacturer and its
581 technically-sophisticated users, employing the manufacturer's
582 distribution resources to propagate the resulting improvements through
583 the user community. The right to exclude others, one of the most
584 important "sticks in the bundle" of property rights (in an image
585 beloved of the United States Supreme Court), was practically
586 unimportant, or even undesirable, at the heart of the software
587 business <footnote> <para>14. This description is highly compressed,
588 and will seem both overly simplified and unduly rosy to those who also
589 worked in the industry during this period of its
590 development. Copyright protection of computer software was a
591 controversial subject in the 1970's, leading to the famous CONTU
592 commission and its mildly pro-copyright recommendations of 1979. And
593 IBM seemed far less cooperative to its users at the time than this
594 sketch makes out. But the most important element is the contrast with
595 the world created by the PC, the Internet, and the dominance of
596 Microsoft, with the resulting impetus for the free software movement,
597 and I am here concentrating on the features that express that
598 contrast.</para></footnote>.</para>
599
600 <para>After 1980, everything was different. The world of mainframe
601 hardware gave way within ten years to the world of the commodity PC.
602 And, as a contingency of the industry's development, the single most
603 important element of the software running on that commodity PC, the
604 operating system, became the sole significant product of a company
605 that made no hardware. High-quality basic software ceased to be part
606 of the product-differentiation strategy of hardware
607 manufacturers. Instead, a firm with an overwhelming share of the
608 market, and with the near-monopolist's ordinary absence of interest in
609 fostering diversity, set the practices of the software industry. In
610 such a context, the right to exclude others from participation in the
611 product's formation became profoundly important. Microsoft's power in
612 the market rested entirely on its ownership of the Windows source
613 code.</para>
614
615 <para>To Microsoft, others' making of "derivative works," otherwise
616 known as repairs and improvements, threatened the central asset of the
617 business. Indeed, as subsequent judicial proceedings have tended to
618 establish, Microsoft's strategy as a business was to find innovative
619 ideas elsewhere in the software marketplace, buy them up and either
620 suppress them or incorporate them in its proprietary product. The
621 maintenance of control over the basic operation of computers
622 manufactured, sold, possessed, and used by others represented profound
623 and profitable leverage over the development of the culture <footnote>
624 <para>15. I discuss the importance of PC software in this context, the
625 evolution of "the market for eyeballs" and "the sponsored life" in
626 other chapters of my forthcoming book, <emphasis>The Invisible
627 Barbecue</emphasis>, of which this essay forms a part.</para>
628 </footnote>.; the right to exclude returned to center stage in the
629 concept of software as property.</para>
630
631 <para>The result, so far as the quality of software was concerned, was
632 disastrous. The monopoly was a wealthy and powerful corporation that
633 employed a large number of programmers, but it could not possibly
634 afford the number of testers, designers, and developers required to
635 produce flexible, robust and technically-innovative software
636 appropriate to the vast array of conditions under which increasingly
637 ubiquitous personal computers operated. Its fundamental marketing
638 strategy involved designing its product for the least
639 technically-sophisticated users, and using "fear, uncertainty, and
640 doubt" (known within Microsoft as "FUD") to drive sophisticated users
641 away from potential competitors, whose long-term survivability in the
642 face of Microsoft's market power was always in question.</para>
643
644 <para>Without the constant interaction between users able to repair
645 and improve and the operating system's manufacturer, the inevitable
646 deterioration of quality could not be arrested. But because the
647 personal computer revolution expanded the number of users
648 exponentially, almost everyone who came in contact with the resulting
649 systems had nothing against which to compare them. Unaware of the
650 standards of stability, reliability, maintainability and effectiveness
651 that had previously been established in the mainframe world, users of
652 personal computers could hardly be expected to understand how badly,
653 in relative terms, the monopoly's software functioned. As the power
654 and capacity of personal computers expanded rapidly, the defects of
655 the software were rendered less obvious amidst the general increase of
656 productivity. Ordinary users, more than half afraid of the technology
657 they almost completely did not understand, actually welcomed the
658 defectiveness of the software. In an economy undergoing mysterious
659 transformations, with the concomitant destabilization of millions of
660 careers, it was tranquilizing, in a perverse way, that no personal
661 computer seemed to be able to run for more than a few consecutive
662 hours without crashing. Although it was frustrating to lose work in
663 progress each time an unnecessary failure occurred, the evident
664 fallibility of computers was intrinsically reassuring <footnote>
665 <para>16. This same pattern of ambivalence, in which bad programming
666 leading to widespread instability in the new technology is
667 simultaneously frightening and reassuring to technical incompetents,
668 can be seen also in the primarily-American phenomenon of Y2K
669 hysteria.</para> </footnote> .</para>
670
671 <para>None of this was necessary. The low quality of personal computer
672 software could have been reversed by including users directly in the
673 inherently evolutionary process of software design and implementation.
674 A Lamarckian mode, in which improvements could be made anywhere, by
675 anyone, and inherited by everyone else, would have wiped out the
676 deficit, restoring to the world of the PC the stability and
677 reliability of the software made in the quasi-propertarian environment
678 of the mainframe era. But the Microsoft business model precluded
679 Lamarckian inheritance of software improvements. Copyright doctrine,
680 in general and as it applies to software in particular, biases the
681 world towards creationism; in this instance, the problem is that BillG
682 the Creator was far from infallible, and in fact he wasn't even
683 trying.</para> <!--<center><img src="anarchism_files/mog2.gif"
684 hspace="0" vspace="0"></center>--> <para>To make the irony more
685 severe, the growth of the network rendered the non-propertarian
686 alternative even more practical. What scholarly and popular writing
687 alike denominate as a thing ("the Internet") is actually the name of a
688 social condition: the fact that everyone in the network society is
689 connected directly, without intermediation, to everyone else
690 <footnote> <para>17. The critical implications of this simple
691 observation about our metaphors are worked out in "How Not to Think
692 about 'The Internet'," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
693 forthcoming.</para> </footnote>. The global interconnection of
694 networks eliminated the bottleneck that had required a centralized
695 software manufacturer to rationalize and distribute the outcome of
696 individual innovation in the era of the mainframe.</para>
697
698 <para>And so, in one of history's little ironies, the global triumph
699 of bad software in the age of the PC was reversed by a surprising
700 combination of forces: the social transformation initiated by the
701 network, a long-discarded European theory of political economy, and a
702 small band of programmers throughout the world mobilized by a single
703 simple idea.</para>
704
705 </section>
706 <section>
707
708 <title>Software Wants to Be Free; or, How We Stopped Worrying and
709 Learned to Love the Bomb</title>
710
711 <para>Long before the network of networks was a practical reality,
712 even before it was an aspiration, there was a desire for computers to
713 operate on the basis of software freely available to everyone. This
714 began as a reaction against propertarian software in the mainframe
715 era, and requires another brief historical digression.</para>
716
717 <para>Even though IBM was the largest seller of general purpose
718 computers in the mainframe era, it was not the largest designer and
719 builder of such hardware. The telephone monopoly, American Telephone
720 &amp; Telegraph, was in fact larger than IBM, but it consumed its
721 products internally. And at the famous Bell Labs research arm of the
722 telephone monopoly, in the late 1960's, the developments in computer
723 languages previously described gave birth to an operating system
724 called Unix.</para>
725
726 <para>The idea of Unix was to create a single, scalable operating
727 system to exist on all the computers, from small to large, that the
728 telephone monopoly made for itself. To achieve this goal meant writing
729 an operating system not in machine language, nor in an assembler whose
730 linguistic form was integral to a particular hardware design, but in a
731 more expressive and generalized language. The one chosen was also a
732 Bell Labs invention, called "C" <footnote> <para>18. Technical readers
733 will again observe that this compresses developments occurring from
734 1969 through 1973.</para> </footnote>. The C language became common,
735 even dominant, for many kinds of programming tasks, and by the late
736 1970's the Unix operating system written in that language had been
737 transferred (or "ported," in professional jargon) to computers made by
738 many manufacturers and of many designs.</para>
739
740 <para>AT&amp;T distributed Unix widely, and because of the very design
741 of the operating system, it had to make that distribution in C source
742 code. But AT&amp;T retained ownership of the source code and
743 compelled users to purchase licenses that prohibited redistribution
744 and the making of derivative works. Large computing centers, whether
745 industrial or academic, could afford to purchase such licenses, but
746 individuals could not, while the license restrictions prevented the
747 community of programmers who used Unix from improving it in an
748 evolutionary rather than episodic fashion. And as programmers
749 throughout the world began to aspire to and even expect a personal
750 computer revolution, the "unfree" status of Unix became a source of
751 concern.</para>
752
753 <para>Between 1981 and 1984, one man envisioned a crusade to change
754 the situation. Richard M. Stallman, then an employee of MIT's
755 Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, conceived the project of
756 independent, collaborative redesign and implementation of an operating
757 system that would be true free software. In Stallman's phrase, free
758 software would be a matter of freedom, not of price. Anyone could
759 freely modify and redistribute such software, or sell it, subject only
760 to the restriction that he not try to reduce the rights of others to
761 whom he passed it along. In this way free software could become a
762 self-organizing project, in which no innovation would be lost through
763 proprietary exercises of rights. The system, Stallman decided, would
764 be called GNU, which stood (in an initial example of a taste for
765 recursive acronyms that has characterized free software ever since),
766 for "GNU's Not Unix." Despite misgivings about the fundamental design
767 of Unix, as well as its terms of distribution, GNU was intended to
768 benefit from the wide if unfree source distribution of Unix. Stallman
769 began Project GNU by writing components of the eventual system that
770 were also designed to work without modification on existing Unix
771 systems. Development of the GNU tools could thus proceed directly in
772 the environment of university and other advanced computing centers
773 around the world.</para>
774
775 <para>The scale of such a project was immense. Somehow, volunteer
776 programmers had to be found, organized, and set to work building all
777 the tools that would be necessary for the ultimate construction.
778 Stallman himself was the primary author of several fundamental tools.
779 Others were contributed by small or large teams of programmers
780 elsewhere, and assigned to Stallman's project or distributed
781 directly. A few locations around the developing network became
782 archives for the source code of these GNU components, and throughout
783 the 1980's the GNU tools gained recognition and acceptance by Unix
784 users throughout the world. The stability, reliability, and
785 maintainability of the GNU tools became a by-word, while Stallman's
786 profound abilities as a designer continued to outpace, and provide
787 goals for, the evolving process. The award to Stallman of a MacArthur
788 Fellowship in 1990 was an appropriate recognition of his conceptual
789 and technical innovations and their social consequences.</para>
790
791 <para>Project GNU, and the Free Software Foundation to which it gave
792 birth in 1985, were not the only source of free software
793 ideas. Several forms of copyright license designed to foster free or
794 partially free software began to develop in the academic community,
795 mostly around the Unix environment. The University of California at
796 Berkeley began the design and implementation of another version of
797 Unix for free distribution in the academic community. BSD Unix, as it
798 came to be known, also treated AT&amp;T's Unix as a design
799 standard. The code was broadly released and constituted a reservoir of
800 tools and techniques, but its license terms limited the range of its
801 application, while the elimination of hardware-specific proprietary
802 code from the distribution meant that no one could actually build a
803 working operating system for any particular computer from BSD. Other
804 university-based work also eventuated in quasi-free software; the
805 graphical user interface (or GUI) for Unix systems called X Windows,
806 for example, was created at MIT and distributed with source code on
807 terms permitting free modification. And in 1989-1990, an undergraduate
808 computer science student at the University of Helsinki, Linus
809 Torvalds, began the project that completed the circuit and fully
810 energized the free software vision.</para>
811
812 <para>What Torvalds did was to begin adapting a computer science
813 teaching tool for real life use. Andrew Tannenbaum's MINIX kernel
814 <footnote> <para>19. Operating systems, even Windows (which hides the
815 fact from its users as thoroughly as possible), are actually
816 collections of components, rather than undivided unities. Most of what
817 an operating system does (manage file systems, control process
818 execution, etc.) can be abstracted from the actual details of the
819 computer hardware on which the operating system runs. Only a small
820 inner core of the system must actually deal with the eccentric
821 peculiarities of particular hardware. Once the operating system is
822 written in a general language such as C, only that inner core, known
823 in the trade as the kernel, will be highly specific to a particular
824 computer architecture.</para> </footnote> , was a staple of Operating
825 Systems courses, providing an example of basic solutions to basic
826 problems. Slowly, and at first without recognizing the intention,
827 Linus began turning the MINIX kernel into an actual kernel for Unix on
828 the Intel x86 processors, the engines that run the world's commodity
829 PCs. As Linus began developing this kernel, which he named Linux, he
830 realized that the best way to make his project work would be to adjust
831 his design decisions so that the existing GNU components would be
832 compatible with his kernel.</para>
833
834 <para>The result of Torvalds' work was the release on the net in 1991
835 of a sketchy working model of a free software kernel for a Unix-like
836 operating system for PCs, fully compatible with and designed
837 convergently with the large and high-quality suite of system
838 components created by Stallman's Project GNU and distributed by the
839 Free Software Foundation. Because Torvalds chose to release the Linux
840 kernel under the Free Software Foundation's General Public License, of
841 which more below, the hundreds and eventually thousands of programmers
842 around the world who chose to contribute their effort towards the
843 further development of the kernel could be sure that their efforts
844 would result in permanently free software that no one could turn into
845 a proprietary product. Everyone knew that everyone else would be able
846 to test, improve, and redistribute their improvements. Torvalds
847 accepted contributions freely, and with a genially effective style
848 maintained overall direction without dampening enthusiasm. The
849 development of the Linux kernel proved that the Internet made it
850 possible to aggregate collections of programmers far larger than any
851 commercial manufacturer could afford, joined almost non-hierarchically
852 in a development project ultimately involving more than one million
853 lines of computer code - a scale of collaboration among geographically
854 dispersed unpaid volunteers previously unimaginable in human history
855 <footnote> <para>20. A careful and creative analysis of how Torvalds
856 made this process work, and what it implies for the social practices
857 of creating software, was provided by Eric S. Raymond in his seminal
858 1997 paper, <ulink
859 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html">The
860 Cathedral and the Bazaar,</ulink> which itself played a significant
861 role in the expansion of the free software idea.</para>
862 </footnote>.</para>
863
864 <para>By 1994, Linux had reached version 1.0, representing a usable
865 production kernel. Level 2.0 was reached in 1996, and by 1998, with
866 the kernel at 2.2.0 and available not only for x86 machines but for a
867 variety of other machine architectures, GNU/Linux - the combination of
868 the Linux kernel and the much larger body of Project GNU components -
869 and Windows NT were the only two operating systems in the world
870 gaining market share. A Microsoft internal assessment of the situation
871 leaked in October 1998 and subsequently acknowledged by the company as
872 genuine concluded that "Linux represents a best-of-breed UNIX, that is
873 trusted in mission critical applications, and - due to it's [sic] open
874 source code - has a long term credibility which exceeds many other
875 competitive OS's." <footnote> <para>21. This is a quotation from what
876 is known in the trade as the "Halloween memo," which can be found, as
877 annotated by Eric Raymond, to whom it was leaked, at <ulink
878 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">
879 http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html</ulink>.</para></footnote>
880 GNU/Linux systems are now used throughout the world, operating
881 everything from Web servers at major electronic commerce sites to
882 "ad-hoc supercomputer" clusters to the network infrastructure of
883 money-center banks. GNU/Linux is found on the space shuttle, and
884 running behind-the-scenes computers at (yes) Microsoft. Industry
885 evaluations of the comparative reliability of Unix systems have
886 repeatedly shown that Linux is far and away the most stable and
887 reliable Unix kernel, with a reliability exceeded only by the GNU
888 tools themselves. GNU/Linux not only out-performs commercial
889 proprietary Unix versions for PCs in benchmarks, but is renowned for
890 its ability to run, undisturbed and uncomplaining, for months on end
891 in high-volume high-stress environments without crashing.</para>
892
893 <para>Other components of the free software movement have been equally
894 successful. Apache, far and away the world's leading Web server
895 program, is free software, as is Perl, the programming language which
896 is the lingua franca for the programmers who build sophisticated Web
897 sites. Netscape Communications now distributes its Netscape
898 Communicator 5.0 browser as free software, under a close variant of
899 the Free Software Foundation's General Public License. Major PC
900 manufacturers, including IBM, have announced plans or are already
901 distributing GNU/Linux as a customer option on their top-of-the-line
902 PCs intended for use as Web- and file servers. Samba, a program that
903 allows GNU/Linux computers to act as Windows NT file servers, is used
904 worldwide as an alternative to Windows NT Server, and provides
905 effective low-end competition to Microsoft in its own home market. By
906 the standards of software quality that have been recognized in the
907 industry for decades - and whose continuing relevance will be clear to
908 you the next time your Windows PC crashes - the news at century's end
909 is unambiguous. The world's most profitable and powerful corporation
910 comes in a distant second, having excluded all but the real victor
911 from the race. Propertarianism joined to capitalist vigor destroyed
912 meaningful commercial competition, but when it came to making good
913 software, anarchism won.</para>
914
915
916 </section>
917 </section>
918 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m3"></a>-->
919 <section>
920 <title>III. Anarchism as a Mode of Production</title>
921
922 <para>It's a pretty story, and if only the IPdroid and the econodwarf
923 hadn't been blinded by theory, they'd have seen it coming. But though
924 some of us had been working for it and predicting it for years, the
925 theoretical consequences are so subversive for the thoughtways that
926 maintain our dwarves and droids in comfort that they can hardly be
927 blamed for refusing to see. The facts proved that something was wrong
928 with the "incentives" metaphor that underprops conventional
929 intellectual property reasoning <footnote> <para>22. As recently as
930 early 1994 a talented and technically competent (though Windows-using)
931 law and economics scholar at a major U.S. law school confidently
932 informed me that free software couldn't possibly exist, because no one
933 would have any incentive to make really sophisticated programs
934 requiring substantial investment of effort only to give them
935 away.</para> </footnote> . But they did more. They provided an initial
936 glimpse into the future of human creativity in a world of global
937 interconnection, and it's not a world made for dwarves and
938 droids.</para>
939
940 <para>My argument, before we paused for refreshment in the real world,
941 can be summarized this way: Software - whether executable programs,
942 music, visual art, liturgy, weaponry, or what have you - consists of
943 bitstreams, which although essentially indistinguishable are treated
944 by a confusing multiplicity of legal categories. This multiplicity is
945 unstable in the long term for reasons integral to the legal process.
946 The unstable diversity of rules is caused by the need to distinguish
947 among kinds of property interests in bitstreams. This need is
948 primarily felt by those who stand to profit from the socially
949 acceptable forms of monopoly created by treating ideas as
950 property. Those of us who are worried about the social inequity and
951 cultural hegemony created by this intellectually unsatisfying and
952 morally repugnant regime are shouted down. Those doing the shouting,
953 the dwarves and the droids, believe that these property rules are
954 necessary not from any overt yearning for life in Murdochworld -
955 though a little luxurious co-optation is always welcome - but because
956 the metaphor of incentives, which they take to be not just an image
957 but an argument, proves that these rules - despite their lamentable
958 consequences - are necessary if we are to make good software. The only
959 way to continue to believe this is to ignore the facts. At the center
960 of the digital revolution, with the executable bitstreams that make
961 everything else possible, propertarian regimes not only do not make
962 things better, they can make things radically worse. Property
963 concepts, whatever else may be wrong with them, do not enable and have
964 in fact retarded progress.</para>
965
966 <para>
967 But what is this mysterious alternative? Free software exists, but
968 what are its mechanisms, and how does it generalize towards a
969 non-propertarian theory of the digital society?</para>
970
971 </section>
972 <section>
973
974 <title>The Legal Theory of Free Software</title>
975
976 <para>There is a myth, like most myths partially founded on reality,
977 that computer programmers are all libertarians. Right-wing ones are
978 capitalists, cleave to their stock options, and disdain taxes, unions,
979 and civil rights laws; left-wing ones hate the market and all
980 government, believe in strong encryption no matter how much nuclear
981 terrorism it may cause, <footnote> <para>23. This question too
982 deserves special scrutiny, encrusted as it is with special pleading on
983 the state-power side. See my brief essay <ulink
984 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/yu-encrypt.html">"<emphasis>So
985 Much for Savages</emphasis>: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
986 Play."</ulink></para> </footnote> and dislike Bill Gates because he's
987 rich. There is doubtless a foundation for this belief. But the most
988 significant difference between political thought inside the digirati
989 and outside it is that in the network society, anarchism (or more
990 properly, anti-possessive individualism) is a viable political
991 philosophy.</para>
992
993 <para>The center of the free software movement's success, and the
994 greatest achievement of Richard Stallman, is not a piece of computer
995 code. The success of free software, including the overwhelming success
996 of GNU/Linux, results from the ability to harness extraordinary
997 quantities of high-quality effort for projects of immense size and
998 profound complexity. And this ability in turn results from the legal
999 context in which the labor is mobilized. As a visionary designer
1000 Richard Stallman created more than Emacs, GDB, or GNU. He created the
1001 General Public License.</para>
1002
1003 <!-- <center><img src="anarchism_files/mog3.gif" hspace="0"
1004 vspace="0"></center> --> <para>The GPL, <footnote>
1005 <para>24. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
1006 url="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt">GNU General Public License,
1007 Version 2, June 1991.</ulink></para> </footnote> also known as the
1008 copyleft, uses copyright, to paraphrase Toby Milsom, to counterfeit
1009 the phenomena of anarchism. As the license preamble expresses
1010 it:</para>
1011
1012 <blockquote><para>When we speak of free software, we are referring to
1013 freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make
1014 sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software
1015 (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source
1016 code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or
1017 use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do
1018 these things.</para>
1019
1020 <para>To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that
1021 forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the
1022 rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
1023 you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify
1024 it.</para>
1025
1026 <para>For example, if you distribute copies of such a program,
1027 whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the
1028 rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or
1029 can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
1030 know their rights.</para>
1031
1032 <para>Many variants of this basic free software idea have been
1033 expressed in licenses of various kinds, as I have already
1034 indicated. The GPL is different from the other ways of expressing
1035 these values in one crucial respect. Section 2 of the license provides
1036 in pertinent part:</para>
1037
1038 <para>You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any
1039 portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
1040 distribute such modifications or work ..., provided that you also meet
1041 all of these conditions: </para>
1042
1043 <para>...</para>
1044
1045 <para>b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish,
1046 that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or
1047 any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
1048 parties under the terms of this License.</para></blockquote>
1049
1050 <para>Section 2(b) of the GPL is sometimes called "restrictive," but
1051 its intention is liberating. It creates a commons, to which anyone may
1052 add but from which no one may subtract. Because of §2(b), each
1053 contributor to a GPL'd project is assured that she, and all other
1054 users, will be able to run, modify and redistribute the program
1055 indefinitely, that source code will always be available, and that,
1056 unlike commercial software, its longevity cannot be limited by the
1057 contingencies of the marketplace or the decisions of future
1058 developers. This "inheritance" of the GPL has sometimes been
1059 criticized as an example of the free software movement's
1060 anti-commercial bias. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
1061 effect of §2(b) is to make commercial distributors of free software
1062 better competitors against proprietary software businesses. For
1063 confirmation of this point, one can do no better than to ask the
1064 proprietary competitors. As the author of the Microsoft "Halloween"
1065 memorandum, Vinod Vallopillil, put it:</para>
1066
1067 <blockquote><para>The GPL and its aversion to code forking reassures
1068 customers that they aren't riding an evolutionary `dead-end' by
1069 subscribing to a particular commercial version of Linux.</para>
1070
1071 <para>The "evolutionary dead-end" is the core of the software
1072 FUD argument <footnote> <para>25. <ulink
1073 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">V. Vallopillil,
1074 Open Source Software: A (New?) Development Methodology.</ulink></para>
1075 </footnote> .</para></blockquote>
1076
1077 <para>Translated out of Microspeak, this means that the strategy by
1078 which the dominant proprietary manufacturer drives customers away from
1079 competitors - by sowing fear, uncertainty and doubt about other
1080 software's long-term viability - is ineffective with respect to GPL'd
1081 programs. Users of GPL'd code, including those who purchase software
1082 and systems from a commercial reseller, know that future improvements
1083 and repairs will be accessible from the commons, and need not fear
1084 either the disappearance of their supplier or that someone will use a
1085 particularly attractive improvement or a desperately necessary repair
1086 as leverage for "taking the program private."</para>
1087
1088 <para>This use of intellectual property rules to create a commons in
1089 cyberspace is the central institutional structure enabling the
1090 anarchist triumph. Ensuring free access and enabling modification at
1091 each stage in the process means that the evolution of software occurs
1092 in the fast Lamarckian mode: each favorable acquired characteristic of
1093 others' work can be directly inherited. Hence the speed with which the
1094 Linux kernel, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary
1095 predecessors. Because defection is impossible, free riders are
1096 welcome, which resolves one of the central puzzles of collective
1097 action in a propertarian social system.</para>
1098
1099 <para>Non-propertarian production is also directly responsible for the
1100 famous stability and reliability of free software, which arises from
1101 what Eric Raymond calls "Linus' law": With enough eyeballs, all bugs
1102 are shallow. In practical terms, access to source code means that if I
1103 have a problem I can fix it. Because I can fix it, I almost never have
1104 to, because someone else has almost always seen it and fixed it
1105 first.</para>
1106
1107 <para>For the free software community, commitment to anarchist
1108 production may be a moral imperative; as Richard Stallman wrote, it's
1109 about freedom, not about price. Or it may be a matter of utility,
1110 seeking to produce better software than propertarian modes of work
1111 will allow. From the droid point of view, the copyleft represents the
1112 perversion of theory, but better than any other proposal over the past
1113 decades it resolves the problems of applying copyright to the
1114 inextricably merged functional and expressive features of computer
1115 programs. That it produces better software than the alternative does
1116 not imply that traditional copyright principles should now be
1117 prohibited to those who want to own and market inferior software
1118 products, or (more charitably) whose products are too narrow in appeal
1119 for communal production. But our story should serve as a warning to
1120 droids: The world of the future will bear little relation to the world
1121 of the past. The rules are now being bent in two directions. The
1122 corporate owners of "cultural icons" and other assets who seek
1123 ever-longer terms for corporate authors, converting the "limited Time"
1124 of Article I, §8 into a freehold have naturally been whistling music
1125 to the android ear <footnote> <para>26. The looming expiration of
1126 Mickey Mouse's ownership by Disney requires, from the point of view of
1127 that wealthy "campaign contributor," for example, an alteration of the
1128 general copyright law of the United States. See "Not Making it Any
1129 More? Vaporizing the Public Domain," in <emphasis>The Invisible
1130 Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . After all, who bought
1131 the droids their concert tickets? But as the propertarian position
1132 seeks to embed itself ever more strongly, in a conception of copyright
1133 liberated from the minor annoyances of limited terms and fair use, at
1134 the very center of our "cultural software" system, the anarchist
1135 counter-strike has begun. Worse is yet to befall the droids, as we
1136 shall see. But first, we must pay our final devoirs to the
1137 dwarves.</para>
1138
1139 </section>
1140 <section>
1141 <title>Because It's There: Faraday's Magnet and Human Creativity</title>
1142
1143 <para>After all, they deserve an answer. Why do people make free
1144 software if they don't get to profit? Two answers have usually been
1145 given. One is half-right and the other is wrong, but both are
1146 insufficiently simple.</para>
1147
1148 <para>The wrong answer is embedded in numerous references to "the
1149 hacker gift-exchange culture." This use of ethnographic jargon
1150 wandered into the field some years ago and became rapidly, if
1151 misleadingly, ubiquitous. It reminds us only that the
1152 economeretricians have so corrupted our thought processes that any
1153 form of non-market economic behavior seems equal to every other
1154 kind. But gift-exchange, like market barter, is a propertarian
1155 institution. Reciprocity is central to these symbolic enactments of
1156 mutual dependence, and if either the yams or the fish are
1157 short-weighted, trouble results. Free software, at the risk of
1158 repetition, is a commons: no reciprocity ritual is enacted there. A
1159 few people give away code that others sell, use, change, or borrow
1160 wholesale to lift out parts for something else. Notwithstanding the
1161 very large number of people (tens of thousands, at most) who have
1162 contributed to GNU/Linux, this is orders of magnitude less than the
1163 number of users who make no contribution whatever <footnote>
1164 <para>27. A recent industry estimate puts the number of Linux systems
1165 worldwide at 7.5 million. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Josh McHugh, 1998. <ulink
1166 url="http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0810/6203094s1.htm">"Linux: The
1167 Making of a Global Hack,"</ulink> <emphasis>Forbes</emphasis> (August 10). Because the
1168 software is freely obtainable throughout the Net, there is no simple
1169 way to assess actual usage.</para> </footnote>.</para>
1170
1171 <para>A part of the right answer is suggested by the claim that free
1172 software is made by those who seek reputational compensation for their
1173 activity. Famous Linux hackers, the theory is, are known all over the
1174 planet as programming deities. From this they derive either enhanced
1175 self-esteem or indirect material advancement <footnote> <para>28. Eric
1176 Raymond is a partisan of the "ego boost" theory, to which he adds
1177 another faux-ethnographic comparison, of free software composition to
1178 the Kwakiutl potlatch. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Eric S. Raymond, 1998. <ulink
1179 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond/index.html">Homesteading
1180 the Noosphere.</ulink>. But the potlatch, certainly a form of status
1181 competition, is unlike free software for two fundamental reasons: it
1182 is essentially hierarchical, which free software is not, and, as we
1183 have known since Thorstein Veblen first called attention to its
1184 significance, it is a form of conspicuous waste. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Thorstein
1185 Veblen, 1967. <emphasis>The Theory of the Leisure Class.</emphasis> New York:
1186 Viking, p. 75. These are precisely the grounds which distinguish the
1187 anti-hierarchical and utilitiarian free software culture from its
1188 propertarian counterparts.</para></footnote>. But the programming
1189 deities, much as they have contributed to free software, have not done
1190 the bulk of the work. Reputations, as Linus Torvalds himself has often
1191 pointed out, are made by willingly acknowledging that it was all done
1192 by someone else. And, as many observers have noted, the free software
1193 movement has also produced superlative
1194 documentation. Documentation-writing is not what hackers do to attain
1195 cool, and much of the documentation has been written by people who
1196 didn't write the code. Nor must we limit the indirect material
1197 advantages of authorship to increases in reputational capital. Most
1198 free software authors I know have day jobs in the technology
1199 industries, and the skills they hone in the more creative work they do
1200 outside the market no doubt sometimes measurably enhance their value
1201 within it. And as the free software products gained critical mass and
1202 became the basis of a whole new set of business models built around
1203 commercial distribution of that which people can also get for nothing,
1204 an increasing number of people are specifically employed to write free
1205 software. But in order to be employable in the field, they must
1206 already have established themselves there. Plainly, then, this motive
1207 is present, but it isn't the whole explanation.</para>
1208
1209 <para>Indeed, the rest of the answer is just too simple to have
1210 received its due. The best way to understand is to follow the brief
1211 and otherwise unsung career of an initially-grudging free software
1212 author. Microsoft's Vinod Vallopillil, in the course of writing the
1213 competitive analysis of Linux that was leaked as the second of the
1214 famous "Halloween memoranda," bought and installed a Linux system on
1215 one of his office computers. He had trouble because the (commercial)
1216 Linux distribution he installed did not contain a daemon to handle the
1217 DHCP protocol for assignment of dynamic IP addresses. The result was
1218 important enough for us to risk another prolonged exposure to the
1219 Microsoft Writing Style:</para>
1220
1221 <blockquote><para>A small number of Web sites and FAQs later, I found an FTP
1222 site with a Linux DHCP client. The DHCP client was developed by an
1223 engineer employed by Fore Systems (as evidenced by his e-mail address;
1224 I believe, however, that it was developed in his own free time). A
1225 second set of documentation/manuals was written for the DHCP client by
1226 a hacker in <emphasis>Hungary</emphasis> which provided relatively simple
1227 instructions on how to install/load the client.</para>
1228
1229 <para>I downloaded &amp; uncompressed the client and typed two
1230 simple commands:</para>
1231
1232 <para>Make - compiles the client binaries</para>
1233
1234 <para>Make Install -installed the binaries as a Linux Daemon</para>
1235
1236 <para>Typing "DHCPCD" (for DHCP Client Daemon) on the command
1237 line triggered the DHCP discovery process and voila, I had IP
1238 networking running. </para>
1239
1240 <para>Since I had just downloaded the DHCP client code, on an
1241 impulse I played around a bit. Although the client wasn't as
1242 extensible as the DHCP client we are shipping in NT5 (for example, it
1243 won't query for arbitrary options &amp; store results), it was obvious
1244 how I could write the additional code to implement this functionality.
1245 The full client consisted of about 2,600 lines of code.</para>
1246
1247 <para>One example of esoteric, extended functionality that was
1248 clearly patched in by a third party was a set of routines to that
1249 would pad the DHCP request with host-specific strings required by
1250 Cable Modem / ADSL sites.</para>
1251
1252 <para>A few other steps were required to configure the DHCP
1253 client to auto-start and auto-configure my Ethernet interface on boot
1254 but these were documented in the client code and in the DHCP
1255 documentation from the Hungarian developer.</para>
1256
1257 <para>I'm a poorly skilled UNIX programmer but it was
1258 immediately obvious to me how to incrementally extend the DHCP client
1259 code (the feeling was exhilarating and addictive).</para>
1260
1261 <para>Additionally, due directly to GPL + having the full development
1262 environment in front of me, I was in a position where I could write up
1263 my changes and e-mail them out within a couple of hours (in contrast
1264 to how things like this would get done in NT). Engaging in that
1265 process would have prepared me for a larger, more ambitious Linux
1266 project in the future <footnote><para>29. Vinod Vallopillil, <ulink
1267 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween2.html">Linux OS
1268 Competitive Analysis (Halloween II).</ulink> Note Vallopillil's
1269 surprise that a program written in California had been subsequently
1270 documented by a programmer in Hungary.</para>
1271 </footnote>.</para></blockquote>
1272
1273 <para>"The feeling was exhilarating and addictive." Stop the presses:
1274 Microsoft experimentally verifies Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to
1275 Faraday's Law. Wrap the Internet around every brain on the planet and
1276 spin the planet. Software flows in the wires. It's an emergent
1277 property of human minds to create. "Due directly to the GPL," as
1278 Vallopillil rightly pointed out, free software made available to him
1279 an exhilarating increase in his own creativity, of a kind not
1280 achievable in his day job working for the Greatest Programming Company
1281 on Earth. If only he had e-mailed that first addictive fix, who knows
1282 where he'd be now?</para>
1283
1284 <para>So, in the end, my dwarvish friends, it's just a human thing.
1285 Rather like why Figaro sings, why Mozart wrote the music for him to
1286 sing to, and why we all make up new words: Because we can. Homo
1287 ludens, meet Homo faber. The social condition of global
1288 interconnection that we call the Internet makes it possible for all of
1289 us to be creative in new and previously undreamed-of ways. Unless we
1290 allow "ownership" to interfere. Repeat after me, ye dwarves and men:
1291 Resist the resistance!</para>
1292
1293 </section>
1294 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m4"></a>-->
1295
1296 <section>
1297 <title>IV. Their Lordships Die in the Dark?</title>
1298
1299 <para>For the IPdroid, fresh off the plane from a week at Bellagio
1300 paid for by Dreamworks SKG, it's enough to cause indigestion.</para>
1301
1302 <para>Unlock the possibilities of human creativity by connecting
1303 everyone to everyone else? Get the ownership system out of the way so
1304 that we can all add our voices to the choir, even if that means
1305 pasting our singing on top of the Mormon Tabernacle and sending the
1306 output to a friend? No one sitting slack-jawed in front of a televised
1307 mixture of violence and imminent copulation carefully devised to
1308 heighten the young male eyeball's interest in a beer commercial? What
1309 will become of civilization? Or at least of copyright teachers?</para>
1310
1311 <para>But perhaps this is premature. I've only been talking about
1312 software. Real software, the old kind, that runs computers. Not like
1313 the software that runs DVD players, or the kind made by the Grateful
1314 Dead. "Oh yes, the Grateful Dead. Something strange about them, wasn't
1315 there? Didn't prohibit recording at their concerts. Didn't mind if
1316 their fans rather riled the recording industry. Seem to have done all
1317 right, though, you gotta admit. Senator Patrick Leahy, isn't he a
1318 former Deadhead? I wonder if he'll vote to extend corporate authorship
1319 terms to 125 years, so that Disney doesn't lose The Mouse in 2004. And
1320 those DVD players - they're computers, aren't they?"</para>
1321
1322 <para>In the digital society, it's all connected. We can't depend for
1323 the long run on distinguishing one bitstream from another in order to
1324 figure out which rules apply. What happened to software is already
1325 happening to music. Their recording industry lordships are now
1326 scrambling wildly to retain control over distribution, as both
1327 musicians and listeners realize that the middlepeople are no longer
1328 necessary. The Great Potemkin Village of 1999, the so-called Secure
1329 Digital Music Initiative, will have collapsed long before the first
1330 Internet President gets inaugurated, for simple technical reasons as
1331 obvious to those who know as the ones that dictated the triumph of
1332 free software <footnote> <para>30. See "They're Playing Our Song: The
1333 Day the Music Industry Died," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
1334 forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . The anarchist revolution in music is
1335 different from the one in software <emphasis>tout court</emphasis>, but here too -
1336 as any teenager with an MP3 collection of self-released music from
1337 unsigned artists can tell you - theory has been killed off by the
1338 facts. Whether you are Mick Jagger, or a great national artist from
1339 the third world looking for a global audience, or a garret-dweller
1340 reinventing music, the recording industry will soon have nothing to
1341 offer you that you can't get better for free. And music doesn't sound
1342 worse when distributed for free, pay what you want directly to the
1343 artist, and don't pay anything if you don't want to. Give it to your
1344 friends; they might like it.</para>
1345
1346 <para>
1347 What happened to music is also happening to news. The wire services,
1348 as any U.S. law student learns even before taking the near-obligatory
1349 course in Copyright for Droids, have a protectible property interest
1350 in their expression of the news, even if not in the facts the news
1351 reports <footnote><para>31. International News Service v. Associated
1352 Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). With regard to the actual terse, purely
1353 functional expressions of breaking news actually at stake in the
1354 jostling among wire services, this was always a distinction only a
1355 droid could love.</para></footnote>. So why are they now giving all
1356 their output away? Because in the world of the Net, most news is
1357 commodity news. And the original advantage of the news gatherers, that
1358 they were internally connected in ways others were not when
1359 communications were expensive, is gone. Now what matters is collecting
1360 eyeballs to deliver to advertisers. It isn't the wire services that
1361 have the advantage in covering Kosovo, that's for sure. Much less
1362 those paragons of "intellectual" property, their television
1363 lordships. They, with their overpaid pretty people and their massive
1364 technical infrastructure, are about the only organizations in the
1365 world that can't afford to be everywhere all the time. And then they
1366 have to limit themselves to ninety seconds a story, or the eyeball
1367 hunters will go somewhere else. So who makes better news, the
1368 propertarians or the anarchists? We shall soon see.</para>
1369
1370 <para>Oscar Wilde says somewhere that the problem with socialism is
1371 that it takes up too many evenings. The problems with anarchism as a
1372 social system are also about transaction costs. But the digital
1373 revolution alters two aspects of political economy that have been
1374 otherwise invariant throughout human history. All software has zero
1375 marginal cost in the world of the Net, while the costs of social
1376 coordination have been so far reduced as to permit the rapid formation
1377 and dissolution of large-scale and highly diverse social groupings
1378 entirely without geographic limitation <footnote> <para>32. See "No
1379 Prodigal Son: The Political Theory of Universal Interconnection," in
1380 <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . Such
1381 fundamental change in the material circumstances of life necessarily
1382 produces equally fundamental changes in culture. Think not? Tell it to
1383 the Iroquois. And of course such profound shifts in culture are
1384 threats to existing power relations. Think not? Ask the Chinese
1385 Communist Party. Or wait 25 years and see if you can find them for
1386 purposes of making the inquiry.</para>
1387
1388 <para>In this context, the obsolescence of the IPdroid is neither
1389 unforseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into
1390 the desert, still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the
1391 profitably complicated rules for a world that no longer exists. But at
1392 least it will have familiar company, recognizable from all those
1393 glittering parties in Davos, Hollywood, and Brussels. Our Media Lords
1394 are now at handigrips with fate, however much they may feel that the
1395 Force is with them. The rules about bitstreams are now of dubious
1396 utility for maintaining power by co-opting human creativity. Seen
1397 clearly in the light of fact, these Emperors have even fewer clothes
1398 than the models they use to grab our eyeballs. Unless supported by
1399 user-disabling technology, a culture of pervasive surveillance that
1400 permits every reader of every "property" to be logged and charged, and
1401 a smokescreen of droid-breath assuring each and every young person
1402 that human creativity would vanish without the benevolent aristocracy
1403 of BillG the Creator, Lord Murdoch of Everywhere, the Spielmeister and
1404 the Lord High Mouse, their reign is nearly done. But what's at stake
1405 is the control of the scarcest resource of all: our
1406 attention. Conscripting that makes all the money in the world in the
1407 digital economy, and the current lords of the earth will fight for
1408 it. Leagued against them are only the anarchists: nobodies, hippies,
1409 hobbyists, lovers, and artists. The resulting unequal contest is the
1410 great political and legal issue of our time. Aristocracy looks hard
1411 to beat, but that's how it looked in 1788 and 1913 too. It is, as Chou
1412 En-Lai said about the meaning of the French Revolution, too soon to
1413 tell.</para>
1414
1415 </section>
1416 <section>
1417 <title>About the Author</title>
1418
1419 <para>Eben Moglen is Professor of Law &amp; Legal History, Columbia Law School.
1420 E-mail: <ulink url="mailto:moglen@columbia.edu">Mail: moglen@columbia.edu</ulink></para>
1421
1422 <para>Acknowledgments</para>
1423
1424 <para>This paper was prepared for delivery at the Buchmann
1425 International Conference on Law, Technology and Information, at Tel
1426 Aviv University, May 1999; my thanks to the organizers for their kind
1427 invitation. I owe much as always to Pamela Karlan for her insight and
1428 encouragement. I especially wish to thank the programmers throughout
1429 the world who made free software possible.</para>
1430
1431
1432 <blockquote>
1433 <para>
1434 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/contents.gif" alt="Contents" align="bottom" border="0">--></ulink> </para>
1435 <para>
1436 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/index.gif" alt="Index" border="0">--></ulink>
1437 </para>
1438 <para>Copyright <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/copy.html">©</ulink> 1999, First Monday</para></blockquote>
1439
1440
1441 </section>
1442</article>
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